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Abstract 
In this thesis, I argue that Descartes' method of doubt not only reveals the 
Meditator's very conception or understanding of certainty but, furthermore, that this 
particular grasp of certainty is not fully satisfied by the first principle - the existence of 
Thought- but rather by his knowledge of God's existence. The underlying scientific 
endeavor taken by Descartes expresses that what the Meditator is ultimately after is 
external ontological truth - the ontological reality of some thing in the empirical domain 
of the sciences. Before actually reaching that domain, per se, the Meditator must first 
understand the very possibility of Certainty with respect to something external to him; 
something external to thought 
The Cogito - as the first principle to emerge from the limitations of metaphy ical 
doubt- functions primarily to establish the 'thinking' and 'knowing' subject as the 
necessary condition for there being any knowledge to begin with. The possibility of 
external certainty itself is only instantiated through our knowledge of something other 
than and external to the Thinking Self-- God's existence. Knowledge of God is the first 
piece of knowledge proper we are certain of, for it is the first moment ofbridging an idea 
to its purported object outside of thinking. Knowledge of God's existence brings to life 
the conception of certainty concerning the existence of something external to self, for it 
shows that, at the very least, such a conception is concretely realizable. 
II 
Introduction 
While the encyclopedia of scholarship on the 'Meditations' has offered an anay 
of critiques, and detailed analyses ofDescartes' actual method of doubt as well as the 
proofs for his existence in the Second and Third Meditations, most arguments have not 
explicitly explored the effects that knowledge of Self and knowledge of God each have 
on the Mediator's very understanding of what certainty for him entails. The literature, 
naturally, has taken the approach of looking at Self and God primarily as actual particular 
certainties. While they most certainly are instantiations of certainty, they are much more 
than that; they have a particular function within the Meditator's overall conception of 
certainty and, more specifically, his conception of certainty with regard to the external 
world which stands at the very core of his underlying enterprise - grounding science and 
thus the empirical world, on something 'firm and lasting'. 
In the following work I first examine the unfolding of the Meditator' s conception 
of certainty, as expressed in the First Meditation. I engage in a reading which sees the 
goal of the Meditation as not only a pursuit for a particular instantiation of certainty, but 
rather, a clarification ofthe very meaning of certainty that the Meditator will adopt. At 
each stage of his method of doubt the Mediator not only 'casts doubt' but, in doing so he 
continuously makes it clearer to us, albeit implicitly, what cetiainty ultimately entails for 
him. Once this reading of the Meditations is established, my main goal is then to proceed 
to examine the two instantiated ontological apodictic truths the Meditator arrives at -
knowledge of the existence ofThought and knowledge of the existence of God - as they 
stand in relation to the criteria laid out by the First Meditation. That is to say, how and 
where do these 'instantiated' certainties fit within the overall conception of certainty laid 
out by the First Meditation. 
The Problem: The Meditator's conception of Certainty 
One of the important, implicit and hidden features of the Meditations' quest for 
certainty is that Meditator himself does not lay out a working definition of certainty 
proper, that is to say, one tated explicitly by the Meditator. The Meditator himself tells 
us that he will cast aside all things which allow for even the slightest bit of doubt until he 
finds that one unshakable truth or certainty. The immediate goal of his method appears to 
be clear; pushing skepticism of one's beliefs and ideas, to the limit - the point at which 
doubt is no longer possible. Yet what does this entail at the beginning of the endeavor? 
What exactly it is that constitutes ce1tainty for the Meditator, specifically within the 
framework of this pre ent meditative enterprise, is not stated at the very onset of his 
approach. Rather, what certainty means to the Meditator only becomes clear as we move 
through the development of the Method of Doubt employed in the First Meditation. It is 
only once the Method has fully unfolded that we can truly see what the Meditator is after. 
The apparent ambiguity of the Meditator's initial stance has been pointed to by 
many scholars, and most notably stressed by Harry Frankfurt.' How can the very pursuit 
of the Meditations even commence unless the Meditator has some pre-established 
awareness or conception of what certainty entails? Some mainstream interpretations2 
have approached this issue, appealing to the technical side of Descartes ' own conception 
1 See Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in Descartes's Meditations. 
Chapter II 
See for example, Cottingham, Descartes, Chapters I-ll. 
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of certainty and truth. These approaches focus on the previous more scientific works, 
mainly the 'Regulae', where the philosopher has offered a model of certainty which rests 
on mathematical knowing and indubitability. Taking the position that for Descartes, the 
scientist, certainty was equated with a state or condition of 'knowing' that was parallel to 
mathematical certainty - that which the mind grasps absolutely clearly and di tinctly and 
which cannot coherently be doubted- such approaches then, ultimately suggest that the 
Meditator all along has in mind, internal indubitability as the meaning of certainty. 
What we have here then is a folding of the pursuit of certainty towards a purely 
internal intuitive self-given awareness. Certainty appeals only to a mental state, an 
epistemological- psychological condition, where epistemological dissent or 
disagreements are not coherent options. This is of course at the heart of mathematics and 
may very well have reflected Descartes' own methodological conception of certainty, but 
clearly as we proceed through the method of doubt we see this is not what the Meditator 
himself is ultimately after. 
As we examine the different facets of the Method of Doubt we note that that the 
point of indubitability the Meditator is seeking is not merely that which is 
psychologically indubitable- as is the case with self-evident, mathematical, truths and 
other moments of pure intuition- but also the externally indubitable. The Eternal Truths 
of mathematics and other pure (clear and distinct) truths are understood by the Meditator 
as internally irrefutable and indubitable certainties and as such he never doubts their 
validity as long as he reflects upon them. In many aspects, mathematical ceriainty in fact 
represents for Descartes a model or archetype of self-given clarity. Yet what the Method 
of Doubt ultimately shows us, is that the validity of mathematical truths rests in the fact 
3 
that they are indubitable in thought but do not necessarily posses any external-ontological 
reality. That is to say, they are undeniable truths when we contemplate them in thought, 
but, their reality outside of mind, their external existence in a mind-independent 
ontological reality is what the Meditator is ultimately after. 
The Demon Hypothesis and the move towards hyperbolic doubt shows us that 
what the Meditator himself wants is internal self-givenness coupled with, actual external 
certainty. It is not sufficient that these truths are self-evident to reason, we want them to 
be true in the 'externally-real' sense. The Certainty he is looking for is not only 
knowledge of the internally indubitable but of something external and concretely real - in 
short it is knowledge that is clear and distinct as well as ontologically and concretely real. 
That is not to say that mathematical certainties are any less real but, rather, their actual 
existence is only given within thought and not the external world, whereas what the 
Meditator is after is actual external existence. 
Focusing only the internal certainty does not give the Meditator's own external 
endeavor the same level of urgency that it deserves, and thus reduce certainty to that 
which is clear and distinct and, not, that which i clear , distinct, and is in fact about a 
non-mental reality. While such 'historical-context' commentators recognize the 
movement towards externality, the strong focus on Descartes' mathematical-driven 
rationalism at times appear to reduce the initial stage of the Meditations to a type of 
defense of rational intuition. This, I believe, only gives us Descartes, and not De cartes a 
the Meditator. Since Descartes' own epistemological and metaphysical conceptions 
constantly make their way to the writings of the supposedly detached Meditator, it is 
crucial, as Broughton, Markie, Carriero and many other scholars have stressed, that the 
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entire meditative nature of the work requires that we primarily focus on the metaphysical 
approach that the Meditator himself engages in. Not the philosopher, but the detached 
Meditator. This is especially the case with respect to the pursuit for certainty. 3 
The meaning of certainty itself is understood and derived through a discovery or 
instantiation of our knowledge of that which must necessarily exist - not in thought alone 
but in an external non-mental sphere. That which he can know to be necessarily existent 
is what, epistemologically, grounds the very meaning of certainty in a concrete sense -
the actual existence of something, not conceptually, but actually. The movements of the 
method of doubt suggest that for the Meditator the pursuit of certainty is rooted not in 
pure mental indubitability but rather an external-ontological one. Thus the different 
stages of doubt reveal that, he is not after indubitability alone but, rather, truth, in the 
strictest ontological external meaning of the word; truth as correspondence to an external 
world. 
The First Meditation, has received its fair share of attention from scholars, yet one 
of the penneating tendencies in the different analyses is a fairly particular focus on the 
intentional objects of Descartes own brand of skepticism.4 That is to say, it has mainly 
concentrated on what the skepticism involved is targeting; namely, first the empirical 
domain of the senses and then, the internal domain of intuitive self-evident mathematical 
truths. Naturally then, the tendency has been to focus on the Meditator's quest for a 
Descartes of course does not always make this easy or even possible. Thus placing the Meditator's 
approach in relation to Descartes' own intellectual stance on various issues is plainly inevitable. That 
being said, the overall enterprise as laid out by the first Meditation exhibits the possibility and, I 
believe, the necessity of separating the two. 
4 See for example approach taken by Martial Gueroult in Descartes' Philosophy i nterpreted According to 
the Order ofReasons. Though Gueroult attention and exegesis of the Method of Doubt is second to 
none, as with many other scholars, the focus is strictly directed at that which is being doubted and not 
what lies behind the method insofar as it helps the Meditator clarify and come to tem1s with what 
certainty actually means for him. 
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particular instantiation of certainty. This is, after all in line with Descartes' own 
development of the method. Yet, an examination of the First Meditation directed solely 
towards the end result of the Meditator's method of doubt, always leads us to affirm that 
nothing positive has been gained by his endeavor. The Meditator in fact himself tells us 
in the opening paragraphs of the ensuing Meditation that, all is lost, and the only thing 
that can be affirmed is that nothing is actually certain. 
While this is indeed the gloomy situation the Meditator finds himself in as his 
method reaches its zenith, the entire meditative process of doubt has nevertheless given 
us a clearer description of what certainty actually means to him. In the very process of his 
repeated failure to eliminate and overcome doubt, lies implicitly an expression of the very 
meaning of certainty. Onto logically empty handed as our solitary Meditator may be once 
the Meditation has reached its peak- with the Demon Hypothesis casting doubt on all 
spheres of knowledge- the radical deception at least allows us, the readers, to see the 
extemal dimension of the Meditator's grasp of certainty; certainty with respect to extemal 
ontological truth. 
In this respect, we should, I suggest, engage in a reading of the First Meditation 
which allows us to see not only the inherent nihilistic conclusions of the Meditator's 
skepticism but rather what these very conclusions reveal about his overall conception of 
certainty. When we peel the layers of the method of doubt we see the direction it takes us 
towards; a coherent and definitive conception of certainty with regard to the extemal 
world, regardless of the fact his conclusions thus far suggest that such conception can 
never be met. His failure to overcome doubt, at the very least, allows us to grasp more 
definitively what the Meditator is after in his pursuit of certainty. Reading the First 
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Meditation in this way allows us to move beyond the relentless skepticism and see its 
positive outcome. 
It is indeed possible to see that, the issue of whether he has armed himself with 
that particular 'external' definition of certainty from the very onset of the Meditation or, 
rather comes to know or understand what certainty is via the process of doubt, becomes a 
peripheral issue within a strict adherence to the text alone. For us, the reader , it is only 
at the end of the process of doubt and its inherent movements that we can fully know 
what the Meditator ultimately wants - truth, in the external ontological sense; knowledge 
of the being and existence of something. 
Within the order of discovery inherent to the Meditation itself, if we stick to the 
Meditator's words alone, we cannot clearly know what his pursuit for certainty entails 
until the Meditation has fully unfolded and, thus, I believe it should be read in such a 
revelatory manner - at least with respect to certainty. The movement of the Meditation 
may suggest that it is only natural for us readers to suppose that the Meditator must have 
had this or some other conception of certainty from the very beginning of the endeavor. 
While it may very well be the case that what certainty means is already presupposed by 
the Meditator, in so readily accepting this position, much of the literature has not looked 
at the very completion of the process of doubt as revealing the Meditator's conception of 
certainty. 5 
Thus, in the first part of this discussion, [ offer a technical examination of the 
different facets of the Method of Doubt which is, for the most part, in conforn1ity with 
5 My position here offers mere ly an interpretive theoretical approach on how to read the overall tone of 
the First Meditation. T here is no reason, to assume that Descartes had actually intended for the 
Meditation to express the Meditator 's very understanding of the concept or notion of Certainty itself. 
Neverthe less, as implicit or even unintentional as it may be, it is the goal of the present the is to stress 
the important of reading the First Meditation in such manner. 
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various traditional interpretations, yet my ultimate goal is to show how those facets, at 
each stage bring us closer to grasping the direction the Meditator is heading towards, in 
his own understanding of certainty. While such a reading is, I hold, valuable to any 
analysis of the First Meditation, it is my aim to show that its true significance comes to 
light when examined in relation to the arguments of the Second and Third Meditation -
the existence of Thought and God. 
Seeing the First Meditation as implicitly revealing the Meditator's conception of 
certainty, opens the door, I believe, to a new way of looking at the core discoveries of the 
two ensuing Meditations - the existence of Thought and the existence of God. By not 
explicitly engaging in this kind of reading, the abundant scholarship pertaining to Cogito 
and God - regardless of its immense scope and breadth - has overlooked the dynamic 
between knowledge of the existence of these truths and the Meditator's own 
understanding of the meaning of external certainty. 
The Problem: The Meaning of Certainty and the Knowledge of Thought and God. 
The traditional approaches of the scholarly literature pertaining to the arguments 
on the existence of God and Cogito - regardless of their specific themes or concerns -
have all treated the Meditator's discoveries as particular moments or instantiations of 
actual certainty. In treating them as such, the scholarly focus, hi torically, has mainly 
concentrated on a technical analysis of Descartes' actual method of arriving at these 
truths; examining the structure of the proofs, questioning their validity, their actual 
meaning, etc. 6 Through dissecting both his methods and conclusions, much attention has 
6 See for example Bemard Williams' approach to the Meditator's knowledge of God in Descartes: The 
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been given to clarifying what exactly the Meditator believes he has discovered. These 
approaches are both valuable and necessary in the process of learning the development of 
the Meditator's argument, yet what is lacking in the literature, is not only seeing how and 
through what means the Meditator proves the existence of Thought and God, but the 
meaning and significance of these proofs to both the criteria necessary for an 
understanding of certainty and the manner in which Descartes wants to apply it to his 
overall enterprise. 
What is ultimately revealed to us at the end of the First Mediation are the criteria 
necessary not only for understanding the meaning of certainty, in the conceptual sense, 
but also where Descartes wants to direct this conception. With respect to the former, 
Certainty for the Meditator, in the most immediate self-given manner, can be defined as 
knowledge of some ontological truth - - knowledge of the existence or being of some 
'thing'. When we look at the overall scope of the Meditator's method of doubt we see that 
his conception of certainty is one which he clearly aims to apply to the 'external' realm, 
the world outside of the subject. His focus is not merely internal indubitability but 
external knowledge. The Meditator wants to know that his hands are externally real, that 
the images he sees are externally real , that the eternal truths of mathematics and physics 
are externally real. Their indubitable givenness in mind is not a sufficient or even 
adequate description ofhis quest for certainty. Approaching the arguments of the Second 
and Third Meditation from this perspective, I examine the manner in which knowledge of 
Thought and knowledge of God, each allow for the realizability of the understanding of 
certainty proper. More specifically, I shall argue that each argument offers the Meditator 
Proj ect of Pure Enqui1y Chapter V, or Anthony Kenny's discussion in Chapter VI of Descartes: A 
Study of His Philosophy . 
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its own set of implications within the pursuit for grounding and understanding certainty 
in its full sense. 
My overall conclusion is that, it is only through knowledge of the existence of 
God - as an ontologically real thing whose existence is outside or external to the self or 
to 'thought' - that the realizability of Descartes' full or complete conception of certainty 
becomes instantiated. In other words, it is knowledge of God's existence that makes the 
possibility of external certainty actualized. On the other hand, the Cogito argument -
knowledge of the existence of thought or thinking - also provides him with an 
instantiation of the criterion necessary for the understanding of certainty but only in its 
most basic rudimentary sense which, I believe, is not compatible with an understanding 
of certainty as it applies to anything other than the existence of self. 
With respect to the Cogito, in giving him an awareness of a necessary ontological 
truth - the being or existence of 'some' thing in reality - his immediate conception of 
certainty comes to life. If being certain, as I believe the First Meditation affirms, is not 
only a psychological-mental disposition, akin to our awareness of mathematical truths, 
but is rather a knowledge or an awareness of something that has its own independent 
being, in reality, then knowledge of the existence of a Res Cogitans most emphatically 
gives the Meditator a concrete instantiation of such certainty. It is knowledge ofthe 
existence of a thing - namely Thought, or a thinking thing in reality, and not just an idea 
or, as he calls it, a mode of thought. fn transcending hyperbolic doubt, the crite1ia 
necessary for a remedial understanding of ce1iainty has been met. 
While this grounds or instantiates an understanding of certainty as knowledge of 
that which exists, the limited ontology of the said existent thing - Thought - and its utter 
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difference and metaphysical separateness from the 'outer' external world, constricts the 
applicability of this conception of certainty. In the richer and fuller sense of his pursuit 
for certainty the Meditator does not merely want to be aware of the being of the objects 
of his thinking as mere ideas or modes of thought, he wants to be certain of the objects of 
his thought, as things which are indeed other than and external to thought; that is to say, 
their ontological being is other than the being of thought. 7 He wants the things which his 
ideas are purportedly about to refer to actual things and not thought alone. The Cogito 
argument, [ hold, only allows him to understand certainty with respect to the being of 
thought since for Descartes, the substance of thought shares no ontological resemblance 
to anything other than thought.8 To have an understanding of certainty that pertains to 
such externality, the Meditator needs to bridge the internal domain of his ideas and an 
awareness of the existence of something other than Thought. This he accomplishes with 
knowledge of God's existence. 
By moving from the idea of God, to God per se, onto logically separate from 
mind, the Meditator has the first moment of certainty in terms of linking Thought to an 
external 'other-than-thought' realm. Though God is of an utterly distinct ontological 
nature than the rest of the objects ofhis thought, which predominantly deal with 
corporeal things, since it is the first moment of knowing the existence of something other 
than thought it can be seen as a necessary precursor for materializing his conception of 
certainty that is to be directed to the empirical world. Whereas the Cogito proof, serves to 
7 Whether this refers to a corporeal extended being or of some other ontological essence is only 
secondary to the fact that they are things which are other than self, other than thought. 
This distinction is echoed in the Sixth Meditation and more emphatically throughout The Passions of 
the Soul where Descartes draws a sharp ontologica l separation of mind and body. Though invariably 
linked the two are ontologically distinct in uch way that ontologically they share nothing in common; 
there is nothing belonging to body which also belongs to thought or vice versa. See CSM I, 328-329 
I I 
realize or materialize his immediate understanding of certainty as it pertains to ' thought 
alone', knowledge of God's existence makes his conception of certainty - as directed 
towards the extemal world - more concrete. 
I thus see the argument for God's existence as a precursor to gaining the world 
back. Knowing that God exists, grounds the very possibility of extemal certainty, without 
which, a regaining of the corporeal world would have no meaning for the Meditator. The 
historical scholarship has commented extensively on God as a guarantor of the fact that 
our knowledge of the world actually corresponds to that world.9 While this is most 
certainly the case as we move forward in the Meditation, what I would like to stress on 
the other hand is the earlier function which knowledge of God represents. Before he can 
know that the world is actually as he perceives it - when free of error - the Meditator 
needs to see the very possibility of extemal certainty materialized, that is to say, certainty 
about something other than Thought. Merely knowing that God exists at this point does 
not, guarantee that the Meditator's knowledge of the extemal world is true, but it does, I 
maintain, at the very least open the possibility for understanding that sphere of 
knowledge as potentially true since now he has an actual instantiation of something 
extemal. In the broad sense of the Meditations as a whole then, we can say that 
knowledge of God both gives the Meditator an understanding of the meaning of extemal 
certainty in general, as well as a more concrete specific guarantee of validity of my his 
actual knowledge of things in the world. The former is established by the end of the Third 
Meditation while the latter, by the end of the Sixth. 
Descartes reveals through his work not only the pursuit for the certain and true, 
9 See Martial Gueroult, Descartes' Philosophy Interpreted According to the Order of Reasons. Chapter V 
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but also his desire to know the criteria through which certainty can be grasped by the 
thinking self. What is more, by contemplating these criteria, Descartes concludes that it is 
only in and through a singular instantiation of a unity of the conceptual (the mental) to 
the externally-objective existent, that the understanding of certainty becomes complete. 
Finally, and most importantly, the comparative analysis of the nature of Ideas in general 
to the nature of the idea of God, reveals that it is our awareness of God's existence which 
represents that exact singular moment of the conceptual-concrete unity. 
In order to develop my position I will be following the text and looking at the 
movement and progression of Descartes' own stance from the First to Third Meditations. 
I begin by looking at the Method of Doubt. I will here hope to show how the different 
facets or stages of doubt, taken together, show the reader, the type of certainty that 
Descartes is ultimately after with respect to his overall goals. 10 I then proceed to look at 
the emergence of the Cogito - the necessary affirmation of a real existent res cogitans -
as it follows from the inevitable limitations of radical doubt. My argument will focus on 
showing that the Cogito argument, in so far as certainty is concerned, is a first and 
necessary step for there to be any epistemology whatsoever, by positing the necessary 
criteria for the possibility of knowledge in general - that is to say, by positing Thought. 
Yet with respect to knowledge proper, knowledge of the existence of Thought will not 
suffice; what Descartes ultimately wants is to establish the truth regarding the external 
reality of our particular thoughts, in so far as their repre entational objects are concerned. 
As the move from idea to external reality is only accomplished when we look at 
the idea of God, I examine the Third Meditation, first elaborating on Descartes doctrine 
10 Though this does not become more fully honed until the end of the Second or beginning of Third 
Meditation, the external dimension to the certainty Descartes is after is already affirmed by the 
conditions of doubt laid out in the First Meditation. 
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of ideas in general, and then focus on the uniqueness of the idea of God. 11 By appealing 
to Descartes' metaphysical stance on Causality and the manner in which he uses it to 
move from an idea of a thing to that thing itself, I argue that it is this knowledge which 
serves as the archetype for the psychological foundation of comprehending the meaning 
of certainty as it relate to all other ideas about the external world . In arriving at 
knowledge of God' necessary existence, the Meditator obtains an understanding of what 
certainty about our thoughts in general implies, in so far as our thoughts are about things 
which are taken to be, ontologically, external objects - objects which are other than 
thought. 
11 The underlying current of my argument regarding knowledge of God's existence i focused particularly 
on the manner in which this knowledge is arrived at in the Third Meditation and not the Fi fth. T he 
overall concern and movement of the Third Meditation is what reveals the implications of knowledge of 
God's existence to the Meditator's conception o f Certainty. The causal arguments of the Third 
Meditation are all rooted in linking the inner world o f ideas (thoughts) to some external correspondence 
based not on mere conceptuality but on actual onto logical external necessity. The Fifth Meditation 
however, in following the traditional onto logical argument structure, is a conceptual proof- knowledge 
of God's existence i ba ed on the fac t that the idea of God is an idea of a thing which itself cannot be 
conceived as other than existing. The proof is anchored on tl1e very 'mathematical-pure intuit ion-like' 
rationalist o f certainty that I believe the Meditator want to move away from in his initial pur uit. A 
detailed comparative analysis on the difference between the two Meditations to my overall thesis, 
would be fascinating in its own right, but is beyond the scope of my present argument and hence I 
merely clarify here my focusing on the Third specifically. 
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Chapter 1: Doubt and The Senses 
1.1/ntro 
In his methodological work, The Regulae Descartes had laid out strict rules and 
methods which were seen as steps in our pursuit of proper scientific discovery. 12 The 
rules laid out were seen as tools necessary for the proper direction of the mind on its 
ascent towards truth and discovery, in such way that it is to be free of technical and 
methodological error. While such rules would lead us towards true discoveries in the 
world of scientific exploration, Descartes nevertheless noted an inherent limitation to 
these rules. What is lacking in science and mathematics, even in the most rigorous and 
methodical application, is a ground of absolute certainty itself- not in the method of 
adequately directing our minds towards truths out there in the world but rather the very 
grounding of certainty and truth itself. The rules, by limiting the possibility of en·or, 
allow us to arrive at real and certain knowledge but they do not give us that initial 
moment that serves as the very defining and grounding of certainty and truth proper. 
What is missing then is not the process of arriving at particular truths but an original first 
'truth' upon which science, in its pursuit for particular 'truths', can rest. For this 
endeavor, Descartes turns to metaphysics. 
Descartes understood that for epistemology to be complete, the certainty upon 
which we can model our knowledge of the world in general must come not from 
empirical knowledge but through a rigorous metaphysical investigation regarding 
certainty proper. The Meditator, engaging in radical doubt, ultimately aims to find that 
12 See Rules .for the Directions of the Mind, CSM I, 9-76 
15 
one thing, concept, notion, idea (etc) whose existence is so apodictically and completely 
undeniable that it will serve as a grounding principle for the very meaning of certainty. 
In being free of any previously conceived beliefs, ifhe can arrive at an awareness or 
knowledge of the necessary existence of something he will find the first principle which 
will then serve as the ground for the conceivability of certainty as itself realizable. The 
Mediator's quest is, in a sense, twofold, finding that which transcends any possible doubt, 
no matter how extreme this doubt may be and, more importantly, once this is 
accomplished possessing an absolute model or type of certainty that will allow him to 
understand particular moments of certainty in the sciences once he obtains them. 
The technical approach of the Cartesian project in the Meditations is explicitly 
stated from the very onset of the First Meditation. In order truly to build a foundation for 
all knowledge we must start with that which is absolutely certain. Descartes affinns that 
in order for him to arrive philosophically at any indubitable first principles it is essential 
to, first and foremost, suspend all be11ef in what he had come to accept as absolutely true, 
and place it under the rigorous scrutiny of his Method of Doubt. In examining the method 
of doubt in general, it is essential to understand both the initial starting point of the 
Meditator, as well as the overall scope of his meditative approach. The starting point is 
the continuously growing process of doubting the things that the Meditator has 'up to 
now taken for granted' as absolutely certain. What lies beneath this process and is, I hold, 
the ultimate goal of the First Meditation is the discovery of the very meaning of certainty. 
In this chapter I would like to examine the general assumption and development of 
Descartes' Method of Doubt in relation to the sensed corporeal world. I will hope to show 




The argument begins with the Meditator claiming that he wants to examine 
whether these ideas he had always considered to be real and true, are in fact susceptible 
to particular criteria that will render them doubtful. His approach from the very onset 
reveals that he may not, as Frankfurt at times argues, have specific criteria for certainty 
but is rather working his way towards such criteria by attempting to eliminate and 
transcend any aspects which can render them dubitable. The project, seeking absolute 
certainty, starts negatively - the Meditator does not elaborate on why the ideas he wants 
to inspect and scrutinize have been so readily accepted by him as true but, rather, looks at 
possible criteria for their fallacious nature. It is at the heart of the Meditation here to 
express what the Meditator is looking for in the pursuit for certainty. By following his 
constantly developing and expanding criteria for doubt, we come closer and closer to 
seeing why the Meditator believes certain types of beliefs are assumed or supposed to be 
true. The method he employs is thus aimed at reaching a conception of certainty that will 
be defined and understood in relation to the transcending of all pos ible crite1ia of doubt. 
In order to facilitate the immense task of emptying all his beliefs, Descartes 
maintains that there is clearly no need to give examples of all opinions or ideas which are 
to be doubted and demolished; rather he groups all that can be known in the two 
categories of possible knowledge- a) derived either from or through the senses and, b) 
the purely mathematical and logical ideas we have about simple natures, independent of 
13 With respect to the Method of Doubt, my aim is to examine the implications of its conclusions to the 
quest for certainty and not to defend or dismiss, as many have, the validity of commencing the search 
for certainty with skepticism. This is indeed a very rich topic, but one that, is far beyond the scope of 
my present argument. As we fo llow the progression of the First Meditation, we note that the pursuit for 
truth and certainty was to unfold through the rigorous discovery of the metaphysical and 
epistemological limitations of doubt, and thus the proj ect must ultimately commence with the skeptical 
approach. 
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an external corporeal world.14 The approach of the Meditator sugge ts that all knowledge 
falls into these two categories and that, taken together, they do in fact represent all that 
can be known. Knowledge is either of a perceived sensory kind or of an internal, logical, 
mathematical kind. 
With respect to this division of all knowledge into these two categories, 
Descartes' skeptical attack was truly intended to be all-embracing; if any idea can be 
shown as dubitable or fallacious, then the entire category to which the idea belongs must 
be accepted as uncertain. 15 Any piece of 'knowledge', which satisfies even the slightest 
criteria for doubt, will place the entire category to which it belongs - either sensory or 
purely rationally intuitive - on shaky grounds and, in fact, as he tells us, will be treated 
with the same degree of skepticism as that which we have regarding things that are 
plainly false. The Meditator affirms, "I should hold back my assent from opinions which 
are not completely certain and indubitable j ust as carefull y as I do from those which are 
patently false. So, for the purpose of rejecting all my opinions, it will be enough that I 
find in them at least some reason of doubt." 16 
Objections have naturally been raised regarding this radical approach of rejecting 
an entire category of knowledge if just one of its constituents expresses the potential to be 
14 This includes all knowledge based on the synthesis of perceived concepts into abstract and imagined 
concepts as well a emotional qualities or properties, abstract entities, etc. Descartes, does not go to 
great length to offer concrete examples of these until the Sixth Meditation, yet presently one can see 
that as the Meditation progresses, such examples are not particularly necessary. 
15 Since, again, we are not given the criteria for certainty, we set out to weed any uncertainties from these 
two epistemological groups based on the different criteria of doubt; criteria which become more and 
more honed throughout the Meditation. 
16 John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (trans.), The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes, Volume II (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 12. Future references, to be 
cited throughout as [CSM/Vol/Page]. 
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false. 17 Anthony Kenny asks," ... why should the fact that I have some false beliefs 
prevent me from being certain about any ... Can none of my beliefs be certain unless all 
are certain?" 18 This is indeed a valid objection, for even if a group of ideas all belong to 
one category or set, an investigation into their falsehood or truth could be carried out on a 
case-by-case basis. While Descartes does not, sadly, clarify his approach here from the 
onset, a careful reading shows that his critique focuses not on individual beliefs but, 
rather, on the nature of the entire set - that is to say on the basis of any ' common 
properties' of its constituents. 
If a particular attribute or characteristic of an idea or belief belongs to all 
members of the set to which that idea belongs, then the entire category can never be 
considered as certain, so long as that attribute is itself fallacious. If a salient character or 
property, say 'Y', belongs, or could belong, to 'all' the particular constituents of category 
'X', and 'Y' is itself shown to be false or doubtful , then regardless of their other 
properties, these constituents can be taken as false by simple deduction. So it is not the 
case that a single false belief makes the set to which it belong false simp I y because it -
the single belief- is false but, rather, Descartes is looking at certain characteristic of the 
entire domain which belong to all it its 'particulars' or constituents. His examination, in 
respect to both the sense based knowledge and eternal truths of mathematics, implicitly 
suggests that his skepticism towards them is based on what he sees as the 'common 
ground' of all the individual elements of each category. To answer Kenny's objection 
17 Elsewhere Descartes makes his rather infamous analogy between a false idea and a single bad apple 
amongst a batch of good ones - Just as the rotten apple can ruin the entire lot, so, claims Descartes, a 
false idea renders the entire category to which it belongs, as doubtful. See Seventh Replies [CSM n, 
324] 
18 Anthony Kenny, Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy, (New York: Garland, 1968), 19. 
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then, while Descartes may give us the impression that 'none of my beliefs are certain 
unless they are all certain' his actual approach is that 'none of my beliefs are certain 
unless the features which belongs to all of them are certain'. 19 
1.2 The Deceptive Nature of the Senses: 
1.2(a) The Historical Context 
The Meditator naturally begins his journey with knowledge gained from the 
senses. He tells us that that he will begin by looking at "the basic principles on which all 
my former beliefs rested"20 and thus it is only fitting that he starts with the concrete 
perceived world as opposed to mathematics.2 1 While the latter contains a much higher 
degree of self-given intuitive certainty than sense-based knowledge, (to be discussed in 
detail later), it is less immediate then knowledge derived from everyday experience. 
The first issue we face when confronting the senses, is to note what they are for Descartes 
and how significant a role they play within the Cartesian system of knowledge as a 
19 In the Sciences (and in every day judgment for that matter) not only do we eventually assent, out of 
practical necessity, to truths that are at least very probable even if the s lightest bit o f doubt can be cast 
upon them, we are not necessitated to throw out an entire body of knowledge because one of its 
members is false. This systematic approach of dealing with an entire category o f knowledge as opposed 
to individual constituents, on the premise of certain univer a lly applicable attributes or properties, 
reveals a metaphysical guidance or approach which is no t found the in the rules of the Regulae. See 
CSM I, 9-76 
2° CSM II 12. 
2 1 I believe that starting with perception based knowledge is indeed the correct approach; mathematical 
and syllogistic truths such are, in a sense, secondary in their temporal givenness to us. It is the perceived 
and sensed world that we are most immediate ly aware of, and thus the basic truths we form from this 
immediate awareness, are more connected to our daily experience. Matl1ematical truths, while of a 
more pure intuitive nature are - at least from the vantage po int of the detached Meditator - separate, 
dis tinct and even distant from the composite world about which we fonn the bulk of our knowledge. 
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whole. The importance of sense-based knowledge within the broader spectrum of 
Descartes' epistemology as a scientist can never be underestimated, regardless of the 
ruthless treatment they receive in the First Meditation. Scientific knowledge (and, 
knowledge in general for that matter) in its reliance and appeals to observation begins 
with sense-based knowledge. The Meditator commences by claiming that "Whatever I 
have up till now accepted as most true, I have acquired either from the senses or through 
the senses"22 The senses are the vehicle through which we are immediately given 
knowledge of the corporeal perceived world around us. 
Descartes' ensuing radical attack on the senses is well known by students and 
scholars alike yet what is at times overlooked is the historical context in which it is 
situated, specifically, in the context of Descartes' contempt for the Aristotelian 
epistemology embedded in the Scholastic philosophy ofhis time.23 A question or an 
issue which has often been raised, recently by Broughton, is the identity of the Meditator 
whom Descartes wants us readers to join along on a meditative joumey.Z4 The issue of 
the supposed identity of the Meditator, finds its first niche here; the critique of the senses 
as the source for and, instantiation of, certainty. In his critique of the senses, is the 
Meditator taking the persona of Descartes himself, the brilliant mathematician, scientist 
and scholar, who is very well versed in the history of a Scholastic philosophy which he 
wished to challenge and revolutionize? Or, alternately, is it Descartes brought down to 
the bare bones intellectual level of the common individual- the lay person who, in 
22 CSM II 12. 
23 A detailed look at De cartes' critique of what he saw as the Aristotelian dimension to the cholastic 
philosophy of his time is, far beyond the scope of my current endeavor. I merely want to present it here 
as the background to the Meditator's approach. 
24 See Janet Broughton, Descartes' Method of Doubt, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 
22-26. 
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seeking the grounds and criteria for certainty in his knowledge of the world, questions the 
validity of the senses?25 
There is an inevitable complementarity in the two positions here, I believe. On the 
one hand Descartes was most certainly appealing to the Scholastics whom he wanted to 
free from what he saw as the shackles of the ' tired old way' of thinking about the senses 
in epistemology. At the same time the relentless critique of the senses which sat at the 
heart ofhis entire approach was also to be understood as a necessary step for any 
intellectually inclined seeker oftruth reading his work. The complementarity of the two 
sides here is this: Descartes' contempt for the 'common-sense' Aristotelianism. In the 
scholarly literature examining Descartes conception of the scholastic philosophy of his 
time, much attention has been given to the issue of sense-based knowledge. Gary 
Hatfield and Dan Garber for example, argue that Descartes saw scholastic philosophy as 
inheriting from Aristotle - via Aquinas - a strict empiricism which reflected a 'common-
sense' approach that accepted all knowledge as sense-based. Things known in the intellect 
are reflections of empirical properties and qualities out there waiting to be grasped by the 
intellect. 26 
Commentators often note how for Descartes, the Scholastics had mirrored in their 
epistemology the standpoint of common sense as naturally adopted by the 'average 
person'. In so far as what constitutes a ground for certainty, the Scholastic thinker held 
25 This question is in fact relevant to most, if not all, aspects of the M editations and, l will continuously 
point out particular arguments where the di tinction between the Meditator' stance and Descartes' 
own world view must be stressed for the sake of consistency and commitment to the philosophical 
method at hand - - presupposing nothing as true unless it is apodictically indubitable. 
26 In fact, even more transcendent and metaphysical truths which are not immediately and tangibly 'out 
there', so to speak, were to be though as ones merely abstracted from other empirica l and tangible 
knowledge. 
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the common-sense empiricist approach - at its heart lay an epistemology that accepts the 
givenness and immediacy of our 'perceived' world as its foundations. 
Hatfield holds that, 
.. . it was by shifting the status of the enses as source of knowledge that 
Descartes effected his attack on Scholastic Aristotleanism .... at the core of 
the Aristotelian conception of the knower lay a sense-based epistemology 
which was distilled into the slogan nothing is in the intellect that was not 
first in the senses.27 
Linking this type of empiricist epistemology to De cartes' portrayal of it as 'common-
ense' , Dan Garber further adds, "Given Descarte ' conception of chola tic philosophy, 
it is not difficult to see why he often links the errors of Scholastici m with the errors of 
common sen e . . . the scholastic world, as Descartes understood it, is simply a 
metaphysical elaboration of the world of common sense."28 
either the Scholar nor the 'common person' can escape from the fact that they 
have been building their knowledge on a foundation that has, at its heart, a complete 
reliance on the enses. The Meditator then is the individual who for a long time has 
accepted the empiricist starting point as omni-present in all of her knowledge and is now 
seeking to question its validity. 
1.2(b) On Immediate Sensory-Deception 
Now, returning to the argument itself, we see that Descartes' immediate grounds 
27 Gary Hatfield, "The ense · and the Fleshless ye: The Meditations as Cognitive Exercises". In Essays 
on Descartes' Meditation , ed. by Amelie Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 46. 
2 Dan Garber, "Semel In Vita: The Scientific Background". In Essays on Descartes' Meditations, ed. by 
Amelie Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 88. 
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for placing the senses under doubt is that they are often deceptive and, according to his 
method, we cannot accept as certain anything that can be deceptive. He says," .... From 
time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust 
completely tho e who have deceived us even once."29 
The main goal of Descartes' initial argument is clear; since the senses can, and 
often do, deceive us, the plethora ofbelief: or ideas we have built upon what the senses 
have infonned us are based on possibly false sensations.30 Knowledge stemming from, or 
rooted upon sensory perception is dubious or at least possibly fa) e ince the en es in 
general can deceive us. Though, as is often objected, Descartes offers very little to 
explicitly clarify what is the nature of this 'deception', we note that what he i getting at 
here is physiological deception based on the bodily-physical character of the nature of 
sensation in general. Sen ation for Descartes has a dual character; on the one hand 
Descartes' philo ophy had completely internalized the act of sen ing to a mental state, to 
a state of thinking and, thus, when he later elaborates on the nature of Cogito as Thought, 
he includes ensing, feeling, etc.31 The seeing of the wax, the feeling of pain, the smell of 
the fire, these are all mental internalized activities - it is the mind that sees the wax and 
not the eye. On the other hand the sensory data which forms our ensation originates 
from our sense-organs. These are, o to speak, the vehicles that ground the very 
29 C M II 12. 
30 The concrete example he presently gives us of such a deception, is with respect to small objects or ones 
in the distance. It is at times objected that, Descartes did not focus on expanding and elaborating this 
issue, at least in so far as offering examples of sensory deception. One could maintain that it is not 
essentia l for De cartes to supply us as with great detail, for there are plenty of sense-deception 
occurrences that any reader will be well aware of. In his more scientific works, e.g. , Optics and Regulae 
Descartes does explicitly deals with this aspect more extensively. Yet, as l shall momentarily argue, 
further c larification is due here, in order to understand his rather rash move toward the other dimension 
of cognitive sense experience that is not usceptible to physical deception. 
31 This is expanded upon and with great detail in 'The Passions of the Sour. ee CSM l , 329-370 
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possibility of sensation, and it is thus here that the deception he speaks of in the initial 
stage of the First Meditation, takes form. It is the very mechanical physiological nature of 
the human eye, for example, that, under certain circumstances, it will yield inaccurate 
sensory data from which we form, internally, sensations that are in tum inaccurate. While 
it is the mind that ultimately turns the sensory data to a ' seeing-of-the wax' it is the eye 
that gives the mind that sensory data to begin with and, hence, inaccurate ense-datum 
will yield false thoughts. 
The initial argument on the deceptive nature of the senses thus gives us here the 
first grain of an expressed criterion of doubt. Yet, more importantly, in doing so it also 
gives us the first hint regarding what certainty means to the Meditator. As I had 
mentioned in my introduction, the Meditator's quest for certainty does not commence 
with an immediate clear description of what certainty means to him. He wants to doubt 
until he can be certain, but since he does not explicitly tell us what that psychological 
condition or state - being certain - actually mean, readers are left to extract it meaning 
by seeing the underlying thread of the method of doubt in its different applications and 
stages. In this initial 'sensory-deception' stage we get the first taste of what he is after -
external ontological truth. The doubt here is based on sensory-deception, but of what is 
this deception? Of the correspondence of our sensations - as mental thoughts about some 
'thing' - to the external ontological existence of that thing in reality; in the present case 
of sensation, the non-mental reality of the objects of our sensations. This, of cour e, later 
becomes the salient theme of the Third Meditation. When he says our senses deceive us 
he simply means, that they deceive us about the accuracy that what they portray 
corresponds to actual real existing objects, qualities, or properties in external reality, that 
25 
is to say, in the external world. To be certain, here, means that sensations give me a 
potirait of a mental reality that corresponds to an external non-mental one. 
Since the senses can be deceptive, this conception of certainty, as knowledge of 
the real and existent, cannot originate from the empirically sensed world. However, this 
criterion of skepticism based on the deceptive nature ofthe senses, notes the Meditator, is 
not all-encompassing in its scope. He immediately affirms that there are certain sense 
perceptions that we cannot call into doubt solely on the premise that the senses are often 
deceptive. These include objects of immediate sense awareness; that I am here, that these 
are my hands typing, that there is light above, that the coffee is hot, etc. He affirms: 
"There are many other beliefs about which doubt is quite impossible, even though they 
are derived from the senses ..... how could it be denied that these hands or this whole body 
are mine ... ?"32 
The move here towards asserting the validity of, at least, a particular type of 
sense-derived knowledge, seems quite perplexing. If we are to follow Descartes' own 
words and not trust any category of knowledge that possesses even the slightest 
possibility of deception or falsehoods with respect to any of its constituents, then the 
Meditator should thoroughly extend his doubt to the entire category of perception. 
Though he, of course, does extend the deception at a latter point of the argument one 
could expect him to do o within the framework of the sensory 'deception' argument 
alone. Yet the current argument suggests that not to trust all the senses and all the 
subsequent knowledge that we build upon them because they are at times deceptive, 
would be a mistake. In order to clarify the difficulty we must view the category of 
32 CSM II 13. 
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sensory knowledge as divided into two sub categories. 33 
If the senses and the knowledge based on them were taken as just one whole 
category, or class, then Descartes' later argument that they are not ' always' deceptive 
would not hold much weight; it is irrelevant that they are not always deceptive, for, again, 
the Meditator insists that our search for certainty cannot rely on any faculty that is even 
partially dubitable. If there is one overarching category for all sense knowledge, and the 
senses in general have even the slightest potential of deceiving or tricking us, by the 
Meditator's prescribed method this category of knowledge must be discarded as the 
source of certain and true knowledge. Rather, what I believe Descartes, as a man of 
science, is engaging in here is a division of sense knowledge into two separate categories. 
One that is susceptible or prone to error, as is the case with say optical illusions and the 
likes, and then the category of immediate sense awareness where there is no possibility of 
uch physical or physiological deception. 34 
The claim regarding the deceptive nature of certain sense-knowledge is a 
scientific-empirical claim, uggesting certain properties of things that could elicit some 
sort of physical deception, as when the eye, for example, is deceived about the proximity 
of an object. According to the Meditator then, this kind of extemal deception, within the 
framework of the present argument, cannot be applied to cases of immediate sense 
33 It is here that we see, as mentioned earlier, the need for a more detailed qualification within the 
framework of this argument. While it may indeed be theca e that within Descartes' di fferent scientific 
investigations this issue is clearly explained and therefore Descartes saw no need to delve on it at any 
great lengths here, the transition, I believe, is still rather ambiguous as it stands unexplained. This 
ambiguity is less a matter o f us knowing what makes a sensation possibly deceptive, but how we can 
move to affinn that there are cases where no error is possible. How does the Meditator himself know 
that the act of seeing the fire or the wax melt is not open to physical sensory deception? 
34 While this division is not made by Descartes, I see it as necessary for the sake of the Method o f Doubt 
itself to proceed in a consistent manner. Descartes is well aware that his method insists on ca ting a ide 
all that sheds even the slightest or partial doubt, and thus we cannot for the ake of the logical 
development of his argument regard all sense knowledge under one roof, so to speak. 
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awareness, even of faculties that may deceive us on other occasions. The eye may 
misjudge the size of a distant object but it cannot be deceived about what is immediately 
present to it, as say when Descartes sees the men walking outside his windows. He may 
be mistaken about an array of particular data pertaining to this specific ensation, but the 
very general perception - that there are men out ide walking - is not omething which is 
susceptible to deception, at least not one based on physiology. There is nothing in the 
sensing here that suggests that what is given could be possibly deceptive. In other words I 
cannot examine the sen ation that these are my hands and find any empirical property 
within such a ensation, which implies the pos ibility of deception. 
Hence he concludes that the argument from deception finds its limitations in such 
immediately broad and general sensations. This argument edges us closer to an 
understanding of the Meditator's conception of certainty as 'external truth' by further 
stre sing that what he ultimately wants is to link the objects in his mind, the ideatum, to 
real external things. It is here that Descartes' Meditation takes its first big metaphysical 
leap, by positing the Dreamer Hypothesis. I proceed to look now at its main purpose, and 
more specifically its meaning within the broader spectrum of defining the criteria for 
Certainty. 
1.3 The Dream Hypothesis: 
The Meditator immediately moves his skeptical approach towards looking for a 
possible source of doubt regarding the sensed world within his own being but outside of 
the naturally deceptive character of the sense , which only beguile u on particular 
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occaswns. Could something else about the internal mechanism of sensation be fallacious 
or dubious? If so could that place the entire sphere of external knowledge under jeopardy 
in so far as that sphere corresponds to a supposed external reality? Descartes approach 
here takes two very well known forms. He first attempts to suggest the possibility that he 
may be a delusional madman who cannot differentiate between reality and a fictional 
reality. Since he does not want to liken himself to a Madman, he allows the Meditator to 
pursue the argument with a more elegant venue of inquiry; the possibility of a dream 
state.35 
Descartes brings forward the notion of insanity or madness to suggest a state of 
deceptive sense awareness that is so broad and extensive that it would apply even to 
immediate acts of perception. In tum, this is presented analogously to a madman who 
perceives himself as fully clothed while in fact completely naked. To separate himself 
from this radical deception of a deranged mental state - a state to which the Meditator is 
well aware he does not belong - Descartes suggests that reflecting on man's dream state 
will serve the same purpose, at least for the current investigation, for they share the same 
salient feature with respect to doubt 36. It cannot be understated how strategically 
35 Though a detailed analysis of the shift from madness to dreaming is beyond the scope of my present 
argument it is however crucial to understand why it is introduced as an alternative, that is to say, what 
they have in common that allows Descartes' Meditator to notice that they perfonn the same function. 
For the sake of the present argument I follow the position of circumscribing the Madman (Madnes ) 
Hypothesis within the Dreamer Hypothesis. While the inherent di fference between them should not be 
overlooked, the dream hypothesis, for all intended purposes, serves the same function a the madness 
hypothesis. I will therefore focus on the implications of the latter more developed argument and keep 
the analysis of their similarity and difference to a minimum. For a detailed discussion on this see 
Frankfurt, Demons Dreamers and Madmen. Part I, Ch V, IX. 
36 Here, most likely, the Meditator takes the persona of Descartes the historical man and philosopher who 
most likely does not want to have hi s readers see him as conceiving of himself as a madman. l f we 
should see the Meditator - even if only occasionally - as the common lay person, then an examination 
of the epistemological implications of a sleep-state would naturally seem much more practical and 
accessible then the possibili ty of dementia. 
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beneficial this move truly is. It allows the Meditator to proceed, not only without 
resorting to posit a hypothetical mental derangement, but also by offering a position 
whereby he can grapple with the task at hand using one of the most fundamental aspects 
of our conscious mental states: the dreaming state. 
He writes:" ... As if I were not a man who sleeps at night and regularly has all the 
same experiences while asleep as madmen do when awake - indeed sometimes even 
more improbable ones."37 The Meditator's investigation into the dream state leaves him 
with this possible well known dilemma; differentiating between the actual states of being 
awake and being asleep at any given moment. He knows that that the two states may 
provide him with distinct modes or types of perceived contents, but can he ultimately 
distinguish one from the other with absolute clarity? One may claim to be absolutely 
certain that they are awake, and moving their hands in a fashion not possible to one who 
is asleep, yet this absolute clarity may be none other than dream content itself. Thus the 
Meditator concludes "I see plainly that there are never any sure signs by means of which 
being awake can be distinguished from being asleep .. . "38 
What is truly the main affirmation here - and this is sadly not made explicit 
enough by Descartes - is the all-encompassing nature of the dream state. While there 
may be elements of a dream's subject matter that do not correspond to what I call real 
sense experience, there is nothing however in the latter- waking life perception- that 
emphatically indicates that it too is definitively not part of a dream state. In other words, 
it may be evident to us that a particular image or scene is part of a dream state because it 
represented something utterly fictitious with respect to what we consider pos ible within 
37 CSM II 13. 
38 Ibid. 
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our 'waking-life world', but, there is nothing in waking life experiences that could not 
have also occurred in one's dreaming. All that occurs in my supposed waking life could 
also occur in the dream-state yet not vice versa, as there are things in a dream that can 
never occur in the ( upposed) awake-state. 
Since the dream-state is indeed much more comprehensive than a waking-state 
with respect to it potential content, then we can think of the latter as a ubset of the 
former. Thus, one may be able to distinguish a dream state from a waking one but, not, 
the waking state from a dream and hence it i at lea t potentially po sible that what the 
Meditator considers 'waking-life' is in fact part and parcel of the dream tate. What this 
ultimately amounts to, for the Meditator at least, is that since there i no ' ure signs' that 
distinguish waking from sleeping, it may be the case that there is no waking-life out there 
at all but only mental internal images produced during sleep. 
Thus, the argument here in fact appear to be less about differentiating the dream 
state from a waking one, and more about the impossibility of differentiating the latter 
from the former. It i this feature of the hypothe is that gives the argument its weight, for 
it allows the Meditator to affinn that it is at least conceptually possible that what is 
termed waking-life state is, ontologically, part and parcel of the dream state. This in tum 
then annihilates any quest for external empirical certainty with respect to the ensed 
world; what we believe is a waking life' ense experience'- which purportedly has its 
intentional external objects actually in the world - has just been called into question. 
Since we are possibly in a constant dream state our sense-based-images may not originate 
from any activity which represents a dynamic of 'thinking' (sensing) and the external 
world but rather a purely internal activity. Thus, the Mediator firmly continues his 
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investigation under the assumption that it is in fact possible that the sensed world is 
indeed nothing but the vivid contents of a dream: "Suppose then that I am dreaming, and 
that these particulars- that my eyes are open, that [am moving my head and tretching out 
my hand are not true. Perhaps, indeed, I do not even have such hands or such a body at 
The significance of this skeptical move, within his entire pur uit, can never be 
overstated.40 Ultimately the Dreaming hypothesis is used as a radical extension of the 
Deception argument whereby it is the first instance of complete doubt regarding the 
external correspondence of our sensations to their purported objects. All that which is 
sensed, including the body, can epistemologically be called into doubt at thi point in so 
far as its ontologically independent existence is concerned. The previou argument from 
external sensory deception was only partial at best, whereas now we can extend it to the 
perceived world in general and thus to any and all knowledge derived from the e 
observations. 
The importance of the argument here i not only with respect to the keptical 
approach but also in terms of its function within the process of clarifying what certainty 
means to the Meditator. While in terms of the Method itself the external corporeal world 
cannot be the ource for apodictic certainty, underneath this skeptici m, we see that it is 
39 C M II 13. 
40 The dreamer hypothesis, is often criticized as unsophisticated, unoriginal, and serving no real new 
philosophic value. Yet most of these attacks assume the position that Descartes thought he was 
providing something novel and unique here. Descartes had emphatically stressed that he had not 
intended to present either the Deception or the Dreamer hypothesis as new approaches within the 
keptical methodology. On the contrary, he realize that he is ' reha hing' positions taken by skeptics 
before him, but, also sees these as necessary steps towards pushing skepticism to its limits, before 
abolishing it. The inability of distinguishing real-life from a dream provides an e sential move away 
from the corporeal world and thus an affinnation that apodictic certainty will not be obtained from 
knowledge based from or through the senses. 
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precisely that externality which he is ultimately is after. The method here implies, 
negatively, that what certainty means to him is knowledge of the existence of something 
real, something that has an independent existence in reality. The argument, in pushing 
aside the corporeal sensed world, mainly affinns that the composite world we claim to 
sense cannot provide us with actual proof of its own existence and thus any knowledge of 
the necessarily true and existent will not be based on any sensory-based external 
perception. Descartes wants certainty to arise from and, apply to, that external domain, 
but the method here will not allow him to accomplish this. It is here of course that 
Descartes' rationalist philosophy intervenes and lays down its own ascribed limitations of 
ordinary doubt by pursuing external truth from within the domain of innate rational, 
mathematical and pure truths. 
1.4 Limitations ofOrdina~y Doubt/Skepticism: Mathematical and Simple truths. 
The Dreamer hypothesis within the Meditator's Method, serves its main function 
by placing the legitimacy of the senses, as the source for true knowledge, under fire. Yet, 
as vast and reaching as this type of doubt ultimately is, Descartes' inherent rationalism 
prevents it from spreading to all spheres of knowledge. Knowledge of the world as it is 
sensed may be false, but the external skepticism here has no bearing on any internal and 
innate knowledge we may have about the external world. The world [ think of through 
'sensation' may, in reality, be utterly different in a plethora of ways, but there are truths 
about the world, which are not sensed but are immediately available innate truths, always 
present to an attentive philosophical mind. 
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The Meditator lays this out immediately after expressing the implications of the 
Dreamer hypothesis; the images that appear in our dreams could be utterly imaginary or 
fictitious, but they implicitly express knowledge of at least something real. He says: " It 
must be surely admitted that the visions which come in sleep are like paintings, which 
must have been fashioned in the likeness of things that are real. ... "41 Even if all the 
images that appear in his mind's eye do not refer to actual and real objects but are rather 
present in a hallucinatory or dream state, they do need to have some other source. The 
mind can conjure these images up but there has to be something else, something real, 
upon which these sensations are modeled. Thus we must affirm that they are.fashioned in 
the likeness of something real. 
The analysis Descartes offer here creates a breakdown or classification of dream-
images into 'general' and 'universal' types ofthings. To illustrate, Descartes examines 
basic dream images such as his body in general and initially concludes that even such 
images of general things must refer to something real. He states, " .. ... At least these 
general kinds of things- eyes, head, hands and the body as a whole- are things which are 
not imaginary but are real and exist".42 
In order further to refine his position, the Meditator pushes forward and examine 
more abstract and vivid images, such as the ones conjured up by the painter who creates 
an image of something that does not correspond to anything perceived in nature. Here 
too, as abstract as they may seem, these conjured composite images must refer to 
something real. Thus he says, " ... when painters try to create sirens and satyrs with the 
41 CSM II 13. 
42 Ibid. 
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most extraordinary bodies, they cannot give them natures which are new in all respects"43 
What Descartes is ultimately attempting to accomplish here is to narrow this notion of 
'something real', not to general things that are given to sense perception but rather to 
universal properties that apply to the very nature of the external sen ation; in the 
analogical case of the painter, it is the colors used in the composition, that must be real.44 
It is thus now not the case that images of general things in dreams, uch as hands 
and feet, are real , but rather that the universal simple ptinciples that underlie these images 
are real , i.e. cannot be dreamed or imagined. We can cast doubt upon all that is ensed, 
but not the simple truths that underlie the knowledge of these sensed images. The dream 
hypothesis affirms that the books I see in front of me may not be real or actually existing 
in the manner given to my senses but, nevertheless, the basic principles which underlie 
this sensation - such as extension, modality, change and place in time and color, must all 
be real. These are simple and necessary truths which are not externally sen ed but rather 
internally known. De cartes, now, affirms that: 
43 Ibid. 
... . although these general kinds of things-eyes, head, hand and so on-
could be imaginary, it must at lea t be admitted that certain other even 
simpler and more universal things are real. ... These are as it were the real 
colors from which we form all the images of things, whether true or false, 
that occur in our thoughts.45 
44 He continues from previous quote afftnning " .... Or if pe rhaps they manage to think up something so 
new tha t nothing remotely imilar has ever been een be fore-something which i the refore completely 
fictitious and unreal- at least the colo rs used in the composition must be real. .. " Ibid. 
45 CSM II 13- 14. 
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The key issue here is that these simple natures could not themselves be fabricated 
by the mind or dream-state, nor are they sensed. That is to say, the simple truths of things 
like extension or dimension are not grasped by the mind via sensation. Nor can they be 
fabricated inside a dream state. These are properties inherent to reality as a whole. The 
dream hypothesis itself represents a radical expansion of the deception argument yet it 
does not however annul the truth of a reality out there; a reality of pure, absolute and non-
sensed laws, rules and principles. A reality that is, above all, mathematical in nature.46 
This transitional move from sensed knowledge to knowledge of absolute eternal 
truths that are naturally present in reason represents - textually - the first apparent 
collapse of the Meditator's character as a layperson. What we see here is Descartes' own 
explicitly rationalist interpretation of reality; his firm belief in the existence of pure 
absolute and eternal truths which reason itself had access to, completely independent of 
any empirical sensory cognition.47 
The argument here shows Descartes' own staunch anti-empiricist rationalism 
working its way into the Meditator's method; though the corporeal world is ' sensed' there 
are pure simple truths about the world which are intuitively and innately present to the 
mind and not sensed. Within the present framework, the Meditator, echoing Descartes' 
rationalist epistemology, holds that the truths of mathematics and physics are indubitable 
46 We see that while these truths at the roots refer primarily to mathematical and logical truths they also 
include a whole set of other epistemological and metaphysical assumptions about the empirical concrete 
world, such as extension in general, modality, shape, spatial and causal relations, etc. The actual scope 
and magnitude of what falls under the category of intuited truths, is not clearly stated by Descartes, but 
it is a recurring theme in all of Descartes philosophy. 
47 Unlike the radical or Pyrhonian skeptic who admitted defeat in his quest for certainty once the world of 
the senses was abolished, Descartes had maintained that pure non-composite truths were entirely 
independent of perception or external cognition. These truths may be (and in fact are) applicable to our 
understanding of the world given through sensation, but knowledge of them does not depend on, or 
stem from sensations. 
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and absolutely certain and our knowledge of them is not susceptible to either physical or 
physiological deception or to the dream-state hypothesis. What this ultimately amounts to 
in the frames of the First Meditation, is that the Dream hypothesis may serve to cleave 
the correspondence of our sensations from their supposed object in the world but, the 
pure truths we know of this world, namely that it is extended with shape and form but, 
also, the plethora of laws of physics and mathematics that apply to all reality, are 
unaffected by the radical sensory skepticism since they are known a priori and not 
through a posteriori sense-based experience.48 
Even if the skepticism employed here has endangered our appeal to the senses as 
an ontologically accurate picture of reality, universal underlying truths remain unscathed. 
We clearly see here Descartes ' opposition to the rigid Aristotelian empiricism which 
affinned all knowledge to be obtained from the empirically observed world. In short, as 
John Carriero eloquently writes, Descartes was adamantly " ... defending the position that 
the human mind comes naturally endowed with a certain amount of substantive 
knowledge concerning the corporeal world ... "49 
The dream argument pushes the pursuit of the criteria for certainty towards 
purely innate intellectual concepts about, and of, the absolute truths, laws, and order of 
48 These truths being part and parcel cannot be negated even within a dream states. For Descartes, no 
matter how vivid one's dreams may be, she - or whatever character she may assume in the dream state -
could not doubt a mathematical truth in a cogent understandable manner. Or as Margaret Wil on has 
suggested, such violations of mathematical truths may be present in a dream, but, not in any way where 
they can be perceived or understood coherently. I will look at this aspect of certainty in the fo llowing 
section. See, Margaret D. Wilson, Descartes, (London ; Boston : Routledge & K. Paul, 1978) 17-3 1. 
49 Jolm Carriero, 'The First Meditation'. In Descartes' Meditations: Critical Essays, edited by Vere 
Chappell (Rowman &Little fie ld, 1997), 9. To illustrate this point, Carriero further states, " .. . according 
to Descartes, our grasp of the essence of body is afforded by the innate idea o f extension and is not 
extracted from the world through sensory interaction and abstraction. Our knowledge that the essence of 
body is extension forms a part of the minds native equipment for understanding the world. As a matter 
of fact, we would still understand the nature of body is extension even if there existed no bodies from 
which such lmowledge may be imported." Ibid. 
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our sensed reality. The initial section of this Meditation is, in itself, a picture of the 
Meditator's assent towards the immediacy of an inward knowledge; the laws and rules of 
reality with which the mind was naturally endowed. While he initially claimed that what 
he has learned and known, his beliefs and opinions, was given to him either through or 
from the senses, after having placed this entire sphere of knowledge under the 
microscope, he now reveals a sphere of knowing, of knowledge, that tern not from 
perception but from pure reason, these truths of natural light. 
Thu far then, the Dream Hypothe i has succeeded in completing doubt regarding 
the sensed world and has placed the criteria for certainty within the intellect' capacity of 
recognizing these natural truths independent of any sensation. Whereas the Aristotelians, 
according to Descartes, saw the knower as receiving all her knowledge from the world 
itself, Cartesian rationalism gives back to the subject a wealth of intuited and absolute 
knowledge which she intrinsically and naturally po sesses. The fir t tage of doubt is 
completed when the Meditator draws inwards and finds absolute truth in principles and 
law that are intrinsically given to reason itself. The move away from the enses is indeed 
not only the central theme of the method of doubt and the First Meditation as a whole but 
is in fact also een by many Cartesians as the central theme of Cartesian rationali t 
epistemology; a defense of the natural light of rea on. Yet, while this may very well be 
Descartes' own position, it is the persona of the Meditator that immediately re urfaces 
and challenges the ontological reality of these simple self-given truths. 
The next step, the notorious Deceiving Demon hypothesis, represents the final 
stretch of the method of doubt. It is the most essential element of the Meditations becau e 
it is here that De cartes arrives at a definitive criterion for doubt. The Demon Hypothesis 
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by challenging these pure-truths does so in a way that allows us to see what Descartes is 
ultimately after while simultaneously revealing its own limitations with respect to activity 
of 'thought' which yields Descartes sought after First Principle. 
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Chapter II: The Deceiving Demon and The Cogito: 
Hyperbolic Deception and the Certainty of Thought 
2.1 Introduction: 
In this chapter I examme the Deceiving Demon hypothesis and the Cogito 
argument which arises out of the limitations of hyperbolic doubt. I begin by examining 
the salient features of Descartes' move towards Hyperbolic Deception a they stand 
directly related to his pursuit for clear criteria of certainty. I attempt to clarify that what 
the hypothesis mainly allows us to see is that Descartes' project goes far beyond the 
scope of having the Meditator - and the reader as well for that matter - sever her reliance 
on the senses as the source and grounds for certainty. If this were the case then the 
Meditator would have been content with the simple intuited truths of natural light as the 
starting point for hi foundationalism. That is to say, if the initial starting point of 
philosophy - its first principles upon which Descartes was to build his science - found its 
grounding for certainty in the immediately and innately given, non-sen ed awareness, 
then the Meditation would need go no further than the truths of logic, and mathematics, 
and those other imple truths which involve no inference or deduction but are rather self-
evident and purely intuited. The true scope of Hyperbolic Deception reflects Descartes ' 
desire to have the grounds for understanding certainty based on knowledge of something 
concrete and actual, beyond the boundaries of elf-evident conceptual truths. 
I then examine the limitation of this Hyperbolic doubt with respect to the present 
condition of the doubter - the condition of thinking in general. My main interest here is 
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the type of certainty that an awareness of the Cog ito argument provides our Meditator, 
and thus I focus my discussion on how it is arrived at and, more significantly, on what it 
ultimately is a certainty of. That is to say, what does the argument give the Meditator a 
certainty of? By reflecting on the nature of the Cogito, I argue for the position taken by 
Spinoza50, that the argument presented in the Second Mediation y1elds only a certainty of 
the activity of 'Thought' or 'Thinking' alone. 
Awareness of the Cogito, of thinking, allows the Meditator to understand the first 
moment of ontological certainty, but not of the ontological kind that Descartes is after -
scientific empirical knowledge. While the Cogito argument is indeed the foundation, the 
First Principle, which Descartes is so passionately looking for, it finds its limitation in the 
fact that it cannot ground an understanding of certainty that can be placed in the context 
of anything but thought itself. Due to the radically distinct and unique ontological essence 
or character of the substance of 'Thought', for Descartes, it shares nothing in common 
with any of the external objects ofhis thought. Thus the 'Certainty' provided by the 
Cogito argument can only be understood with respect to the existence of a thinking thing 
(or substance) alone and not certainty as could relate to the existence of anything outside 
of thought. 51 
50 Spinoza believed that the '1 think therefore I am' ultimately amounted to saying 'I am thinking ' or, ' there 
is thought. ' [See Spinoza, Baruch. Renati Descartes Principorium. Phil, I , Prolegomnon.] 
51 The Meditator is looking for the very condition which will allow him to understand the meaning of 
certainty about the external world, about something external to him. Knowledge of the necessity of 
Thought's existence only allows the thinker to understand the condition required to obtain knowledge in 
general, but with respect to knowledge proper, this will not suffice. 
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2.2 The Deceiving Demon: From Dreaming to External Deception. 
The Dream Hypothesis has two salient features. The hypothesis serves as the 
pinnacle of rigorous scrutiny against the certainty we have of the ensed world being as it 
is perceived, but, it is also - simultaneously - the first move towards the realm of 
absolute a priori truths accessed by the intellect alone. However, as the argument 
progresses we note that though the Meditator adopts a rationalist stance, his persistence 
and tenacity bring out the limitations of accepting mathematical truths as the foundations 
of certainty. 
It is in the nature of immediately given pure truths to be such that we cannot 
mentally-psychologically doubt them. That is to say, they are seen as indubitable, in so 
far as we cannot rationally doubt them using the natural disposition and mechanics of our 
thinking. 52 Yet within the present framework of the First Meditation, this only means that 
these truths may be indubitable to us when we think them, but, are they ontologically and 
externally true in the non-mental sense? That is to say, are they true only as mental 
thoughts or ideas or, do they have a real ontological existence outside of thought? This is 
ultimately the main concern for the Meditator here. He - unlike Descartes the scholar -
while being aware of these truths of mathematics and logic completely independent of the 
sensed world, does not know whether they are actual truths about reality, that is to say a 
non-mental non-conceptual reality. [n other words, do these immediate truths - which are 
said to be of laws and principles that underpin and underlie all reality - actually have a 
52 I cannot cognitively (and coherently) doubt that the sum of two and three i five, I cannot cognitively 
conceive of a squared circle. The negation o f these self-given truths is mentally impossible. 
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being outside ofhis mind?53 
Within Descartes' own rationalism, it is not merely the case that eternal truths are 
mentally indubitable; for him they were of course actually true, representing concrete 
objective claims about reality, independently of any mental representation. The 
transparent truths Descartes speaks of, such as mathematics, modality, extension etc, do 
not merely refer to concepts in our mind that derive their certainty from the fact that they 
are psychologically indubitable, but rather because they are truths of and about reality per 
se. They are indeed grasped or understood or accessed by the mind, and with absolutely 
internal clarity, but, they are clearly for Descartes much more than that- they refer to 
something real and existent outside of mind. That is to say, they have their own 
ontological status completely independent of our psychological and intellectual intuition 
ofthem. 54 
This position reflected Descartes' own metaphysical stance which accepts God as 
the creator and guarantor of these universal and eternal truths. These are divine natural 
laws, for which God has endowed human reason with the capacity to know and 
contemplate. However, within the confines of the method set out by the First Meditation, 
the Meditator himself cannot afford to take such a stance. The intuitive self-evident status 
of the truths of natural light, produces, as it were, a mode of internal psychological 
certainty that is expressed and instantiated via the fact they are absolutely indubitable for 
him. Nevertheless in their immediate self-givenness they remain strictly conceptual, that 
is to say, he does not know that they have any being outside of mind. 
53 This mind-to-externality correspondence also becomes the salient feature of his investigations in the 
Third Meditation. 
54 They are innately present in the mind but are not a creation or imaginative fabrication of the mind. This 
is a crucial point; mathematics and geometry have an existent reality outside my mind, and for that 
matter outside the dream. 
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If the mediator is to lead an investigation that attempts to be void of any 
metaphysical assumptions he must not presuppose that these truths have any ontological 
reality other than their presence in his thought, without any reference to a non-mental 
reality. The introduction of the Demon Hypothesis represents the Meditator breaking 
away from the ' self-evident' quality of simple truths as the grounds and criteria for 
certainty. Focusing on their actual non-mental existence or reality reveals Descartes' goal 
of grounding apodictic certainty not merely on something known to be real in the 
conceptual sense but, more importantly, real in the concrete external sense, that is to say, 
outside of mind. 
The premise and structure of the Hypothesis are well known to all readers; the 
Meditator proceeds to posit the possible existence of a deceiving demon genius. 55 This 
entity will be powerful enough to have the ability to make Descartes' think of these 
transparent and indubitable truths that ultimately have no ontological being. In short he 
would make him think about laws and principles that refer to nothing externally real. The 
Meditator states: 
.... firmly rooted in my mind is the long standing opinion that there is 
omnipotent God who made me the kind of creature that I am. How do I 
know that he has not brought it about that there is no earth, no sky, no 
extended thing, no size, no shape, no place, while at the arne time 
ensuring me that all these things appear to me to exist just as they do 
now ... . may I not similarly go wrong every time I add two and three or 
count the sides of a square ... 56 
55 As before, my concern is not with the validity of his argument but with its conclusio ns and implication 
to the entire project. At this point of the argument such an assumption serves an explicit functional 
purpose - extending the doubt to its possible logical limits. Therefore the effects of the demon in tenns 
of extending the doubt are completely independent of any need to actually prove tha t such a demon 
actually exists. If it is even plausible that such a being could exist then it is also plausible that our 
knowledge, our knowing, is in a state of deception. 
56 CSM II 14. And more explicitly stated; " .. some malicious demon has employed all his energies in order 
to deceive me . . ..1 shall consider myself as not having hands or eyes, or fle h, or blood or senses, but as 
falsely believing that r have a ll these things" CSM II 15. 
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It is not merely the case of a Being which rests above and beyond and happens, 
rather mysteriously, to deceive me. This is a Being who "made me the kind of creature 
that I am" and is therefore the cause, so to speak, of how man perceives, thinks, feels, 
emotes, etc. Descartes suggests that if this god is indeed responsible for my being the 
way that I am, he, in a sense, could make me in such a way that I think whatever he 
chooses to make me think, which could potentially entail the possibility of making me 
think utterly false concepts .. 
Yet, ifthe Demon could bring it about that my actual thinking, perceiving, and 
reasoning are false, what does this imply at the pre ent stage of the argument? Doe the 
possibility of external deception by this entity imply that I can now coherently doubt the 
truths of mathematics, of size, shape, extension etc? Furthermore, regardle of my 
cognitive ability or inability to doubt these truths, what is the external ontological status 
of these truths? These questions indeed represent the pinnacle of Descartes ' goal in 
employing the Method of Doubt - for one, it elaborates and clarifies the type of certainty 
he is after, and secondly it lays the groundwork from which the Cogito argument springs. 
An examination of the true powers of the Demon Deceiver shows us both its 
limitation and strength within the Method of Doubt. The possibility of the existence of a 
Demon Deceiver does not imply that the Meditator can now exercise a coherent act of 
doubting the truths of say, mathematics, in their immediate givenness to mind.57 Rather, 
57 Just as Descartes holds that even in a dream it was inconceivable to think of the urn of two and three as 
being anything other than five, likewise, the Demon 's deceptive powers are not instantiated in now 
allowing the Meditator to conceive of the sum as equal to six. The deception hypothesis here doe not 
introduce a scenario where our ability to mentally perform an act of doubting such pure simple truths is 
granted. For the Meditator, the self-given and self-evident nature of 2+3=5 can never be menta lly 
negated and rather, what is at stake here is whether or not the e pure and imple truths are actually true, 
in the external non-cognitive sense of the word regardles of whether they are true for the Meditator. 
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the doubt has now shifted outside of the subject, wherein our concern is with things as 
they are in themselves as opposed to their ' being true' in thought. The possibility of a 
radical external deception of this soti shows the Meditator that while the laws and 
principles of 'natural light' cannot be cognitively doubted, they may not have any 
external actuality or reality; no more reality than any of the marvelous ideas he has in his 
sleep. At this stage of his skepticism, eternal truths and mathematics may be called ' true' 
only in the sense that they are psychologically indubitable and self-evident, but cannot be 
called ' true' if the intent in calling them such is, to proclaim that they are concrete, 
actual, and existing elements of reality. 
Absolute certainty of these simple truths, if it is to move beyond mere 
conceptuality and treat these truths as concrete and real in the non-mental sense, is 
unattainable if external deception has no boundaries. It is possible that a grand deceiver 
has made me the type of being whose thought contents bear no necessary resemblance to 
anything real outside thought, and this makes the self-evident nature of pure simple truths 
externally meaningless, so to speak. The conclusions and implications of the Hypothesis 
taken together with the Dream Hypothesis are, for the Meditator, completely all-
encompassing at this point of the argument. 58 In terms of the actual ontologically 
concrete existence of any ofthe objects ofhis thoughts the, deception is conclusive and 
58 It is important to note that I am here by adopting what Cottingham calls the 'extreme' stance regarding 
the devastating effect of the Demon hypothesis on e ternal truths. Much debate has surrounded this topic 
in the literature and some scholars, Cottingham for one, do not take such a radical tance. ( ee 
Cottingham, Descartes pp. 66-70) Some choose to downplay the demon 's powers by suggesting that 
Descartes himse(f did not actually believe that these absolute truths are malleable by such an entity. 
While I carmot at present explore this issue in great detail , I maintain that any approach that is 
uncommitted to the Demon's ability to threaten the Meditator's acceptance of eternal truths is 
ultimately based on a reading of the Meditation which does not give the Meditator himse(fthe correct 
locus within the investigation. The salient fea ture of the Demon hypothesis is found in Descartes' 
relinquishing of his belief in these truths to the Meditator' s rigorous approach. Descartes most certa inly 
did not doubt the existence and reality of these truths, but as far as the supposedly unbiased Medita tor is 
concerned, he does not yet have the means - namely the benevolence and omnipotence of God - by 
which he can be certain that these self-evident truths are in .fact true. 
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fatal. He resigns himself to saying, 
I will suppose then, that everything I see is spurious. I will believe that my 
memory tells me lies, and that none of the things that it reports ever 
happened. I have no senses. Body, shape, extension, movement and place 
are chimeras. So what remains true? Perhaps just the one fact that nothing 
is certain. 59 
The Dream Hypothesis allowed us to cast away the domain of the sensed world as 
something externally real by internalizing it, by turning sensations into 'images in the 
mind' with no necessary correspondence to external reality. Yet with immediate intuitive 
self-given truths which are internalized by their very immediacy in thought, the Dream 
Hypothesis falls short and, what is needed is explicitly to show that something external 
endangers them. It may indeed be asked why Descartes has the Meditator go to such great 
extremes for this process of doubt to be completed. The Hypothesis should be seen as a 
type of mental exercise which furnishes Descartes with the ability of logically conceiving 
a possibility wherein the bond between these pure truths as they are grasped internally 
and their external correspondence is severed. Since for Descartes this possibility was so 
radically unlikely, he conceives of a very unlikely, hyperbolic, yet logically possible 
scenario. 60 
The Demon Hypothesis, by placing the source of doubt, external to the subject, 
shows us, albeit implicitly, what Descartes is ultimately after here, at least with respect to 
a complete criteria for certainty. Descartes seeks a certainty that does not merely rest on a 
principle or content of thought alone, but rather something that exists essentially and 
59 CSM II 16. 
60 The possibility that it is his own intellect that fabricates the contents of his mind is not established until 
the third meditation when he examines the nature of ideas. I will look at this with much greater detail in 
the following chapter. 
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independently of any thought we have of it yet clearly corresponding to the mental image 
(an idea or thought) we have of it. He thereby, aims at bridging epistemological and 
ontological certainty. This in essence is the criterion of truth - it must stem from 
knowledge about some 'thing' which has an ontological being separate from its being 
present to mind as an object of thought. The search for truth is one that seeks to find that 
which is indubitable to the mind but also certain in the world outside of mind, that is to 
say, has an ontological reality and existence beyond thought. This, indeed, becomes the 
prevalent theme in modem philosophy for several centuries.61 
The very presence of the Demon Hypothesis suggests that ifthere is a 
psychological paradigm of certainty - a paradigm that allows us to understand Certainty 
proper- it should be one that is applicable to the concrete world and not be just 
conceptual certainty. Even though that external world does not itself provide the grounds 
for that certainty, when we do arrive at it, we should be armed with a certainty that is 
built upon our knowledge of the existence of external things and not just ideas. This 
pursuit, indeed proves to be the main driving force of the Third Meditation. Yet prior to 
looking at that, we must follow the Meditator in his recognition of the most salient 
limitation of the Demon Hypothesis - the necessary existence of thinking. 
As I have just claimed, for the Meditator, while the Demon can deceive him about 
the external ontological status of the truth claim 2+ 3=5, it bears no relation to the fact that 
the thought 2+3=5 can never be epistemologically refuted. Furthermore, this applies to all 
61 As P.J. Markie eloquently notes "Descartes goes on to define the central point of epistemology for the 
next three hundred years. How can we move from our certain knowledge of the content of our 
experience to a knowledge of its cause? How can we know whether our experience is caused by an 
external world that is basically the way the content of our experience represents it as be ing ... ?" P. J . 
Markie, 'The Cogito and Its Importance'. In Descartes' Meditations: Critical Essays, edited by Yere 
Chappell (Rowman &Littlefield, 1997), 34. 
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contents of thought, not just pure simple truths. The Demon's power, originating 
'outside' the subject, only infringes on the non-mental validity of the intentional object of 
our thoughts but does not affect their ontological status as elements of thoughts or ideas. 
It is this of course which brings Descartes to the recognition of the self-revealing activity 
of 'thought' itself -which has accompanied his entire activity of doubt from the very onset 
of the Meditation. 
While the Hypothesis drastically severs the correlation between our 
ideas/thoughts of things and the actual ontological external existence of such things, it 
does not challenge their ontological existence as actual ideas or thoughts. As the First 
Meditation reaches its zenith, the scope and limitation of the Demon Hypothesis already 
alludes to the inevitability of the Cogito's emergence. I thus now proceed to look at the 
Cogito argument, with the hopes of clarifying the type of Certainty it yields, and its 
incompleteness with respect to external empirical knowledge. 
2.3 The Cogito: The existence of Thought 
In his first moment of absolute apodictic certainty, the Meditator recognizes that 
the Deceiving Demon may deceive him about the a posteriori external validity of any of 
his ideas or thoughts, but he cannot deceive him that he has these thoughts to begin with. 
The true discovery behind the Cogito is the discovery of the irrefutability of thought, or 
thinking activity in general. When the Meditator says that as long as he thinks anything 
at all he certainly exists62 - regardless of being deceived - he is reaffirming that all 
62 See CSM II 16- 17. 
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activity, including being deceived, is an act of thought. Since this is the first moment of 
absolute certainty, we need to look at the process of this discovery in the Second 
Meditation in order to understand what exactly the Meditator is certain of I will first 
present the argument as it is given in the texts and then proceed to look at the type of 
certainty that this yields. 
Descartes initial argument is well known.63 The entire framework of the First 
Meditation revolved around the activity of doubt. The argument unfolds when Descartes 
questions the nature and implications of his previously accepted state of utter deception. 
His approach can, structurally, be broken into several main parts. Fir t, he says: " But I 
have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no 
minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: ifl convinced myself of 
something [or thought anything at all] then I certainly existed."64 
The Mediator recognizes that regardless of what the Demon may convince him 
that he thinks, believes or senses, there still must be the subject there doing the thinking 
and doubting. Clearly at this point, after he has doubted all bodily attributes, he does not 
yet know what this subject truly is and thus he is merely treating himself as the locus or 
hub for the activity of doubt. The main thrust of the argument here is that the 'doubting I' 
must exist regardless of the deception. The very activity of deception be it internal, or 
from some external cause - as is the case with the Demon Deceiver- is itself a thinking 
cognitive activity. 
63 It is beyond the scope of the present work to engage in the different scholarly examination of the 
technical aspects of Descartes' argument. My overall focus here is the type of certainty the Cogito 
yie lds and not a critique of its logical validity. Thus r focus mainly on the tenets of the argument which 
he lp c larify what the Mediator is truly certain of and how this is situated within hi broader enterprise 
within the Meditation as a whole - finding a first principle of certainty that will serve to ground all 
ensuing scientific empirical particular certainties. 
64 CSM II 16- 17. 
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A false thought may be one whose purported object has no reality, but it is 
nevertheless a thought and hence it exists. Since all knowledge or knowing is an act of 
thought, then it is at least ontologically true (certain) that thinking as a concrete and 
actual activity exists. The Meditator continues: "But there is a deceiver of supreme 
power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too 
undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me ... and let him deceive me as much as he can, he 
will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something"65 
The different layers of argument here have naturally spawned many 
interpretations throughout the history of modem philosophy. Some read Descartes as 
saying that since he cannot 'be nothing' (not existing) so long as he 'thinks he is 
something' it thus suggests that conceiving of oneself, in some way or another, is a 
stipulation for recognizing the existence of thought. That is to say, 1 am or, I exist ~[I 
conceive of myself as being a particular sort ofthing, namely, with respect to what he can 
finnly recognize, a thinking thing. This appears to be an element of Jaakko Hintinkka 's 
'performative interpretation' which claims that it is in the thinking or contemplating 
about the activity of thought itself that we perform a type of existential awareness of 
seif.66 Though Descartes invites this type of interpretation when, for example, he ays 
that he exists 'as long as he thinks that he is something' I hold, along with Kenny, that 
this is not the impetus behind the Meditator' s words.67 
It is not in the thinking of oneself specifically as a thinking thing or even of 
65 Ibid. 
66 For discussion on this see, Jaakko Hintikka, 'Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance' . In, 
Descartes: A Colfection of Critical Essays, edited by Willis Doney (Macmillan; 1967) 108- 137. 
67 For Kenny on Hintinkka see Kenny, Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy, Ch. II. 42-45 
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thinking of oneself as this or that way, that one explicitly asserts her existence. It is not in 
'thinking that I am something', but, rather it is in the thinking of anything- regardless if it 
is an existential claim about one's own nature or not - that I am something, namely, that 
which is doing the thinking.68 It matters not whether the Meditator thinks of his own 
existence or whether he thinks about a golden triangle. What all 'thoughts of something' 
have in common is the instantiation of the thinking activity, of intellection. The 
performance of 'thinking' is not only accomplished or instantiated when we tum our 
minds eye to an inward reflection of the mental activity of mind itself - what I take to be 
Hintikka's position - but rather when we turn our minds eye onto anything. All mental 
activity involves 'thought ' regardless whether the Meditator is turning his mind towards 
perception of a ball of wax or a mathematical equation. 
Since for Descartes we are always aware of our thoughts, recognizing the 
existence of 'Thought' is self-evident at the moment we reflect upon what we are thinking 
regardless of what it may be. What the argument amounts to, is saying that; as long as I 
am thinking of something I am aware of that thought or idea and therefore aware that I 
am thinking it, therefore there is a thinking activity, thus thought exists. There are of 
course an array of other aspects to the Cogito argument that have been raised here but I 
am fundamentally concerned with expressing the position that the argument ultimately 
only affirms the existence of thought and thinking. However, in order to clruify my 
position I do want to discuss one historical aspect of the Cogito argument; is it an 
inference, or an intuition?69 
68 For Kenny's approach see Kenny, Descartes, 42-45. 
69 This is essential for several reasons. First, it clarifies certain aspect of Cartesian metaphysics with 
respect to intuition and thought. Second, with respect to the metaphysics, it points towards Descartes ' 
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2.4 Cogito and Sum: Inferred or Intuited? 
The argument of the Second Meditation starts with affirmation of the doubter's 
'existence' in general, without ever knowing what this ' I' truly is, and only then moves to 
affirm the existence of the 'I' as a particular kind of thing, namely a thinking thing. Thus 
the initial conclusion itself is only "I am, I exist". The argument does not explicitly prove 
or deduce the existence of the 'I' from the existence of thought but, rather, the latter 
follows as a metaphysical description of the former. That the 'I am' argument ari es out of 
awareness of the existence or being of thought or thinking in general has already been 
stated, but in terms of the formal argument in the Second Meditation the discovery is first 
and foremost an intuitive claim.70 In the Discourse however, Descartes expressed what at 
least appears to be the 'inference' link between thinking and existing. Whereas the 
Meditations' concludes 'ego sum, ego existo' the Discourse yields the much better known 
form of the argument "Cogito, ergo sum"- 'I am thinking, therefore I exist'. 71 The 
difference in these two formulations - though according to Descartes, ultimately 
expressing the same goal - has been taken by readers to suggest two approaches taken by 
conception of the proper order of epistemological discovery. Finally, and most importantly, by 
understanding the process Descartes is advocating here we can, I believe, gain an even clearer picture of 
where the Cog ito fits within the pursuit for a grounding of certainty in general and, more importantly, 
certainty with respect to the external world. 
70 That the doubter is thinking, is instantiated in the activity of doubt, and so it is indeed an integral part of 
the initial proof of 'I am I exist'. Yet here it is not proved that he is essentially a thinking thing but rather 
only that the ' I' exists, which again, at this point of the argument is tantamount to saying only that the 
doubter exists. 
71 CSM I 127. I add the emphasis here on ' therefore' to stress the apparent ' logical-inference' 
cha racteristic of the argument. 
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Descartes; one relying on pure intuition, and one based on a logical inference.72 
The 'I am I exist' ofthe Second Meditation73 is taken by some readers, Curley notes, to 
be an affinnation arising out of pure intuition; an internal intuition that appeals to the act 
of'doubting'. On the other hand while according to Descartes he had not wanted the 
argument to be perceived as an inference, the format which it takes in the Discourse-
'Cogito ergo Sum' - inevitably, albeit implicitly, takes the form of logical inferential 
argument. Is existence inferred from thinking? And, if so, what are the implications for 
our present pursuit? 
To understand Descartes' position we must take a quick glance outside the 
Meditations at his division of knowledge into deduction and intuition. Descartes 
rigorously looks at this issue in the Regulae. Within his foundational system of 
knowledge, there is a set of immediately given self-intuited beliefs. These are not learned 
or taught but are naturally present to the mind and could be reflected upon by turning our 
attention to the 'light of reason'. Formally stated, by intuition Descartes means: 
... the conception of a clear and attentive mind, which is so easy and 
distinct that there can be no room for doubt about what we are 
understanding .. .intuition is the indubitable conception of a clear and 
attentive mind which proceeds solely from the light of reason. 74 
The knowledge that is built upon conclusions that follow these necessary first 
principles of intuition is an act of deduction through inference. Deduction, says 
Descartes, is "the inference of something as following necessarily from some other 
72 See, Edwin Curley 'The Cogito and the Foundations of Knowledge', In The Blach11ell Guide to 
Descartes' Meditations, edited by Stephen Gaukroger (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006) 30-47 . 
73 CSM II 17. 
74 Descartes, Rene. Oeuvres De Descartes, edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Librairie 
Philosophique J. Vrin, 1983). Vol. X, 368. All future reference to this primary source will fo llow 
traditional citation fonnat, [AT, Volume, Page]. 
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propositions that are known with certainty."75 We fonn connections and conclusions from 
concrete established roots that are intuitive.76 So, in general, conclusions that are f01med 
via appealing to a chain of simple intuited truths are said to be inferred or deduced from 
these intuitions. In this way an inference or deduction is not intuited but rather learned. 
The matter however is not that simple. 
Descartes held that while a series of conclusions drawn from intuition represent 
an inference, there is occasion to view a piece of knowledge as both inferred and intuited 
depending on how one relates the parts of a claim or a single piece of knowledge, to the 
whole. A pure intuition is itself always non-inferential, only known through a self-given, 
non-mediated thought activity, which appeals to nothing but internal rational reflection. If 
a conclusion was so intrinsically connected to a (previous) pure intuition, we could think 
ofthis conclusion as intuited even though, technically, it is inferred. Hence, when a 
conclusion is immediately and directly drawn from such an intuition, from a technical-
methodological standpoint it is indeed inferred, but we can also think of it as special 
extension of the initial intuition, whereby it is so closely bound and linked to it that such 
a connection is intuited. 77 
Ultimately, the issue here is about drawing immediate - non-sequential -
75 ATX 369. 
76 Or, as P.J.Markie eloquently states " intuition is the faculty by which we gain the initial certainties that 
make deduction possible ." P. Markie, 'The Cogito and Its Importance'. In V.C. Chappel Descartes 
Meditations: Critical Essays, 37. 
77 Markie suggests that Descartes is ultimate ly positing two types of intuition - the primary intuitions, 
appealing to immediate ly self-given truths of reason, and secondary or extended intuitions which are 
'immediately inferred' from pure intuition. See Markie, 'The Cogito and Its Importance', V.C. Chappe ll 
Descartes; Essays, Ch II. pp 37-59 
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conclusions from purely intuited premises.78 Taken in separation, the relation of the 
conclusion to the premise is one of inference, yet when we look at the one fluent 
movement in the order of discovery it yields a single unified mental act, which is 
intuitive. Markie states it as follows: 
When we immediately infer a conclusion from an intuited self-evident 
premise, we are not aware of any movement of thought through a series of 
premises, so may describe our knowledge of the conclusion as intuitive. 
No extended series of intuition leads us to the conclusion; there is just one 
mental act in which the self-evident premise is intuited and the immediate 
conclusion is drawn. 79 
We can now return to Descartes' position with respect to the relation of the "I 
think" to the"[ exist, in the 'cogito ergo sum' argument of the Discourse. For Descartes 
the 'I think' is taken purely as an immediate elf-evident intuition and the 'I am' or ' I 
exist' is inferred from it, but in such an immediately direct way that we can think of the 
interconnectedness of the two - the entire conclusion 'I think ergo I am' - as one mental 
act or claim which is in a sense intuited. That is to say, self-existence is the immediate 
inference drawn from an intuited awareness of one's particular mental state; thought or 
thinking. 80 Descartes has thus accepted that the 'I exist' is, in a sense, inferred from the "I 
think" but that the entire claim was more properly viewed as an intuition. 
Descartes strongly dismisses any suggestions that the entire argument followed a 
syllogistic inference format with the hidden premise 'whatever thinks exists'. This issue 
surfaces in the Seventh Set of Objections and Replies. Gassendi insists that the premise i 
78 o, if p(s) is immediately concluded from p(r) without any intermediate series or connections, then 
one can say that 'p(s)' was inferred from 'p(r)', but, the union of the two, producing 'if r then s' is 
known intuitively. 
79 Markie, ibid, 37-38. 
80 Markie states this as follows: " ... His knowledge that he thinks is intuitive in the primary sense of being 
self-evident and entirely non-inferential; his knowledge that he exists is intuitive in the extended sense 
of being immediately inferred from the simultaneously intuited premise that he thinks." Ibid. 
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implicitly assumed and is, in fact, what allows Descartes to make the bridge from 
thinking to existing. That is to say, for Gassendi, if the Meditator is inferring existence 
from 'I am thinking' or, even simpler, just that 'there is thinking' or 'there is thought' he 
is presupposing some sort of initial major premise about thought in general , namely, that 
existence clearly pertains to it. 
Descartes argues that knowledge of his existence had stemmed from no previous 
premise other than the "I think". That is to say, the "I think", as an intuition, together 
with the conclusion that 'he therefore exists' precedes any knowledge of the general 
premise "everything that thinks must exist." To Mersenne he writes: 
"When someone says 'I am thinking therefore I am, or exist' he does not 
deduce existence from thought by a syllogism, but, recognizes it as 
something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind. This is clear 
from the fact that if he was deducing it by means of a syllogism, he would 
have to have had previous knowledge of the major premise 'Everything 
which thinks is, or exists'; yet in fact he learns it from experiencing in his 
own case that it is impossible that he should think without existing.81 
It is only by appealing to this conclusion - that 'I exist because I think' or 'am thinking' 
that we learn the general rule that 'whatever thinks must exist' or 'whatever thinks is'. By 
looking at one's particular case where 'The 1', is known to exist based on our intuition that 
there is "Thinking" we can conclude that whatever thinks exists or has being. 82 
Yet what does this debate ultimately amount to? Descartes wants the order to be 
as follows: 'I think; therefore, I exist; therefore, whatever thinks mu t exist' a opposed to 
'I think; whatever thinks must exist; therefore I exist'. The scuffle, I hold, boils down to 
81 CSM II 100. 
82 Thus the issue is not to downplay Descartes' appreciation for the statement 'everything that thinks must 
exists.' Descartes had clearly accepted this absolute simple truth, not because it was self-given but 
because it was based on a concrete example of an actual thinking thing that is real and exists. 
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differentiating between the particular 'I think' and the general'whatever thinks'. For 
Descartes, general conclusions follow from an actual instantiation of what they are 
purportedly about. It is the particular that shows the issues at hand (be it existence, or 
any other metaphysical or logical property) actually and concretely embodied. 
With respect to the Cogito argument we note the following passage from the 
Principles where he states that such truths as 'whatever thinks exists' and other general 
conclusions: " ... are very simple notions, and ones which on their own provide us with no 
knowledge of anything that exists. "83 While Descartes assents to the truth of the general 
claim 'whatever thinks exists' he maintains that ultimately, by itself, the premise reveals 
nothing about actual concrete and real existence on its own, and in fact only gains its 
practical merit or usefulness in relation to the initial particular instantiation of existence 
proper, as expressed via the Cogito intuition.84 
This is in fact the sticking point of the entire argument. A general rule or truth 
claim gets its actual power when it is taken with respect to a particular instantiation of the 
issue at hand, from which the general premise draws its broad universal conclusions.85 In 
the Principles, Descartes argues that, general claims, regardless of how simple, 
immediate and, self-given they may appear to us, have no reality at all if they are not 
based upon or, deduced from, actual examples of that which the claim pertains to be 
83 CSM I 196 [Principles I, I 0]. 
84 That is to say, the ' I think' offers a moment of 'instantiated existence', so to speak, and is the grounds 
upon which we can make genera l claims about 'things which think' 
85 Descartes appears to categorize eternal truths as general conclusions, which cannot be doubted without 
yielding a contradiction, yet, nevertheless, they are merely conceptual and, of their own accord offer us 
no conclusive reason to assume that they correspond to something actually existent outside of thought. 
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about.86 It is not enough that the statement, 'whatever thinks exists' is trictly taken as an 
indubitable truth, for it is then only an abstraction, which does not actually prove that 
anything exists. 
In the ontological sense, to understand such claim as indubitable and true is not 
meaningful unless have already a particular case of 'Thinking' from which the conclusion 
'existence' can be drawn. It is once existence has been shown or proven in the ontological 
experiential sense then the general claim about 'things that think must exist' has any 
practical meaning.87 What is at stake here for Descartes is the ultimate status of the claim 
'1 think' or 'I am thinking'. In stating that he concludes existence from the '1 think' as 
opposed to 'whatever thinks' Descartes is making an explicit claim regarding the status of 
the 'I think' as not just an intuition but a special kind of self-referring existential intuition, 
one which expresses the self revealing activity of some truly ontological existent thing -
Thought. 88 
The true force behind the claim 'I think' goes beyond conceptuality. The key issue 
here is that, to the Meditator, the claim "it is impossible to doubt that I am thinking" 
reveals a truth that is not merely a self-evident and self-given one akin to, say, laws of 
86 In the Principles he states," . . . When we say that it is impossible for the same thing at the same time to 
be and not to be, that what has been done cannot be undone, that he who thinks cannot fail to be or exist 
while he think, and numerous other things of this sort, these are eternal truths and not things existing 
outside our thought" [Principle I, 49) C M I 209. 
87 This brings us back to the argument regarding the external ontological certainty of eternal truths. If we 
say that it is an eternal general truth that 'what is done cam1ot be undone' we have, according to 
Descartes made a general claim that is established from an experiential case that proved or verified that 
a thing cannot be undone. Likewise, we take the statement 'Whatever Thinks Exists' as a basic simple 
truth only because we know that there is, at least a first particular instantiation of a thinking thing which 
is or has being. 
88 On the one hand the move from the 'I think' to ' I exist' is an intuition in the sense that it possesses an 
indubitable self-evident character. Yet, at the same time it doe much more than that. The fact that I 
catmot negate the claim " I think" is, in itself, in ' ufficient to prove or assert that there really is 'thought' . 
Thus, what Descartes is really po iting here is not an intuition that refers to some de tached eternal truth 
but one that actually yields the necessary ontological presence of Thought or Thinking activity in the 
objective sense. 
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mathematics and physics. While it most certainly is a simple self-evident truth, it yields 
something ontologically much greater than mathematical indubitability; by affinning the 
actual and concrete existence of ' thinking' or ' thought ' as a particular real ontological 
thing, the statement yields not just an indubitable intuition, it yields external ontological 
truth. It is from this perspective that the affinnation gets its status as the absolute first 
principle that the Mediator is looking for. 
Descartes' argument rests on two premises; that a) that there must a deceived 
ubject as the recipient, so to speak, of the demons deceptive powers and b) one cannot 
doubt the existence of the thinking activity inherent in the 'deceptive' activity. However, 
it is traditionally objected that if we do indeed push the possibility for external deception 
to its most radical extent then it could be granted that nothing escapes the powers of the 
Demon deceiver and that there simply is no doubting at all and thus, ultimately, no 
thinking. Ifthere is such a demon it may simply be that the entire activity of doubt that 
has led to all of these discoveries is itself not real ; in which case he would need to know 
that a benevolent non-deceiving God exists to guarantee the very presence ofthought.89 
While this is an inevitable difficulty in any radical skeptical approach, it is a far too 
extreme and almost nihilistic pyrhonian reading of Descartes. The skeptical conclusions 
that are to be drawn from even the possibility of such radical deception, may be of 
extreme proportions, but do not and cannot affect the certainty instantiated in and through 
the ever present activity of Thought, revealed thus far through 'doubting' . 
89 I am hereby mere ly acknowledging the difficulty arising from the 'Cartesian Circle' problem. Again, 
my endeavor here is neither to defend nor critique the validity of Descartes' assumptions or arguments 
but rather their implications to the pursuit for defining certainty. 
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2.5 Thought vs. 'Thinking Thing' 
The' I think' reveals itself as a special self-evident claim that emanates from that 
which is in actuality Thought proper. When the Meditator sees the 'I think' as the most 
immediate of First Principles, he understands it not as a truth in mind like a mathematical 
truth but a metaphysical self-evident truth about the property of a real existent thing ~ 
Thought. Before proceeding to express my position on the type of certainty the Meditator 
gains from such a profound knowledge, I would first like to clarify the true essence of 
that which he claims to be certain of. 
That he is thinking, or that there is thinking in general going on, is Descartes' first 
principle. Yet what is Descartes ultimately certain of? The movement in the Meditations 
is from knowledge of Thought in general to knowledge of an 'I exist', or, better stated, the 
thinking I exists. What, however, is being posited other than Thought, alongside this 'I ' ? 
To say that thinking exists simply means that there is Thinking activity going on along 
with its thoughts, but is there anything more? There is a sense of appropriation here 
where thinking, belonging to me, implies my existence. I exist because thinking exists. 
But what is this 'I'? Given the stark conclusions of the First Meditation, can it be anything 
other than Thinking or Thought? 
The Meditator's position in general, affinns that he can know nothing concrete 
about any "I" in either the psychological or ontological sense, other than Thought. Does it 
follow from this that there really is no '[' at all? Or, better yet, does it follow that the 
Meditator cannot really speak of an ' I' at all, but only of Thought and Thinking activity 
in general? I believe that this is indeed the position that the Meditator should adopt, but 
instead he becomes, once again, a vehicle for Descartes' own inherent metaphysics of 
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Substance which does not allow a collapsing of the I to Thought alone. The 'I' itself 
represents a substance whose essential and necessary property is indeed Thought but is 
not collapsible, ontologically, to Thought. 
The argument in the Second Meditation unfolds thus: 
At last I have discovered it- thought; this alone is inseparable from me. I 
am, I exist-that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am 
thinking? For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I 
should totally cease to exist.... I am then in the strictest sense only a thing 
which thinks .. I am a thing which is real and which truly exists. But what 
kind of thing? As I have just said - a thinking thing. 90 
There is something else being affirmed here, onto logically, besides just thinking 
activity or Thought. By suggesting that 'thought' belongs to some Thing without which it 
could not be, we see that the argument here inevitably alludes to the existence of 
something other than just mere 'thought'. While the '[' here may not be the man sitting 
there meditating, clothed and wann next to the fire, the 'I' is not to be seen, for Descartes, 
as collapsible, ontologically, to Thought per se.91 
While this is not explicitly stated, the argument here channels through the 
Meditator - though rather subliminally- an essential feature of Cartesian metaphysics -
first, a substance is not collapsible or identical to its essential feature( ) and, second we 
do not have any coe,rnitive epistemological access to the actual ontological nature of the 
substance itself but, at best, can only know its essential property. The complete and 
whole nature of a substance is not one and the same as its essence. The latter, the essence 
of a thing, is how we come to know or be aware of that thing's being or existence, while 
9° CSM II 18. 
9 1 Thought is an ontologically real thing but we only know it as lhe essential property of that to which it 
pertains - the 'thinking thing'. 
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what the thing is in separation from its essence, is unknowable and is beyond any 
epistemological framework. Descartes' ontology expands the boundaries of the existence 
of Thought or Thinking activity, for it posits some substance in which thought resides. 
We only know thinking as a necessary ontological property of some other Substance. 92 
Yet, the Meditator himself makes no claim to posses such a metaphysical grasp of 
the nature of substance. lfthe Meditator's method only yields certainty ofthought, why 
posit that there is a thinking 'thing' at all? Why not state the first principle as 'Thought 
exists ' or, 'There is Thinking'?93 In confonnity to the method outlined from the very 
onset of the entire work, it seems that this is ultimately the position he himself must 
accept and Descartes' own metaphysics must be set aside. From a contextual standpoint 
the Meditator cannot and should not presuppose any external thing other than thinking 
and ultimately the thinking thing is in essence nothing other than thinking.94 
Descartes ' own attempts to clarify the issue of whether anything else could 
belong, actually, to the 'I' other than Thought are notoriously inconsistent. At times, 
Descartes insists that in the Meditations he merely speaks of those things that are clearly 
knowable to the Meditator as belonging to his being, that is to say his being as a 
Doubting Subject. Thus he insists that it is possible that there are other features that could 
belong to the ' I', yet he is merely not aware of them. Yet in other instances, namely the 
92 This issue is of great complexity and, a detailed discussion of Descarte ' metaphysical division of 
substance, mode, and accident, is far beyond the scopes and needs of my present topic. 
93 A position re flected in Spinoza's interpretation of the arguments in the Second Meditation. 
94 Descartes, in general, puts the Meditator in a very precarious and unnecessary position if he a llows him 
to introduce a metaphysics that claims the 'I' as some ontological substance other than thought. Not only 
can we know nothing about the substance in the non-mediated direct way (beyond thought that is), but 
the very positing of such an ontological substance hierarchy appears to be out of place. I am merely 
affirming here that the position of the Meditator when not laden with this external substance-
metaphysics allows us to omit the latter without sacrificing the true force of discovery present in the 
Second Meditation- the self-evident and self-re flective awareness of the activity of Thought. 
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Sixth Meditation, Descartes explicitly assures us that since he, that is to say the 
Meditator, is only aware ofThought alone as the essence of his being, it thus follows that 
in actuality nothing else belongs to this being other than Thought.95 What lies implicit in 
the latter position is that, with respect to the subject's reflection upon his own essence as a 
substance, he will be aware of all that belongs to it. That is to say, there is nothing that 
can belong to the 'I' which the 'I' itself is not aware of. 96 
Which position is to be definitively adopted here is questionable. Yet, again, what 
is essential to our present argument is not what the Meditator could know but what he 
actually has proven beyond any doubt. If, explicitly, he can be aware of nothing else 
belonging to this 'I' other than thought, then the fact that there may be some pure essence 
to this Thinking Thing beyond Thought is not pertinent within the framework of the 
pursuit for certainty. At this point, the Meditator himself can only be certain of thinking, 
and thus we are left with Thought alone as the first principle. 
The entire ensuing argument of the Second Meditation reveals that for Descartes, 
our awareness of anything is an awareness of thinking that thing; thinking as an 
omnipresent condition. Or as Descartes notes, to see (sense) something, say the wax in 
front of him, or to think that one sees the wax, is one and the same - it is a thought, 
namely about wax, regardless of the actual real presence or absence of wax. We can 
95 The complex ity of this issue is, far too great to discuss in depth here, nor do I see it as essential for the 
present argument. I merely want to raise this issue in order to further stress the problematic nature of the 
'I' when it is taken, even in the early stages of the Meditation, to mean something more complete o r at 
least more expanded then mere Thought. This further stresses the position that Descartes ultimately 
does not know, at this point, what this subject is, and should thus let the Meditator engage in a 
metaphysics that is strictly bound to what is immediately given and known - that is, Thought/ Thinking 
alone. 
96 Nom1an Malcolm in dealing with this exact issues states, "x is my essence, if it is the case that if I am 
aware of x then (necessarily) I am aware of myself and iff am aware of myself then (necessarily) I am 
aware of x" . Norman Malcolm, 'Descartes' Proof that His Essence is Thinking' , in Descartes: A 
Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Willis Doney, (London: Macmillan, 1968), 3 14 (312-38). 
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relate this directly to Descartes' answer to those had insisted that the Cogito argwnent 
could have been equally formulated with respect to any other activity and, not necessarily 
the 'I think'; for example I breathe therefore I exist.97 Descartes states that, if we refer to 
breathing per se, as an actual concrete corporeal activity, our argument clearly has no 
meaning, for breathing presupposes a material domain which we have already lost. 
However if one is referring to one's idea or awareness of breathing, then clearly it is a 
valid argument since my awareness of breathing, implies a thinking that I am breathing 
which, at the very least, means that I am in fact thinking. 
Even ifthere is no actual activity of any such kind taking place, it is still the case 
that I perceive the activity taking place and, for Descartes, believing and thinking are one 
and the same. In fact by affinning that all sensing begins with the thinking activity, the 
entire domain of sensation has been internalized - ensation as a whole has been 
appropriated as an internal activity of thinking. The senses themselves we recall are of 
the bodily domain and may not reveal anything real or true in the strictest ontological 
manner of speaking, but the unified act of sensation, of understanding and 
comprehending what the senses give us, regardless of their validity, is a purely internal 
activity of thinking. 
97 See CSMK Letter of March 1638" If one wants to conclude one's existence from the sentiment that one 
breath even if this opinion is not true one concludes very we ll; because this thought of breathing 
appears to our mind before the thought of our existence, and because we cannot doubt that we have it. 
And in this sense to say, l breathe therefore I am is no other thing than to say I think, therefore I am" 
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2. 6 Knowledge of Thought and The Type of Certainty it Yields. 
What does this discovery ultimately give the Meditator in tenns of the pursuit for 
certainty within the framework of his project? There are two crucially intertwined aspect 
to this; the certainty it elf, that is to say, the condition of being certain itself, and the 
condition with re pect to that from which it is derived - thought. In order to get the full 
scope of this issue, especially with respect to the latter aspect, I see it of paramount 
importance to contrast the current position of the Meditator to his argument for God's 
existence in the Third Meditation. For the moment then, I am only touching upon the 
issue now and will examine it in detail at the end of the following chapter. 
The first issue is about the obtaining of certainty in general regardless of what the 
certainty pertains to. What does this do for the Meditator in regards to his current 
epistemological state? By finding that which i absolutely onto logically certain, in the 
sense that it yield an awareness of the necessary existence of something, the Meditator, 
in one single act, both transcends hyperbolic doubt and, by doing so, comes to have an 
understanding of the very meaning of certainty. As he transcends radical doubt, by 
encountering the ontologically real and existent, he comes to know the very condition of 
or, highest criteria for, certainty proper. His di covery, in a sense in tantiate within him 
the 'condition of being certain', arrived at through knowledge of the ontological reality 
and existence of something. Hence, in the most fundamental sense, knowledge of the 
existence of 'Thought' is the archetype for defining certainty, for it is ultimately this 
knowledge which first expresses an epistemological instantiation of unshakeable 
ontological truth. Thus it is through the di covery of the Cogito that the Mediator 
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recognizes what being certain, in its most immediate form, entails. 
Now, in this respect, I am, again, treating the condition of being certain itself and 
not being certain about Thought/Thinking specifically. From that angle, the condition of 
being certain could have been fulfilled with discovery of any necessarily existing object, 
thing, principle, law, etc. It is in the encountering of and, arriving at, knowledge of the 
ontologically necessary, that certainty finds its platfonn for the Meditator. Yet as we 
return to his more specific endeavor, we are bound to contemplate what this condition of 
certainty gives him with respect to it being about Thought spec~fically. Being a certainty 
about the existence ofThought, what dimension of applicability does it give to Descartes' 
ensuing epistemological journey in general, in the more practical sense, that is to say 
beyond merely the condition ofbeing certain? 
After the Cogito argument has unfolded, Descartes concludes, as we have seen, 
that whether his thinking is of false non-existent objects or not has no bearing on the fact 
that he still has thoughts about these objects. Whatever is given to knowledge starts with 
Thought; with 'the thinking' of something. Awareness ofthe existence ofThought allows 
us to understand what certainty means with respect to the very possibility of there being 
knowledge in general, for all knowledge and all sensation, arise from within the intellect. 
The type of certainty provided by the Cogito is honed to establish the very possibility of 
epistemology to begin with, and does not correspond to any particular piece of 
knowledge proper, i.e., a particular element of knowledge actually known. 
The Cogito argument not only affirms the existence of a particular thing, it 
affinns the existence of that from which all knowledge starts. Before he can have any 
knowledge of the actual truth of the things in the world, he must first affi1m that such 
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knowledge is possible. The Cogito proof is the starting point of such an affirmation for it 
allows the Meditator to see that all knowledge of that world starts with thinking. 
In affirming the existence of thought, he gains no awareness about any concrete and 
empirical qualities of the external world. Nevertheless, he is now at least in the position 
to affirm that since thinking or thought exists then external knowledge is possible. Yet, 
returning again, to the 'condition of being certain', when we look at the discovery here as 
a unity, that is to say the condition of being certain taken together with the fact this 
certainty particularly pertains to 'thinking' or 'thought', we then ask - to what extent does 
this condition apply to external knowledge? I have just claimed that with respect to the 
condition being certain about thought, the Meditator has opened the door to the 
possibility of knowing 'in general' in so far as he now is absolutely aware that the key 
initial ingredient for knowing - thought - is real and existent. However, can this 
condition apply to the comprehensibility of the existence of things outside the ontological 
being of thought? Does his capacity to understand certainty as knowledge of a particular 
thing's existence or being, transcend its applicability to thought alone? Based on 
Descartes metaphysics of substance as it applies to the uniqueness and 'otherness' of all 
other things, I contend that without an initial moment of absolute proof of something 
other than thinking, the Meditator's condition of being certain has no external dimension 
or applicability - it relates to thinking alone. It opens the door to knowledge of the 
outside world but, does not apply to anything within that domain (to be discussed in next 
chapter). 
While the discovery of the Cogito yields a first moment of certainty it i not 
sufficient for establishing the archetype for understanding certainty as applicable to our 
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external-empirical knowledge proper. Of course, it is a given that at thi point of the 
Meditations all he knows now as true and real is the existence of Thought. Thus, I am not 
claiming here that certainty with respect to its object only applies to Thought for that is 
simply stating the obvious. Rather, what I am looking at here is, again, the condition of 
being certain itself. From this angle, what I am suggesting is that the very 
comprehension of certainty here cannot be (psychologically) transposed to 
comprehending cetiainty as the real ontological existence of other non-thinking things. It 
is only once the Meditator has arrived at knowledge of a particular external instantiation 
of something other than thought that he can consequently understand what certainty in 
that domain actually represents. He needs to base this certainty in something 
ontologically certain, but something other than Thought. 
In the order of discovery, this is reached when the Meditator arrives at an 
indubitable and cetiain knowledge of God's existence. I thus proceed to look at the 
argument of the Third Meditation which picks up on the very task of the First Meditation; 
linking our thoughts of things to those things as they actually are, ontologically 
independent from their givenness in mind. I first look at the issue of ideas in general, with 
respect to their givenness in mind as Thoughts as well as clarifying Descartes' stance on 
their possible cause. I then proceed to look at the Idea of God and the manner in which it 
yields for the Meditator the implied and necessary existence of God. I conclude the 
discussion by examining the type of certainty, once God has been shown to exist, that this 
gives the Meditator and its significance within the sphere of the entire project. 
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Chapter III: Our Ideas and The Idea of God 
3.1/ntro: 
A few words to recap what has been achieved with respect to the pursuit for 
certainty will help before proceeding. The incremental levels of honing his approach and 
method in the First Meditation expressed what Descartes was ultimately looking for, not 
just indubitability in the conceptual, logical sense but rather knowledge of something that 
is in fact true - knowledge of what has external ontological being in and for itself. With 
knowledge derived from or through the senses, the Meditator found neither indubitability 
nor certainty proper. In the realm of mathematics, and other non sensory-based simple 
eternal truths, the Meditator found an ineluctable logical and psychological indubitability. 
Nonetheless, due to the possibility of radical external deception he concluded that the 
bridge between the perceived indubitability of uch truths and their actual ontologically 
concrete existence in reality, that is to say beyond conceptuality, could not be established. 
In these truths he thus finds indubitability, but not certainty proper. 
Knowledge of the existence of 'thought' moves beyond mere conceptuality; it is 
the first truth that is accepted as dealing with, and referring to, something concretely and 
decisively real in the fullest ontological sense of the word - the presence ofThinking or a 
Thought in reality. However, the Cogito argument is not only an affirmation of the 
existence of Thought solely as naked intellection, void of any concrete content, but also 
of particular individual thoughts as well. The entire empirical world has been called into 
question and the only thing left standing, ontologically, is the existence of Thought, yet 
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our individual thoughts are part and parcel ofthis Thinking activity98 • Thus, while we 
may not have the external world we nevertheless at all times possess ideas of that world. 
The backdrop of the Third Meditation then, is a synthesis of the conclusions of 
the first two Meditations. The First has left the Meditator aware that none of his ideas or 
thoughts are objectively true in so far as their contents actually refer to real , ontologically 
existent things or objects. The Second Meditation, in establishing the necessity of the 
existence of Thought, has affitmed that regardless of the external reality of what his ideas 
claimed to be about, it is absolutely certain that the Meditator has these ideas themselves, 
as particular parts ofhis thinking. Armed with this affirmation Descartes' Meditator now 
returns back to the path of the First Meditation, attempting to look more closely at the 
possible cause of his ideas. In fact the entire approach and scope of the Third Meditation 
reveals it to be as an investigation of the cause of our ideas. 
3.2 Ideas in General: 
First and foremost we note that ideas are not things separate from the Cogito.99 
Rather, they are the particular moments of the Cogito's instantiated activity of thinking; 
they are in essence instantiations of individual thoughts. 100 As Kenny points out, the 
98 Again, it is this very presence of individual thoughts, of particular thought that allow us to see the 
Cogito, or Thinking, as a necessary ontological entity for the existence of any knowledge what so ever, 
for all knowledge of things begins with the Thinking of these things. 
99 I note here that I begin my examination of the Third Meditation at the point where the Medi tator begins 
to explore the nature of his ideas. While Descartes opens the Meditation with questions regarding 
deception and the possibility o f a God, these are ra ised as concerns that, as the Meditator recognizes, 
can only be confronted by explicitly taking apart the nature of his ideas. Indeed, since all he can cling to 
by the end of the Second Meditation is 'Thought ', it is only natural that he begins his query in the Third 
by further analyzing the nature of the particular moments of instantiated thought - that is to say, his 
ideas or thoughts. 
100 At the end of the Second Meditations Descartes concludes," ... I see now that even bodies are not s trictly 
perceived by the senses or the faculty o f imagination but by the intellect alone and that this perception 
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accepted philosophical meaning of 'idea' during Descaties' time was very distinct from 
the way Descartes had used the term. Kenny says, "Before De cartes, philosophers used 
it to refer to archetype in the divine intellect; it was a new departure to use it 
systematically for the contents of the human mind . . . " 10 1 
Now, one of the key aspects necessary to understanding ideas as contents of the 
mind is to realize what Descmies means when he refer to their truth or falsity. An idea in 
and for itself - that is to say, just as a thought in the mind - is not something that can be 
true or false. Ideas are mere thoughts or representations of things and, as such, cannot be 
false within the frameworks of the Cogito itself and thus they are not susceptible to any 
claim of truth or falsity even iftheir purported objects are in fact non existent. If I look 
at my idea of a ball of wax, whether the ball of wax is, ontologically speaking, externally 
a real thing or not, bears no effect on the presence of the idea in my mind. 102 
The actual truth of an idea stems from the correspondence between an object-
that which the idea is about- and an actual external thing. This brings us back to the First 
Meditation; one does not doubt that he or she has ideas but rather whether the ideas of 
things actually corTespond to something external in the empirical tangible world. Thus, 
Bernard Williams explains: 
..... for the mind to be involved in any actual fal sehood on the strength of 
derives not from the ir being touched or seen but from their being understood ... " CSM II 22. 
101 Kenny, Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy , 97. 
102 Regarding this issue Bernard Williams writes: " . . . An idea by itself does not contain either truth or 
falsehood, to have an idea in one ' s mind is just to think o f something, and j ust to think of something 
does not involve any claim that can be either true or fa lse . .. " Williams, Descartes: The Proj ect of Pure 
Enquiry, 130- 131 . We have already seen this issue dealt with in the Second Medi tation when the 
Meditator affinns that to see the wax and to think one sees the wax or, even further, to think that one 




these ideas it must do more than merely have the idea .. .. The principle 
occasion of falsehood is when l affirm that an idea which J have 
corresponds to something outside itself, that is to say, when I }udge that 
something really exists confonnable to some idea that I have. 03 
A slight qualification is needed here in order to clarify what does and does not 
actually count as an idea an idea, regardless of it always being true when taken strictly in 
its ontological sense, as a mode of thought. One could claim that an idea in fact is false if 
it represents a logical contradiction or fallacy, for example the idea of 2+4=7 or of a 
squared circle. For Descartes however, it would be misleading to think of such claims or 
statements as false ideas for they are in actuality not ideas at all. Rather they are, if 
anything, a collection of intertwined words that fonn false concepts and are thus 
unintelligible and unthinkable. 104 An idea is a thought, and a thought must be intelligible 
in such a way that I - the thinker - have an under tanding of what it means. Therefore I 
cannot say I have the thought of2+2=5 for I do not have the power to understand the 
meaning of these words and hence it is not an idea at all. 105 
103 Ibid. , 13 1 - 132. 
104 Looking, earlier, at the method of doubt, I had raised this issue with respect to the powers of the Evil 
Genius. While the demon makes it possible that, fo r example all mathematical operations are fa lse in 
and for themselves it neverthe less remains the case that I could not intell igibly understand them in 
another fashion; it is possible that 2+2 does not equal4 and may in fact equal 5, but I catmot intelligibly 
comprehend the meaning o f this. Hence, while I may utter the statement a 'Sara is the bachelor's wife ' I 
am not fom1ing a fals idea here, rather I am not comprehending the meaning of the concepts and hence 
have a malformed or incorrect thought. 
105 Descartes writes elsewhere: " I cannot express anything in words provided that I understand what l say, 
without its thereby being certain that there is within me the idea of what is signified by the words in 
question." AT VII 160. 
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3.3 The Types of Ideas: 
Descartes, having stated that ideas are thoughts about things, moves on to classify 
the different types of ideas. Here Descartes offers his well-known doctrine of the triadic 
classification of ideas. Ideas are, innate, adventitious, or fictitious (invented). An innate 
idea is one that has always existed in the mind and whose existence or being requires 
nothing but the internal activity, capacity and ability of the intellect. A fictitious idea is 
one that is the product of the mind itself, that is to say an invention of the mind, which 
does not refer to anything real but is rather an expression of the imagination through the 
combination and permutation of many other ideas. Finally, an idea is adventitious if it is 
an idea of something that is perceived as having its origin outside of the mind. As 
Descartes' concern in the Third Meditation (and for the entire inquiry) is to determine 
whether it is possible to move from a 'thing' or object given to the mind in its "idea-form" 
to the actual external existence of that thing outside of the mind, it is clear that his 
primary concern is with adventitious ideas. Nevertheless I would first like to clarify a few 
issues regarding the nature of the overall classification. 106 
In a sense, all ideas are innate for we only have the mind and its ideas. Thus, at a 
first reading, one may object to this classification if it posits a type of idea - namely 
adventitious ones - that makes an appeal to external experience and thus objects outside 
of mind. The point of contention, naturally, is that if adventitious ideas are those that, 
with respect to their object - that is to say, that which they are about - find their actual 
origin in external experience then these cannot be granted for there is nothing outside 
106 l make note here that there is a plethora of issues concerning this division, most of which go far beyond 
the scope of my focus at the present moment. I am more concemed with the pursuit for extemal truth 
and thus my predominant focus here is to concentrate, as the Meditator himself does, on adventitious 
ideas. 
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thinking, at this point of the argument. Yet this is not what Descartes intended by the 
classification. The division is meant to represent how ideas appear to us in their 
immediate givenness within thought. The classification offers an account of the character 
of the ideas, that is to say, the descriptive properties of the objects of our ideas, yet it 
makes no presupposition about the existence of anything other than mind per se. The 
classification refers to our understanding of the various types of contents of ideas as they 
appear in consciousness- that is, in complete separation with any dependence on the 
natural world or sensation. It is, as it were, a phenomenological descriptive account of 
what the ideas pertain to be about. This holds for all three types of ideas. 
Descattes' division here thus deals with the objects or contents of his ideas strictly 
as they are given to and for the mind. With respect to innate ideas, Descartes refers to 
them as ideas whose object appear to us as determined by the intellect alone and so they 
depend on no external cause. What this means is that an idea is not said to be innate 
solely in the sense that it is in the mind, for all ideas are innate from this perspective. 
Rather, the point is that, looking at the nature of such purely intellectual ideas, their 
character is such that we conceive of them as originating from and, created by the 
capacities of the intellect. Innate ideas are not only present in the intellect but are 
detem1ined, caused or brought into being, by the power of the intellect alone. 107 An 
107 For example, if we consider a purely intellectual idea such as the idea of extension, it is seen by 
Descartes as determined by the inte llectual capacities of the mind. Again, that is not to say that the idea 
of extension (as an innate idea) does not correlate to extension qua actual object or thing in reality, for 
that is an entirely different claim. To use such ideas dynamically, that i , to actually think of them in 
some sort of practical and applicable manner, does indeed involve physical and tangible experience. 
Yet what we are looking at here, at this level of discussion is the fact that we perceive the objects of the 
ideas - that which they are about - as requiring no external causes, no causes at all for that matter, other 
than the mechanisms of the intellect's capacities. Williams writes that with respect to such innate ideas: 
" ... While development, practice and experience may be needed for human being to be able to think with 
them, they do not really depend on corporeal causes at all and they could play a role in abstract thought 
for a creature who did not have a body and needed no external stimulus to elicit these ideas in the 
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innate idea is conceived as being born from the powers of the intellect alone, yet having 
an external dimension with respect to the reality of its object. It claims to be an idea about 
a thing that has a non-mental ontological reality. This however, is not the case with 
fictitious (invented) ideas. 
The idea of a chimera is an idea of a thing that I perceive not only as originating 
from the powers of the intellect but, also, one referring to nothing onto logically separate 
from mind. It is perceived as having no reality outside the confines of the human intellect 
and imagination. The chimera is never assumed to have any reality outside of the 
imagination. An innate idea, in essence, though it arises from within the intellect, may 
with respect to its content, refer to a thing, property, relation, etc, which we believe has 
some ontological reality other than its presence in mind, while a fictitious one remains, 
ontologically, always as a thought or concept with no external status - has no otherness to 
it. 
Adventitious ideas, on the other hand, are those whose intentional objects appear 
to originate from outside the subject, in so far as their cause is concerned. They are not 
only about things, objects, or events which we believe to have ontological existence other 
than the thinking self, we also perceive them as caused by that which they purport to be 
about. Descartes is merely describing here our standard natural disposition of assuming 
that the objects of our ideas not only correspond to their objects but are also caused by 
them; when I look at my idea of the wax, I am naturally drawn to believe that it (the idea) 
is caused by the wax itself as an actual concrete object in the world. 108 
mind .... . Descartes believed that these basically innate ideas could be developed without any experience 
at all". Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enqui1y, 134. 
108 This does not stand in opposition to the Meditator's conclusion of the Second Meditation where he 
affirmed that ultimately it is the mind that sees the wax. That still stands; we see with the mind's ~ye but 
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In examining the nature of adventitious ideas we presuppose a level of 
involuntariness here; they are infringed upon us, unwillingly, by that which they are 
about - the external sense objects. This of course is merely our belief or disposition or, 
as Williams eloquently refers to it, a natural tendency of the understanding. While most 
of these thoughts or ideas claim to be about a world or realm external to Thought, the 
external actuality or being of such a world cannot be granted at this point of the 
argument. Thus it is the task of the Meditator to resist such an assumption and search for 
the true and actual cause of these ideas. The existence of these "things" outside of the 
mind is exactly what Descartes is setting out to prove. This is clearly the point of 
contention that the Meditator confronts in the First Meditation. 
The three arguments of the first Meditation have forced the Meditator to affirm 
that he cannot link the objects of his ideas to some sort of external ontological reality 
where they exist. Nevertheless, even if the source of these ideas is not concretely that 
which they are about, do they not, asks the Meditator, still need to have some 01igin? 
This is the first task which he faces as he returns to the grounds of the First Meditation -
what is the origin or cause of his ideas, regardless of the fact that they may all be 
objectively false. 
3.4 Ideas and Their Origin. 
The Meditator looks at ideas from two different perspectives; ideas taken strictly 
as modes of thinking, regardless of their content and, then moves to look at ideas in so far 
as they are ideas with particular objective qualities and character. As our main focus here 
the origin of what we see - its cause - is what we are so naturally biased to view as the object proper in 
the world, be it a concrete or abstract object. 
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is an attempt to bridge ideas to the world which they are supposedly about, the Meditator 
naturally concentrates on the latter. 109 
3.4(a) The Cause of an Idea, qua mode a_[ Thought. 
In looking for their cause, the Meditator first considers ideas in their pure naked 
ontological form, that is to say he looks at them as modes of thought, independent of their 
content - that which they are purportedly about. The immediate setup of the Meditator's 
approach here is already anticipated from the conclusions he has accepted thu far- since 
ideas, taken strictly as modes of Thought, require nothing but Thought to exist, then we 
conclude that ideas are caused by thought. From this angle it may seem quite peculiar to 
say that ideas are caused at all. If they represent singular moments of the instantiation of 
thought, then formally speaking they are not really caused by the Cogito but rather 
proceedfrom it. 11 0 Yet, in fact, this precise point appears to be the actual scope of what 
Descartes had in mind - ideas are caused by the Cogito in so far as they proceed from it. 
Descartes' position here sheds some light on the ontological relation between 
Thought and Ideas. On the one hand, ideas, in proceeding from the Cogito, are not 
onto logically collapsible to it, but rather are a part of it. Ideas as 'particular' thoughts are 
in a sense facets or instantiation of the thinking activity but are not one and the same as 
109 I therefore focus the core discussion on idea of a particular kind, and thus merely offer a quick look at 
the cause of ideas taken strictly as modes of thought in order to clarify the loose ontological distinction 
between ' thought' and ' ideas' . 
110 In what sense does an idea need to have an origin, a source or a cause? This is raised by Caterus in the 
Objections and Replies. In the immediate strict sense it conveys Descartes' treatment of ideas as a type 
of a thing - namely, a mode of thought - that must have some origin, be it set f-caused or externally 
determined. 
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that activity taken as a single whole - as Thought itself. That being said, ideas are not to 
be viewed as some new ontological entity, that is to say the argument here does not 
extend or expand the given ontology beyond what we presently have - thought. In so far 
as ideas are modes of thought itself, we cannot perform a complete ontological separation 
between ideas and thinking - ideas are ontologically part of the Cogito. Thus, as 
Descartes states, looking at the ontological nature ofhis ideas, he concludes that their 
being or existence, as modes of thought alone, require nothing but the existence of 
thought and are thus all equal in that respect; they can all be seen as caused by the 
Cogito, completely independent of their intentional object. 111 He affirms, " In so far as the 
ideas are considered simply as modes of thought, there is no recognizable inequality 
among them: they all appear to come from within me in the same fashion." 112 
3.4(b) Ideas considered with respect to their intentional object. 
Ideas taken solely as modes of thought are then, as Descartes tells us, all equal in 
terms of their ontological reality or essence. However, as we have seen, our main 
concern here is about the objects of our ideas - the reality of that which our ideas are 
about. Ideas are not all the same when they are examined with respect to their apparent 
contents. We now take into consideration the degrees of complexity of the objects of our 
ideas- the complexity of their perceived attributes and properties. It is here that the 
discussion gets its true force. If something, 'X', is the cause of my ideas then that thing 
111 In examining ideas as caused by the Cogito we are not looking at them as the existence of something 
formally and onto logically different from thought itself but ratl1er as the instantiation of thinking 
activity. 
11 2 CSM II 27-28. 
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relates to the idea not only in respect to the idea's ontological form as a mode of thought, 
but, also in respect to the multitude of attributes of the objects of our individual ideas. 
When we look at the strictly ontological essence of ideas, we see that since they 
are all static, we cannot relate the cause to any dynamic qualities or attributes, for ideas 
are only seen as analogous to thoughts, and all proceed from the same source. That is to 
say, all ideas, taken as just ideas, have the same attribute - they are modes of thought. 
Yet when we differentiate ideas on the basis of the attributes of their actual content, the 
notion of their cause itselfbecomes much more dynamic. Here again the Meditator's 
excursion is purely phenomenological; he will examine the characteri tics of his ideas, 
solely as they are given in and to mind or thought alone. 
The Meditator's approach in his quest to examine the descriptive and qualitative 
properties of what his ideas are about revolves around the notions of objective and f ormal 
reality. 113 An in-depth look at this issue is far beyond the scope of my present argument. I 
simply wish to clarify what Descartes actually means by these terms and how they are 
used in reference to our ideas and their contents. Briefly stated, by the fonnal reality of a 
thing, Descartes means its 'actual' reality, that is to say, what the thing is - in and for 
itself - and not as it appears in mind. 114 A thing's objective reality is its reality as given 
through 'representation' . rts objective reality is the thing as it appears to the mind' s eye. 
In fact, Descartes appears to have the Meditator use these terms synonymously- where 
'formal ' and 'actual ' are equivalent and, 'objective' and 'representational' are equivalent. 
11 3 ince the Meditator does not elaborate on how, why or from where, he has obtained knowledge of such 
concepts we are le ft , again, assuming that Descartes is chatmeling his own metaphysical stance on the 
issue. 
114 Or, as it stands on its own, ontologically independent of any perception we have of it and, for that 
matter, ontologically independent of anything else. This division clearly echoes a Socratic/Platonic 
division of knowledge into appearance and reality. 
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The fonnal reality of say a ball of wax is its ontological essence - which, within 
Cartesian metaphysics, is its being an extended finite material substance. ln this sense all 
corporeal things share the same reality. 11 5 However, although all such things share the 
same formal reality as extended things, they vary drastically with respect to the plethora 
of representational attributes we perceived about them. When we consider the 
representational characteristics of the objects of our ideas, we see differences from one 
thing to the next as no two things are objectively - that is to say representationally - fully 
alike. Now, all this is taken with respect to actual external extended things, within 
Descartes' broader system of physics/metaphysics. However in the present line of 
argument of the Third Meditation, seeing that the external corporeal and, mathematical 
world have both been abolished, it is only natural that the Meditator speaks of formal and 
objective reality specifically as it applies to our ideas. 116 
The fonnal reality of an idea is its actual reality, that is to say 'what it formally 
is'. Now we have already seen that an idea is,formally peaking, strictly 'a mode of 
thought'. Therefore, regardless of their representational content - the characteristics of 
that which they are about - all ideas are equal in so far as their formal reality constitutes 
modes of thought. Hence the idea of a fictional chimera has no more, or less, f01mal 
reality then the idea of a stick or the abstract idea of say, multiplicity; the content of the 
idea has no bearing on what it actually is, qua instantiation ofThought. 11 7 On the other 
11 5 This is at the core of Descartes' metaphysics of substance; a ll tangible concrete things share the same 
substance-form - extended matter. 
116 While they are not extended material things, ideas for Descartes are nevertheless things, and hence this 
distinction of objective and formal reality is indeed as applicable to ideas as they are to golden triangles. 
In fact it is here that Descartes' use of the terminology takes a novel tum. 
11 7 For detailed discussion on this issue see Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquify, Ch.5 (11 5 -
47). 
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hand, an idea's objective reality (or being/essence) is its reality as a particular thought of 
a particular object or thing. The objective reality of an idea is thus its representational 
and objective content - the properties and attributes of that which it claims to be about. 
In this sense, suggests Descartes, we can collapse the objective reality of the sun 
itself to the objective reality of our idea of the sun. Clearly we do not know that the 
objective reality of the sun itself actually corresponds to the idea of the sun in the exact 
manner given to mind, for we do not know whether there is sun out there at all. 
evertheless since what we have now is the idea of the sun, its objective reality is still its 
characteristics, as it is given in mind. That is to say, just as the characteristics of the sun 
itself ( if say, there were a real existing sun) belonged actually to the sun, so, whatever 
attributes belong to the sun taken as an object of the 'idea-of-sun' belong to the idea 
itself. 118 
For Descartes, the objective reality of an idea is what objectively (via 
representation) belongs to the intentional object of the idea - that which the idea is about. 
In Descartes' own words, objective reality is:" . ... the being of the thing represented in 
the idea, as it is represented in the idea ... Whatever we perceive as being in the object of 
our idea is in the ideas themselves objectively." 11 9 That is not to say that an idea itself is 
ontologically equivalent to the actual representational attributes of the object of the idea, 
but rather, that the perceived attribute of the object of the idea belongs objectively to the 
idea itself. If I have an idea P which is about a thing, an object, that has attribute Q, we 
are not claiming that P=Q formally, that is to say that P is ontologically reducible to Q, 
but rather that Q is the objective reality of P; it is what P represents in tenns of 
118 See First set of Objections and Replies. CSM II 74-75. 
119 Second set of Objections and Replies, CSM II 113- 114. 
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descriptive attributes. 120 
Now, with respect to our present discussion the most important element to draw 
out of the objective/formal distinction is its relation to causality. We are after the cause of 
ideas in so far as their objective reality is concerned; the relationship between the 
representational content of our ideas and whatever the cause of such content may be. 121 
The entire approach to this question here rests on Descartes' heavy reliance on both the 
Causal Principle in general and its applications to the nature of ideas. The Meditator's 
approach here, is, again, channeling Descartes' own tance on the metaphysical criteria 
for causality, in terms of both his understanding of the causal principle in general, as well 
as its application to ideas in particular. This is perhaps the one single most important 
element of the Third Meditation for it not only clarifies his stance on the relation of ideas 
to their purported objects but, in doing so, it opens the door to the uniqueness and 
distinctiveness of the idea of God. 
3. 5 The Causal Principle: 
Descartes conception of the relationship between cause and effect, in general, and 
in its relation to ideas - rests entirely on this principle; there must be at least as much - if 
not more - present in a cause as there is in an effect. 122 The cause-effect relationship is 
120 Or, as Cottingham adds in a footnote to the text, we can think of the objective reality of Q as its 'Q'-
ne s. If Q, a the object of my idea, is the table, its objective reality is its table-ness that is to say, its 
attributes that make it a table. 
121 We are attempting to examine whether we have any idea that can allow us to move fro m that idea to 
the necessary cause of that idea based on the actual attributes of that idea, i.e. its objective reality. 
122 This affirms also that, from nothing only nothing fo llows, or, something cannot proceed from nothing. If 
something cannot proceed from nothing it must be the case that there cannot be anything in the effect 
that is not already present in the cause. Conversely, if the effect had some attributes that were not 
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one oftransference; whatever is in the effect is there by virtue of receiving it from its 
cause. Descartes states: 
Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must be at least as much 
in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause. For where, I 
ask, could the effect get its reality from, if not from the cause? And how 
could the cause give it to the effect unless it possessed it? It follows from 
this both that something cannot come from nothing, and also that what is 
more perfect--that is, contains more reality-cannot arise from what is less 
c 123 per1ect . . . 
The Meditator's acceptance ofthe concrete and actual existence of such a causal 
ptinciple in general, and even more so its applicability to the nature of ideas points to 
what some have taken to be one of the most serious problems in Descartes' supposedly 
presupposition-less endeavor. This view of causality may have been seen by Descartes 
and his contemporaries as a basic self-evident truth; a rule given from the natural light of 
reason, yet, Descartes makes no effort to have the Mediator defend or prove it, which 
appears contrary to the rigorous conditions laid out by the First Meditation. 
Do we have absolute indubitable and certain knowledge or awarenes that this 
principle is both conceptually and actually real? If one commits to the 'hard' stance on 
the implications of the Demon hypothesis- as I have in the previous chapter - then 
ultimately this principle suffers the same fate as all other simple and self-evident truths. 
We have already seen that eternal truths, such as this principle, may indeed be, for the 
Meditator, self-evident and certain in so far as psychological limits of doubt are 
concerned, however, what is at stake here is how he knows that this principle represents a 
true claim about reality. 
immanently present to the cause, this would suggest that these attributes, regardless of their variety and 
complexity, arose from nothing, which violate the initial premise. 
123 CSM II 28-29. 
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Insofar as the Meditator is concerned, we are never offered, even analogously, 
anything that bridges the 'conceptual-actual' gap with respect to this principle and thus we 
are forced to accept Descartes' metaphysics as a given presupposition. This is indeed, an 
insoluble and inescapable difficulty within the Third Meditation. Descartes subjects the 
Meditator's supposedly 'clean-slate' approach, to his own brand of metaphysics 
throughout the Meditation and we have already confronted this before. evertheless, 
nowhere in the entire work is it as prevalent as it is in the present context since the entire 
ensuing argument revolves around this principle.124 
Returning to his pursuit, just as the Meditator applied Descartes' own notion of 
objective and formal reality when he examines the general ontological nature of ideas, he 
now subjects them to the causal principle. Whatever the cause of my ideas may be it must 
have at least as much if not more than what is present in these very ideas. As 
controversial as it may be for the Meditator simply to adopt the Causal Principle in 
general, Descartes may be seen as even less justified in applying it to ideas. There is no 
reason provided why this principle which Descartes would have most likely understood 
with respect to the physical corporeal world, could or should apply to the nature of ideas. 
This is indeed part of the difficulty at hand here, but, since the Meditator does not know 
concretely of anything else existing other than his mind, it is only natural , [hold, that he 
applies the causal principle in general to the one thing that he does in fact know exists -
Thought and its ideas. 
124 The T hird Meditation is often accused of being a massive point o f departure as it contains several 
metaphysical assumptions besides the causal principle. That being said, as my concern here is with the 
movement of the argument towards the pursuit for certainty, it is, again, not my concern to offer a 
detailed critique of either the validity of the princ iple itself nor the validity o f presupposing it at this 
point. My focus here is the implications of this principle for the Meditator 's grasp of the origin of his 
ideas. I merely point out the problematic element of Descartes' approach here and continue my 
examination of how it is used. 
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The Meditator expresses his stance on the ontological nature of ideas and their 
origin; whatever is the formal cause of my ideas must objectively and fonnally 
(eminently) contain whatever is objectively contained in my ideas. When we were just 
looking at the objects/content of our ideas without considering the cause of these ideas, 
Descartes had maintained that the objective reality of the idea is analogous to the 
objective reality of its object. That is to say, the descriptive and representational reality or 
quality of our ideas is analogous to the objective-representational property of the 
intentional objects of our ideas - that which they are about. Descartes now pushes this 
further, applying the causal principle and thereby affirming that whatever the actual cause 
of an idea may be, it will, onto logically and actually, contain what is objectively present 
in the idea. Whatever the idea has objectively, it receives from its cause which has it 
fonnally and concretely. Therefore, the causes of the idea of the sun will formally or, 
actually, posses the qualities that are present in the idea; in short it will be something that 
itself, in reality, contains or possesses whatever the sun possesses. Whatever is the 
original cause of our ideas is what transfers to these ideas their objective reality, and 
hence actually has these properties, in the formal eminent sense. 
In looking at their cause, the Meditator insists that while ideas can pawn off 
other ideas, there can never be an infinite regress of idea-upon-idea. There must be an 
original point, a source which is itself not an idea but rather something that possesses the 
objective qualities we see in our ideas. This brings us back to the Meditator's original 
temptation expressed in the First Mediation; that ideas correspond to their purported 
object(s). The crux of the argument here is that the causal principle of ideas does not, on 
its own, allow us to make that jump. The ptinciple only affirms that 'some-thing' must 
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have these properties or qualities of the objects of our thought as they are given to 
thought, but, it is ambiguous as to what that may be. 
Hence, Descartes sees two options here; either I am the cause of the idea or, it is 
something outside of me, that is to say, outside of thought. If my mind is the origin of the 
idea of the sun then as such it is the source and foundation for supplying all the qualities I 
attribute to this particular object as it is given to thought. In other words, if this were the 
case with respect to all of our adventitious ideas, the Cogito would fonnally contain the 
attributes which are objectively present in all of our ideas. If, alternately, it can be shown 
that the mind cannot fonnally or eminently contain what is objectively present in the 
idea, we would need to conclude that the cause of these attributes (the idea's objective 
reality) is something external to the subject. Thus he says, 
If the objective reality of my idea turns out to be so great that I am sure the 
same reality does not reside in me .. .. hence I myself cannot be its cause, it 
will necessary follow that I am not alone in the world but that ome other 
thing which is the cause of this idea necessarily exists. 125 
We have earlier lost the world and anything external to the subject due to the 
Demon Hypothesis, yet we now see that regaining it, or at least gaining an instance of it, 
is possible if we can show that thinking itself cannot, based on its own essence, furnish 
the necessary conditions for causing this or that idea, when we take into consideration the 
qualities or attributes of the objects of our ideas. As the Meditator proceeds to see what is 
common to all his adventitious ideas his decisive conclusion is that he sees nothing in 
them (ideas of corporeal things) that could not arise from his own mind. He explicitly 
states," ... as to my ideas of corporeal things, I see nothing in them which is so great or 
125 CSM II 29. 
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excellent as to make it seem impossible that it originated in myself. .. " 126 The claim here 
is that all his ideas could have as their cause the 'thinking thing' itself since, it is at least 
possible, that the Thinking Thing could ' formally' posses all the properties and 
characteristics of the objects of his ideas. What however does this actually entail? In 
suggesting that the entire gamut of descriptive and qualitative propetties which describe 
the contents of his thoughts, can 'originate from myself Descartes is making an explicit 
claim about the possible ontological nature of the 'thinking thing' ; namely that these 
properties could belong to the essence of the thinking thing. 127 
The self of the Second Meditation was reduced, strictly speaking, to this distant 
and almost non-discursive ontological being, a pure, thinking thing. Nevertheles now we 
have a much richer vision ofthe possible nature of self, one that can include the totality 
of all properties and qualities. We now no longer need to doubt the external existence of 
that which our ideas are about solely due to the possibility of radical deception, but rather 
due to the possibility that the mind alone is the sole origin of the entire contents of our 
ideas. Hence the quest for certainty regarding the content of our ideas with respect to the 
objects (content) of our ideas - in so far as this certainty means establishing the 
connection between an object in mind and its corresponding object in the realm of non-
mental reality - is now facing its toughest obstacle. 
In affinning that it is actually I who can formally posses all the properties the 
objects have, I am at once annihilating the necessity of any object-of-thought having any 
126 Ibid. 
127 In the previous chapter I raised the problem of whether the essence of the thinking self could be more 
than just thought or thinking. Descartes ambiguous stance on the matter is especially accentuated in this 
present context. Since he ultimately does not know what this Res Cogitans truly is, it is at least 
conceptually possible that it could contain these myriad of properties and qualities. 
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being or reality external to thought. This is the heart of Descartes' theory of ideas; they 
do not need to correspond to or, originate from, anything other than thought. On the one 
hand this raises and elevates the ontological status of the Cogito, yet at the same time it 
radically pushes us further away from obtaining the certainty I claim Descartes is after -
the move from an indubitable certainty in Thought, to its actual ontological reality 
outside the self. 
3.6 The Idea of a Perfect and Infinite God 
In this context the idea of God at once surfaces as something radically different 
from all other ideas. Amongst my ideas, states the Meditator, is one of a perfect and 
infinite being. Following the same scrutiny placed on other ideas, the entire argument 
here is a causal one - expressing the move from an idea of God, to the origin or source of 
the idea as it stands in relation to the criteria stipulated by the Causal Principle. [n 
accordance to the principle, the Meditator naturally concludes that this idea itself could 
not exist were it not the case that its cause - whatever it may be - actually and formally 
possessed these attributes of perfection and infinity, as they are objectively 
(representationally) present in the idea. His conclusion is that, since nothing more or, 
even as perfect or infinite as God could exist, the object of the idea - God - must 
cotTespond to that alone in which perfection and infinite actually reside; in short it is God 
itself. 128 
128 As l have earlier explained with respect to the Cogito argument, my concern is not with the 
me thodological validity of the proof itself but rather the type of certainty it gives the Medi tator. I thus 
do not, in the remainder of the chapter, focus on either defending or refuting the mechanics of the proof 
itse lf. Rather, I would like to focus on those core issues inhe rent to the argument which clarify the 
significance of this discovery to his overall pursuit for an archetype of certainty. 
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3. 6(a) The Idea in Thought: 
The Meditator, at first, presents the idea of God as an idea that is in fact present to 
his thinking; when he reflects upon the various ideas in his mind he finds that one of 
them is of a supremely perfect and infinite being. At this level of the argument, 
Descartes merely treats the idea of a God as something that is as immediate and given as 
any other idea he has thus far treated; it is simply provided as a given to him; when he 
looks at his ideas he sees amongst them one, whose intentional object is a perfect and 
infinite being. 129 Since at this point of the argument the Meditator i only certain of the 
existence of Mind or Thought and its content - ideas - it is only appropriate, that he 
explores the objective reality of this idea as it is immediately intuited within Thought and 
not appeal to any external metaphysical or theological principles. 130 It is here that he 
finds that the idea is that of a being which is complete, self caused, omnipotent, the cause 
and guarantor of all - in short it is the idea of an infinite and perfect being. 
As it is these very attributes of perfection and infinity which distinguish this idea 
objectively, from all other ideas, the Meditator at first sets out to clarify several key 
issues or points with respect to the actual presence of the idea of God in mind. The first is 
129 More explic itly tated: "By the name God I understand a substance that is infinite, independent, all-
knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself and everything else, if anything else does exist, has been 
created."CSM II 29-30. It may be objected that, not proving that he has the idea to begin with is 
problematic. Yet this line of critique does not, I be lieve, adequately grasp the grounds already laid out 
by Descartes. We have seen that the affim1ation of the Cogito (Thought) inseparably accompanies the 
affirmation Thoughts/ Ideas and thus it is superfluous for Descartes to offer any proof for the presence 
of any of the ideas present in his ' thinking. The thinking of an idea is in a sense a self-evident proof of 
its existence or be ing. 
130 Descartes' own personal and theological conceptio n of God's essence or being may have stretched far 
beyond these few descriptive qualities or characteristics. Yet within the framework of the Meditation, 
approaching these would not do justice to the philosophical approach at hand here; he thus correctly 
only focuses on the immediately given elements or attributes of the idea as it appear to his mind's eye. 
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the problem of the intelligibility of this idea to begin with. Do we actually have a true 
clear understanding of what this idea means, or, is it a confused one or even blank and 
non-rational to the same degree that the idea of a squared circle is? If the entire argument 
of the Third Meditation is to move from the idea of God to the idea's cause, then 
Descartes must be firm that this idea of God is indeed a rationally coherent one. The 
second issue is that the idea is a not a negative one; an idea that is an abstraction or 
negation of some other idea present to thought. 
3. 6(b) The Idea of God: Its Intelligibility- Grasping Vs Understanding 
An immediate point of difficulty which Descartes confronts is directed towards 
those who maintain that that the full and true meaning of the idea of a perfect and infinite 
being is ultimately incomprehensible to the human mind. Ifhe has the idea in his mind it 
must meet the criterion of what constitutes an idea which, as we have seen, is not just 
collection of words but of course words whose meaning I rationally understand. A finite 
being, one may hold, is incapable of adequately grasping the idea of the infinite, the 
complete and the perfect. Descartes' response here, often misunderstood or 
misinterpreted, rests entirely on a differentiation between grasping the nature of God in 
it completeness, versus having an understanding of God as infinite and perfect. 
Descartes agreed with those who asserted that a complete grasp of God's essence - as 
pure substance - was not possible for a finite being. 131 Such deep grasp would demand 
131 Or, to echo the Neo-Platonist claim - to fully understand the infinite- its full essence and be ing -
implies becoming one with it, having a form of ontological merger between the understanding subject 
and the infinite itself. 
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some sort of ontological unity between the thinking substance and, the infinite and 
perfect being itself. This was not only impossible insofar as our own ontology was 
concerned but, more importantly, was contradictory to the unique and singular 
ontological being of God himself. 
That said, Descartes is clearly against the claim that our inability to fully grasp the 
complete essence of the infinite implies that nothing can be known about God. While a 
higher level of knowing or grasping God is beyond the cognitive abilities of a finite 
being, Descartes maintains that when we think of God as that which is infinite and 
perfect, we clearly and distinctly know what these words or concepts mean. One does not 
need to have a complete grasp of what it is like to be infinite and perfect, in order to 
comprehend what is meant by these terms. 132 While 'understanding' may very well be 
lower on the epistemological ladder than 'grasping', such a complete and comprehensive 
grasp is not necessary for a basic comprehension of the significance and meaning of the 
terms at hand. 
ln short, it is sufficient, claims Descartes, that I understand the concept of the 
infinite and perfect even if I cannot fully grasp it. 133 He states: " lt does not matter that I 
do not grasp the infinite, or that there are countless additional attributes of God which I 
cannot in any way grasp, and perhaps cannot even reach in my thought. . . It is enough that 
132 That is to say, we can never fully grasp the instantiation of perfection and infinitude as it is 
ontologically present through and within God, yet we understand what the idea of perfection and 
infinitude mean. In short , we do not grasp the manifestation of the infinite and perfect, yet we do 
comprehend and understand what these mean, at least conceptually. 
133 To Mersenne, Descartes writes; " ... just as we can touch a mountain but not put our arms around it. To 
grasp something is to embrace it in one's thought; to know something, it suffices to touch it with ones 
thought" (Letter to Mersenne, 26 May, 1630)" CSM II 32-33. 
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I understand the infinite ... " 134 In fact, the Meditator insists that not only can one 
understands the idea of God but that it is in fact the most understandable, clear and 
di tinct of all his ideas. 135 
3.6(c) The idea of God: Its Intelligibility- Not via negativa: 
While a detailed exposition of the concepts is not provided, the Meditator does 
however attempt to somewhat clarify his use of the terms by contra ting them with his 
own essence. He presents the idea in relation to the nature of the one thing whose essence 
he is absolutely certain of; Thought. The contrasting of the idea of the infinite and 
complete in relation to the nature of the thinking elf as a limited, finite, lacking and 
incomplete substance, expresses the most crucial point regarding the intelligibility and 
significance of the idea of God. 136 
The Meditator immediately denies that idea of God is a negative one, arrived at 
by a negation of the nature of self as finite and limited. If the concept of God were to be 
known through a via negativa, the comprehension of the concepts ' infinite ' and ' perfect' 
would be dependent on and, secondary to, comprehension of the finite. God would then 
only be understood in reference to what it is not as opposed to what it actually is; God is 
134 CSM II 32. 
135 It is in the nature ofThought in general to be embedded with the idea of the infinite and perfect, and 
hence it is utterly clear and present to the mind's eye. " .... the idea that I have of God the truest and 
most clear and distinct of all my ideas." CSM II 32. The concepts of infinity and perfection are so clear 
to the Meditator, that he does not e laborate at any great leng th about their pecific meaning, which is 
purely intuitive to him. 
1.16 This is beautifully worded in the Fourth Medita tion; " .. . when l consider the fac t that I have doubts, or 
tha t I am a thing that is incomplete and dependent, then there arises in me a clear and distinct idea of a 
be ing who is independent and complete, that is, and idea of God" CSM II 3 7 . 
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that which the finite thinking-self is not. Though the idea of the infinite and perfect stood 
in opposition to the nature of the self as finite and imperfect, for Descaties it was in fact 
the latter - the Res Cogitans - that was understood as imperfect and finite by means of an 
abstraction and negation of the original and, 'positive' attributes of the former. 
For Descartes, as Williams notes, the positive term always precedes the negative; 
it is through the negation of the positive that we arrive at our understanding of negative 
concepts. 137 If the concept of God, as infinite and perfect, was derived negatively from 
our concept of the self as finite and imperfect, it would imply, as Descartes' claims, that 
the idea of the infinite and perfect is only understood in abstraction from his 
understanding of the essence of Thought. Since a negative term is abstracted from the 
positive, the former is naturally, for Descartes, far less clear and distinct than the latter. 
This cannot be the case with the idea of God - the order is obviously reversed; it is only 
because we already have an idea of the infinite, complete, and the perfect that we 
understand ourselves as finite and lacking.138 • 
One of the points of difficulty regarding this issue, stems from the fact that the 
137 Here, the negative is dependent on the positive and not vice versa - that is to say, we understand the 
negative only through an abstraction from the positive but the positive is understood in and through 
itself. For example, in the Third Meditation, Descartes suggests that our under tanding of 'darkness' is 
derived from our primary understanding o f 'light' . I need an awareness of the concept 'heat' to know 
what 'cold ' is, whereas the concept of 'heat' itself needs not be contrasted with its opposite for it to be 
intellectually understood. The negative idea as an abstraction from something else clearly cannot be 
understood in i a lation from that thing. (See CSM Il 3 1) This stands in opposition to a philosophical 
stance which mainta ins that opposite concepts are understood as a unity; a concept and its opposite are 
understood simultaneously - each is defined and understood in relation to its opposite and the two are 
thus inseparable. From this approach, unlike the Cartesian stance, there is no one initial primary positive 
concept from which we understand its negation, ra ther, the order is irrelevant; each concept represents 
that negation of the other and thus, they are, in a ense, dependent on each other. 
138 From Descartes' epistemological position here, it is logically inconceivable that the infinite and 
complete be understood as an abstraction from something that is much lesser - the incomplete and 
finite. This would make the fonner subordinate to the latter, which would imply that I derive my 
understanding of the infinite, whole, complete, and perfect, from something that is epistemo logically of 
a lesser reality (both objectively and formally). 
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chronological movement in the Third Meditation is indeed from the negative - the Res 
Cogitans - to the positive - God- which has often lead to confusion regarding which 
one is actually antecedent for the Meditator. We first examined that which is finite and 
imperfect and only then move to the perfect and infinite. Yet it is Descartes' position 
however that while he .first recognizes his own condition of doubt and desire, he could 
only now- in looking at his idea of God - understand these as negative imperfections if 
and because he is already equipped with an innate awareness of what it means for 
something to be perfect, complete, infinite and flawless. Doubt, want, desire, anguish and 
all other corporeal and mental constraints can only be seen as a lack or an imperfection in 
relation to the idea of something that is perfect and does not Jack or want or desire, etc. 
The Meditator asks, "how could I understand that I doubted or desired - that is, lacked 
something - and that I was not wholly perfect, unless there was in me some idea of a 
more perfect being which enabled me to recognize my own defects by comparison."139 
It is, in fact, not merely a matter of negation and opposition that is at stake here. 
The idea of God does not need to be contrasted with any other idea in order to be clearly 
understood. Through the eyes of the Meditator there is an internal, intuitive non-
discursive character to our understanding of the concepts at hand that makes it essentially 
impossible to fully and adequately contrast it with anything else. From this perspective, 
his intuition of perfection and infinitude not only precede and define our under tanding of 
the Cogito as limited and finite, they are also the most immediate, independent and clear 
ideas he can have for they are self-given in a manner that requires appeal to no other idea 
- abstract or otherwise. 
139 CSMII 3 1. 
95 
------- --- --- -------
3. 7 The Cause of the Idea of God. 
3. 7(a) The cause of the Idea itself. 
Having established the existence of a clear and distinct idea of a perfect infinite 
being, the Meditator now places this idea under the same scrutiny we have seen all other 
ideas subjected to - establishing the true relation between the idea and its cause. 140 The 
Meditator has just affirmed that with respect to all other ideas, there was nothing in them, 
objectively (by representation) that could not - even if only as a di tant possibility -
belong to the Res Cogitans formally or, actually. The question now, naturally, is whether 
the same could be said regarding the idea of an infinite and perfect God; could this also 
proceed from Thought alone and, if not, can it proceed from anything else that is not 
God? Descartes' well known first argument for the existence of God stems from his 
emphatically denying both of these possibilities. 
With respect to the objective attributes of the idea of God, namely perfection and 
infinitude, the Meditator treats two separate claims; first, the Res Cogitans cannot be the 
cause of the idea of God and, second, nothing else other than God can potentially be the 
cause of the idea of God. Though the two fall under the same domain of the implication 
of the Causal principle they are ultimately distinct claims. The Meditator says: " ... these 
attributes are such that the more carefully I concentrate on them, the less possible it 
140 Descartes raises here two separated, yet conceptua lly connected, issues. First is with respect to the idea 
itself - what is the source or origin of the idea? Then, he questions the origin of his own existence in so 
far as he is a thinking thing that has the idea of a pe1ject and infinite being. The first question is 
essentially what is asked about ideas in general from the very on et of the Third Meditation - an 
investigation regarding the cause of our ideas in so far as they are ideas of a particular kind. Is the 
objective reality of this idea of perfection and infi nitude something that could proceed from my own 
essence as a thinking thing or must it have it's origin outside me, be it the object of the idea itself or 
some other thing? If the latter, then what is this thing? The second question attempts to examine the link 
between the cause of the idea itself and the cause of that which has the idea - the Cogito. 
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seems that they [the idea I have of them] could have originated from me alone .... So from 
what has been said it must be concluded that God necessarily exists."141 
The argument here follows a familiar line of reasoning; since there can be nothing 
in the effect (the idea) which is not formally (actually) in the cause, the cause of the idea 
of the infinite and perfect would be something that is itself infinite and perfect, in the 
strictest ontological sense. Or, to follow the tenninology of the Third Meditation even 
closer, whatever is the cause of the idea of God would formally possesses what the idea 
possesses objectively. This, as we have just seen, is not compatible with the essence of a 
thinking doubting thing. 
As we have seen, considering the possibility that thinking thing is the formal 
cause of all other ideas, Descartes had drastically expanded the possible essence of the 
Res Cogitans. Yet no matter how grand this Res Cogitans is, it could never formally 
possess what is objectively present in the idea of God; perfection, infinitude, 
completeness. The very act of learning, doubting, searching for truth, all represent some 
sort oflack, a growth, and a need - not attributes that pertain to something complete and 
whole and in need of nothing. 
Turning the discussion towards a type of self examination, the Meditator persists 
in attempting to find some reasonably possible scenario in which his essence could in fact 
contain the attributes he has ascribed to the idea of God. He has already affirmed that his 
present condition, one of utter doubt and uncertainty, are 'sure' signs of imperfection, but, 
could these perfections of God rest within him potentially and unrealized so that, as he 
develops and expands, he may come to possess them?. If this was theca e, and his 
potential were to be actualized could the idea of God not proceed from him then: 
141 CSM II 3 1. 
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But perhaps I am something greater than I myself understand, and all the 
perfections which I attribute to God are somehow in me potentially, 
though not yet emerging or actualized. For I am now experiencing a 
gradual increase in my knowledge, and I see nothing to prevent its 
increasing more and more to infinity. Further, I see no reason why I 
should not be able to use this increased knowledge to acquire all the other 
perfections of God .... if the potentiality for these perfections is already in 
me, why should not this be enough to generate the idea of such 
perfections? 142 
Descartes immediately however sees that this is clearly an impossible scenario 
and, is in fact contradictory to the nature of a perfect and divine God. An utterly perfect 
being does not arrive at a perfect state, so to speak, through some sort of growth or 
expansion; it is wholly actualized perfection. In such a being there is no growth, 
increasing and expanding to become something. We see here Descattes' own 
metaphysical stance on the immutable nature ofthe divine God; if it is perfect and 
infinite, then it is so not in virtue of any potentiality; its attributes are wholly and 
permanently actualized. With respect to his own potentialities he says" ... this is all quite 
irrelevant to the idea of God, which contains nothing that is potential. .. " 143 In a perfect, 
infinite and complete being all ontological properties, are omnipresent and actualized and 
thus nothing can pertain to it in potentiality. Such a potentiality implies a growth, a 
becoming, an evolving, all of which are signs of imperfection. On the other hand, since 
his own essence expresses this type of potential for growth it is thus not perfect and 
whole and thus consequently, according to the causal principle could not produce the idea 
of the perfect and whole. 
What does this amount to? In its immediate form the claim here merely asserts 




that the Res Cogitans itself crumot be the source of the idea of God. What about the cause 
of the idea of God being some other thing yet unknown to him? It may seem natural at 
this point ofthe text to assume that since the 'thinking I' is not the cause of God, it then 
follows that nothing else could be the cause of God. After all , the only thing the 
Meditator can cling to now with absolute certainty is the Cogito and its ideas and, thus, if 
it is not the Cogito, there is nothing else, hence naturally it must be God. This however, 
as tempting as it may be, is not the route taken by Descartes. 
The mere assertion that the 'thinking thing' is not the cause of the idea is not a 
sufficient ground to demand that nothing else could be, for even though he knows of 
nothing else, it is still logically possible that there are things - ontological entities -
whose nature and essence are yet unknown to him. It is not the very fact or premise that 
the Res Cogitans crumot cause the idea of God, which directly necessitates God as the 
sole cause of this idea but, rather, this latter assertion arises out of the same principle that 
lead to the initial conclusion, namely the causal principle 
However, the very reason why the 'thinking thing' cannot be the cause of the idea 
of God, equally applies to all other potential things 144; any other thing, be what it may, by 
virtue of containing the attributes necessary to bring about the ideas of perfection and 
infinitude is itself perfect and infinite and thus it is, formally, what we mean by the term 
God. It cannot be anything but God, since the cause of the infinite and perfect mu t be the 
infinite and perfect according the causal principle. 145 
144 The Meditator at this po int is well aware that he knows of the ex istence of nothing but Thought or 
Thinking. Therefore, in con idering other things being the cause o f the Idea of God he is merely 
speaking in the hypothetical; ifthere were non-mental things could they have the potential to be the 
cause of the idea of God.? 
145 See CSM II 34-35 
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3.6(b) The cause of the Cogito in which the idea of God exists. 
Armed with the knowledge that the idea of God can only be cau ed by God alone, 
Descartes now proceeds to look at the cau e of his own essence in so far as he is a 
thinking thing with the idea of God present to it. What Descartes is ultimately after, is 
" ... whether I my elf, who have this idea, could exist if no such being existed." 146 The 
real issue at hand here is whether it could be that God is the cause of the idea of God but 
not necessarily the cause of the 'thinking thing' in which this idea resides? Or stated more 
directly, could the two - the idea of a God and the Thinking thing that has the idea - have 
eparate and distinct causes? 
The argument here, takes us once again into Descartes' metaphy ical milieu as he 
considers the possibility that the 'thinking thing', is a causa sui, self-cau ed, depending on 
nothing but itself. 147 lf it were self caused, Descartes argues, it would be capable of 
supporting and sustaining its own existence in and through the inherent powers of his 
own essence. If it were capable ofthis then it would clearly be endowed with all the 
same perfections he ees in God, and would not be enduring such a state of doubt, desire, 
and want; again, all ign of a lack. In Descartes' metaphysics then, a thing which is its 
own cause is in fact that which is wholly complete and perfect. In this respect clearly 
only God is a 'causa ui '; he gives himself all actual perfections and i thus lacking 
nothing." . . . if [derived my existence from my elf, then I should neither doubt nor want 
nor lack anything at all; for I should have given myself all the perfections of which I have 
146 CSM II 33. 
147 Or, in the French translation, a thing is self-caused if it power to be or exist i ' independent o f every 
other thing' [Ibid] . The issue of God as ·elf-caused will become a central theme in the Fifth Meditation 
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any idea, and thus l should myself be God." 148 
He therefore at once moves to suggest that maybe he has always existed. 
Expanding on the previous metaphysics, Descartes insists that whatever is, or exists, 
requires something to preserve its being from one temporal moment to the next. Thus if 
he had always existed, in the sense of not having a cause at all, he would still need 
something to preserve his existence. Descartes' main claim from this approach is that, if 
such a power had existed in him, as part and parcel of his essence as a Thinking thing, he 
would be aware of it. 149 Since he sees no such power within him he concludes that he 
cannot preserve his own being and that he thus depends on some other being 
Descartes at once brings us back to the argument affinning that whatever is 
preserving his being is preserving the being of a thing that has the idea of God in it. It is 
here that Descartes makes the link between the cause of the idea and the cause of thinking 
in general more cohesive. With the causal principle in mind, he affirms that whatever 
would be the cause and preserver of this Thinking thing, which thinks of perfection and 
infinitude, must itselfbe a thing which possesses these properties itself; that is to say, the 
property of 'thinking' in general but also, and more specifically, the properties pertaining 
to the attributes inherent to this particular thought of and about God; perfection and 
infinitude. 150 
148 CSM II 33 . 
149 This is in accordance to Descartes' position that whatever i in Thought is such that it can be known to 
us. 
150 It could be that I am preserved and caused indirectly by something that is not explicitly God itself, and 
is thus not tl1e original cause of the thinking thing, but rather an intennediate cause. Whatever it is that 
could preserve my being may not formall y contain the properties of perfection and infinitude but only 
have them objectively in the sense that we do, but, ilie causal principle demands that we catlnot perform 
an infinite regress here - - there must be ilie original cause that formally and actually possesses these 
attributes if they are present to my tllinking. 
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According to the causal principle whatever is the original cause of the Cogito 
must itself formally possess whatever belongs to Cogito objectively (in Thought). It thus 
cannot be that the cause of the idea of God, and the cause of the thinking self which has 
the idea embedded within it, were two different things, for they both point to a cause 
which must itself be perfect and infinite of which there must be one alone. 
Taking the two proofs together Descartes concludes by stating that God, in 
creating and preserving 'thought' , places within it the ability to not only reflect upon its 
own essence, but also find within it the very idea of God itself, its creator. The Meditator 
eloquently states: " ... it is no surprise that God, in creating me, should have placed this 
idea in me to be as it were, the mark of the craftsman ... " 151 
3. 7 The Demon Hypothesis and The Idea of God 
Earlier, I looked at the Demon hypothesis as, amongst other things, a 
methodological tool allowing Descartes to hone the Meditator's approach towards a 
particular direction: the metaphysical pursuit of real concrete truth and not mere internal 
psychological certainty - a certainty based on logical self-givenness or self-evidence. The 
Meditator has already claimed to arrive at such truth when looking at the necessary 
existence of 'Thought' or 'Thinking' and has now arrived at his second concrete truth; the 
necessary existence of God. The former was claimed not to be susceptible to the powers 
of the demon deceiver and indeed neither should the latter. It is thus essential to 
understand why the possibility of a demon deceiver does not place strain on the force of 
151 CSM II 35. 
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Descartes' argument in the Third Meditation. 152 
The possibility of a Deceiving God had earlier severed the correspondence 
between the reality of things - both corporeal and mathematical - as they were given in 
mind and their external existence in reality.153 The Third Meditation itself on the other 
hand confronts this issue with respect to the powers of the intellect; the intellect is aid to 
possess potentially the power to be the sole cause and origin of all of its ideas except the 
idea ofthe infinite and perfect. Yet can a Demon God not make all this false? In what 
sense is it that God's actual existence is not subsumed or engulfed under the same 
ruthless blow struck by the ruthless deceiver? The answer to this problem also finds its 
grounding in the ever present causal principle - now examined in relation to the 
limitations of hyperbolic doubt. 
Even though the Demon's powers represent a serious hurdle for the Meditator's 
journey, we saw that it' s deceiving powers were limited to the outside non-mental world 
and not to thinking or ideas. Regardless of the Demon's power of deception, he cannot 
make it the case that I do not have a thought about this or about that when I am clearly 
thinking it. 154 Since the Meditator is firm on having a clear idea of the infinite and 
perfect, the issue here is thus not a question of the Demon Hypothesis threatening the 
152 This question not only reafftnns the main essence and function of the Demon Hypothesis but, more 
importantly, with respect to the pursuit fo r archetypes of certainty, it shows us the true distinct 
me taphysical character of the idea of God as it stands in relation to all o ther ideas. T he Meditator 
himsel f does not rai e this issue in the Third Medita tion. De cartes was so convinced that the move 
from the idea of God to his actual existence based on the causal principle was impervious to hyperbolic 
deception that he saw this venue of inquiry unfruitful. 
153 The Demon in this respect can make all things exte rnally false, even to the extent o f mathematics and 
other pure eternal truths. We recall that even though psychologically one cannot perform an act of doubt 
with respect to mathematical and other eternal truths, and therefore for us it is certa in - this only yields 
an internal epistemological certainty and not a kernel of non-mental actual truth, outside of mind. 
154 We always recall that in the Second Meditation it is in fac t this very limita tion that brings forth the 
Cogito argument. As Descartes says, as long as in my mind's eye there is present and given an idea of 
some 'X', the Demon can never bring it about that I am not thinking about this ' X' , independent of 
' X 's ' actual non-mental existence. Hence, I am always ' thinking' . 
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existence of the 'idea' of God in my mind but, rather, threatening the actual existence of 
the object of that idea- God itself- regardless of me having the idea of it. The very 
existence of our ideas is safe, at least at this point of the Meditation and thus, if the 
Demon has any say in the matter, it i with respect to external ontological being of God -
his existence per se. 
However, since the core claim ofthe Third Meditation is that knowledge of God's 
exi tence per se is arrived at from the idea of God, then we cannot claim that the Demon 
threatens God's actual existence while at the same time leaving the idea of God intact in 
our minds. We could say this, with respect to a11 other ideas; the Demon can crush any 
certainty regarding the actual ontological existence of their purported objects while 
leaving their existence as 'ideas' unscathed. This cannot however be the case with the idea 
of God. 
Ontologically, it may not be necessary for the idea of God to exist in order for 
God himself to exist, and neither is it necessary that we could on I y arrive at this 
knowledge of God via an idea of it. God does not depend on us having the idea of God, 
but, it is necessarily the case that if the idea of God exists then God necessarily exists as 
the cause of that idea. It is contrary to the conditions laid out by the Causal Principle that 
God does not exist while the idea of God exists. The idea of God, as Descartes' 
metaphysics shows, implies his necessary existence. Therefore, as long as he is aware of 
having the idea of God the possibility of some Deceiving Demon cannot undennine the 
Meditator's commitment to his proof. 155 
155 Furthermore, if we give into the force of Descartes ' use of the Causal Principle as a foundational 
principle of and about the nature of reality, we see that it can also never be said that the Demon places 
the idea of God within me. Even if the demon deludes me, l still have in my mind 's eye the concepts of 
perfection and infinitude. It would be impossible for the Demon to be the cause of this idea, for then it 
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By understanding that the very idea of God is not possible unless God formally 
and concretely existed as its cause the Meditator finds in his Thinking the first kernel of 
bridging the 'concept-object' gap, with respect to something other than self - other than 
Thought. I want to suggest that this discovery completes the first phase of the 
Meditations; grounding the Meditator's conception of certainty. In the Second Meditation 
he gained an understanding of certainty in general, and now he gains this understanding 
of certainty in relation to a world outside of the Res Cogitans. That there is a 'thinking 
thing' defined for him certainty in its most immediate pure sense, as knowledge of that 
which is ontologicaJJy actual and real. Yet the missing piece here is a broader conception 
of certainty, one that is to be, in due time, applicable to scientific knowledge; certainty 
understood as knowledge of something real other than and outside of thought. I would 
like to conclude now by elaborating on this conception of certainty. 
would be the Demon itself - according to the causal principle - that formally and actually possessed the 
properties of perfection and infmitude in which case he would not be such a malevolent deceiver but, 
rather, a divine and non-deceiving God. 
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Conclusion 
Certainty of God: The Meaning of External Certainty 
Though Descartes' initial metaphysics, even prior to the Demon hypothesis, 
pushes the Meditator away from the sensed-empirical world in his quest for certainty, the 
overall enterprise of the Meditations as a whole, in its attempt to ground science, is not 
complete until he regains the world back; until he can philosophically demonstrate that 
ideas in general - that is to say, ideas of particular things - actually do correspond to their 
purported objects. In other words, he must regain the knowledge that what he senses 
(thinks about) actually does exist, separate from mind. 
For the Meditator, the world out there does not, as it were, prove its own non-
mental existence through and by our awareness of it. Yet the scientific endeavor of the 
entire project aims to ground and justify the very understanding we have of that world not 
as a mental construct but as a separate extended ontological dimension. Thus, the second 
part of the Meditations (Fourth to Sixth) follows a path whose end goal is not only to free 
our understanding of any error with respect to our understanding of a 'suppo ed' or 
'assumed' world - a world given to thought alone - but to show that such a world is 
indeed real in the material/extended sense. Only then can radical skepticism be abolished 
completely. 
The world remains a product of thought, until we can find some other thing that 
can ground its actual existence. This includes the concrete actual existence of any 
mathematical, logical or physical principles or laws in reality. Even though these are not 
extended material corporeal particulars, the Meditator wants to view them as actual or 
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real principles of, about and in reality. The Meditator explicitly regains both of these 
worlds- the mathematical and corporeal - in the concrete sense only once he has shown 
that God is not a deceiver but rather a benevolent guarantor, asserting that the objects 
inherent within the thinking activity coiTespond to objects or things that are in fact 
external to 'thought'. Yet this argument is far beyond the scope of the Third Meditation, 
which does not offer a focused discussion on the implications and significance of God's 
veracity and benevolence as it pertains to hyperbolic deception. 
At the end of the Third Meditation we are clearly far from uch a feat. The 
Meditator at this point is ontologically certain of two things alone; the existence of 
'thinking' or 'thought' in general and the existence of a supremely perfect and infinite 
God. Simply knowing that God necessarily exists from the fact that we think of him is, 
in ufficient for the Meditator to acknowledge that anything else external to thinking 
exists, besides God. evertheless, knowledge of God's existence alone can be viewed as 
a necessary first step towards an understanding of external certainty, from a different 
perspective. 
I suggest that, prior to regaining the world back the Meditator first needs an 
archetype or paradigm of certainty upon which he can ground the understanding of what 
certainty about the external world actually entails, and this, I believe, is what the 
Meditator obtains via his knowledge of God's necessary existence. That is to say, 
knowledge of God is a nece sary condition for the comprehension or understanding of 
any ensuing certainty with respect to and, about external 'particulars ' . It is this very claim 
l would like now to further explore. 156 
156 The scholarly literature deals extensively with the different aspects of the proof of God's existence as 
well as its implications to actual knowledge of the world - that is to say, looking at God as guarantor of 
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I have argued that one of the salient features of the first three Meditations is the 
Meditator' s journey towards understanding certainty itself; that is to say, understanding 
what it means for him to be certain to begin with. The entire skeptical approach is an 
expression of the Meditator working his way, so to speak, towards a solid grasp of what 
certainty entails. By not allowing certainty to be pinned down to the epistemologically 
self-given character of mathematical and logical truths, the Meditator reveals by the end 
of the First Meditation that what he is ultimately after - in his understanding of certainty 
- is not internal immediate self-givenness but rather knowledge of that which is 
onto logically and externally real. To be certain is to have awareness of the truth of some 
pat1icular existence and, placed it in the context of the overall project here, to know that 
our ideas of things actually correspond to ontologically real, non-mental entities. 157 
In this regard, knowledge of the CogiLo does indeed offer the Meditator that first 
moment of certainty proper; giving him knowledge or awareness of a first principle of 
and about reality - the actual existence of 'thinking' or ' thought'. Yet for the overall 
scientific underpinnings of this work, the ultimate question is whether his understanding 
of certainty born from awareness of the fact that 'Thought ' exists, is in itse(j'suffi cient to 
ground his understanding of certainty with respect to anything other than the Cogito and, 
more specifically, certainty as it could apply to the empirical world in general? Does the 
awareness of this existent thing - thought - establish the meaning of certainty (in the 
understanding) as an awareness of existence or being of anything whatsoever? 
the external correspondence of my thoughts to the ir object in the world. While this of paramount 
importance, what I am suggesting here is looking at /,:now/edge of God as a necessary criterion for the 
comprehensibility of external non-mental certainty. 
157 The Meditator has come to understand what he means by certainty when the actual ontological 
existence of a thing (or principle) becomes instantiated; when he is aware that something is concretely 
and actually real - in short, when he ha transcended radical skepticism. 
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The Second Meditation establishes a very focused, honed, and contextual 
conception of certainty, one that is only applicable to understanding the existence of one 
particular thing; thought alone. Knowing that there is 'thinking' is indeed a mode of 
understanding certainty with respect to knowledge of some existent thing. Nevertheless it 
is the very ontological nature of this thing - thought alone- which limits the Meditator 
from practically comprehending the possibility of certainty with respect to the existence 
or being of anything external to or, other than this thinking; a certainty that could apply to 
the knowledge of externally existent entities which our thoughts claim to be about. 158 
The intuitive and internal character of this discovery- that thinking exists -paired 
with the ontological nature of the Cogito as thinking alone, makes the present condition 
of being certain one that can only be understood in reference to the existence of thought. 
Since the substance 'thought' is of such a radically different ontological nature from 
anything which is other to it, our awareness of its existence - in so far as this serves as an 
archetype for understanding the meaning of certainty - cannot serve as a backbone for the 
meaning of being certain about anything else. The Meditator cannot, at this point, begin 
to comprehend what external certainty means for that would imply understanding that 
something other than Thought exists or, has being. This is a luxury he cannot presently 
afford, for he is not yet aware of an ontological essence other than thought - nothing else 
has yet to be instantiated at this point of the argument. 
The ontological nature (the essence) of that which we claim to be certain of- that 
158 Again, my approach here precedes actual knowledge of the existence of the world, but rather focuses 
on the epistemological conditions necessary for such a regaining to occur. The task of eventua lly 
regaining the externa l world requires that the Meditator has an understanding of external existence to 
begin with. Otherwise his task is incomprehensible; he needs to first comprehend the concrete 
possibility of externa l (other-than-thought) ex istence before he can proceed to specific external things. 
My claim is that knowing the Cogito as a thing, precisely because it is not an ontologically separate-to-
thought thing is in itself incomplete as a grounding force for his ensuing endeavors. 
109 
which we are aware exists in reality - serves to color and shape the very characteristic of 
the condition of being certain. To be aware that something exists, is to be aware that 
something of a certain quality or character exists. Hence, knowing that thinking or 
thought exists produces an epistemological condition of certainty that is comprehensible 
with respect to whatever is ontologically parallel to thinking. That is to say the condition 
of certainty can only be extended towards an understanding of the existence of things 
whose essence is thinking or thought. Since the purported objects of his ideas are wholly 
ontologically distinct from the Cogito- he cannot extend his understanding of the 
existence of the latter to the fanner. The inward intuitive awareness ofThought is bound 
specifically and solely to the ontological nature of that particular substance - 'thought'. 
With knowledge of the existence of 'Thought' the Meditator gains knowledge of 
the possibility of actual existence, but, this knowledge is bound to the very es ence of 
that thing alone, and does not give him an adequate conception of what the possibility of 
actual external existence means as it applies to anything but Thought. Thus, as far as an 
archetype or paradigm for grounding certainty is concerned the Meditator's first 
discovery lacks the force for grounding an understanding of a broader and fuller sense of 
certainty; one which at its core yields an epistemological and psychological awareness of 
existence in general and thus of the existence of things other than thought. 
Hence by the end of the Second Meditation we are left with a dimension of 
certainty that does not have any external 'outward' character. A more comprehensive 
conception of Certainty in the understanding, one that adequately functions as an 
archetype about cetiainty in a broader sense, must stretch beyond the confines of the 
mental alone, it must possess an external and non-mental dimension. It is only through 
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the movement from Thought to God that he can understand Certainty with respect to the 
reality (or being) of things as they stand outside of and, independent from, thought. 159 It 
is upon this move alone that the mediator can have an understanding of certainty proper 
as it pertains to actual things outside of his mind. This move is first instantiated through 
his awareness of the necessary merge between the idea of God and God ' s existence. 
When the move from the object of an idea to the object itself is materialized, we 
have the first instantiation of external truth. 160 As Williams earlier noted, the truth or 
falsity of our ideas is taken to be their correspondence (or lack thereof) to that which they 
claim to be about. In this respect the idea of God is by and by the only true idea the 
Meditator can metaphysically arrive at, for it is the only thing whose existence can be 
apodictically affirmed, at least within the framework of the metaphysical method the 
Meditator chooses to employ. Only here do we see an external correspondence which 
renders an idea, actually true. 
Only through the knowledge that the idea of God necessarily implies its actual 
existence, does the Meditator become subjected to the first instantiation of something 
other than thought. This knowledge presents the Meditator with the first ontological 
movement from a thing in mind (as an object of an idea) to its actual existence in reality. 
However, this bridging of mind and external-object, offers him something much more 
159 When we look at the progression from the Second to Third Meditation, we see tha t the conditions o f 
such extemal certainty are fulfilled by establi hing the link between thinking and ex ternal non-thinking 
existence - the concrete and actual existence of something 'other' than thought, yet g iven and presented 
to and in Thought. In short, to truly understand what it means to be certain of something conceptually 
and concretely we need a particular instantiation of this move from a thing being given in thought to its 
necessary ex istence outside o f thought. 
160 We recall that knowledge of self is not born from this move from idea in mind to its correspondence. 
While some approaches, such as Williams' , o ften speak about ' the idea of the Cogito ', this is I believe a 
mistaken approach; we do not prove the existence ofThought through an idea of 'Thought' or 
'Thinking'. The move from an object of an idea to its non-idea non-mental existence only becomes 
materia lized in the Third Meditation via the idea of God. 
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than knowledge of some particular existent 'other'. It is this movement, I would like to 
suggest, which not only grounds in the understanding the very conception of external 
certainty in general but, in doing so - in allowing the Meditator to grasp externality - it 
functions as the necessary first step in regaining the world he had earlier lost to 
hyperbolic doubt. 
Being aware that something other than thinking or thought exists, serves to 
broaden his previously established grasp of certainty by opening and expanding its 
applicability to the actual objects of his knowledge; the ideas in his mind, in so far as they 
are ideas of things which are indeed taken to be other than Thought. Through this 
discovery- that the object of a particular idea in mind necessarily corresponds to that 
object proper, not as an object of an idea but an actually separate object- the Meditator 
can visualize the very meaning of a realm outside of thought. In turn, this singular 
moment of comprehending what it means to be certain of something other than the 
Cogito, establishes a general and broad archetype in the understanding about the very 
meaning of external existence. 
Since the proces of coming to know God's actual existence is the only 
philosophically justifiable instantiation of the move from idea to object, it in effect 
represents the sole moment of unshakable external truth - a truth about something other 
than thinking. As such, it is a process of intemal discovery not just about the object 
whose existence has been asserted but, more importantly, about the overall meaning and 
significance of existence outside the realm of Thought. It is this principle - that God 
exists - that (albeit indirectly) allows the Meditator to adequately grasp the meaning of 
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the 'otherness' of the objects of his ideas of anything. 16 1 
This paradigm of comprehending the very meaning of otherness is, I hold, an 
epistemologically and psychologically necessary element of his endeavor to regain the 
world. Before he has any certainty about the individual existence of specific 'particular' 
things outside of him- things his ideas claim to be about - the Meditator needs to be 
armed with a mode of understanding that can grasp external existence in general ; an 
understanding of what it means for there be an 'other-than-thought' reality. The world of 
particular things - be they corporeal extended objects or mathematical abstract entities -
cannot be concretely regained by him unless he is epistemologically equipped with the 
condition of understanding ' existence' as it relates to things outside of thought. 
It is only at the very moment in which the possibility of externality becomes 
actualized, that he becomes fully aware of an 'other'. Knowing that some particular thing 
other than himself (as pure thought) necessarily exists, the Meditator can now draw a 
general mental picture of external existence in general. Without knowledge of God's 
existence, the Meditator could not make sense of the notion of existence with respect to 
anything but 'thinking'. Furthennore, it is not merely knowledge of something external 
that allows the Meditator to grasp the meaning of externality but, rather, that this external 
object actually corresponds to the idea we have of it. 
Thus, if awareness of God' s necessary existence was derived not from the idea of 
God but from some other source, the strong sense of connection between mind and 
161 Clearly the Meditator speaks of the external existence of things earlier on, but, he can only do so in a 
very vague and, at best, symbolic manner, for both the Demon Hypothesis argument and his view o n the 
nature of ideas (that they could all proceed from him alone) have in a sense deprived him of the very 
understanding of what it means for something to be outside o f thought. The only ontological framework 
he can be familiar with i Thought and its ideas. It is only when the possibility o f moving from mind to 
world becomes actual and real that he can grasp what this correspondence of idea-object and actual-
object means. 
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externality would not be explicitly established. 162 By moving from the idea of 'X ' to 
knowledge of the necessary existence of' X ' the Meditator establishes the internal-
external correspondence necessary to makes sense of his endeavor to regain the world - a 
world which is now only in mind. 
This brings up a very important aspect of the Meditator's knowledge of God's 
existence; since the main issue at hand is the actual activity of external-correspondence, 
the specific ontological nature of God is not explicitly relevant here. The idea of God 
serves as a grounding principle for understanding external certainty not because it is an 
idea of a thing with this or that ontological character but, rather, strictly due to the fact it 
is the only idea from which we can actually step outside thought into an external realm 
through that very process of mind-object correspondence. Thus, it is the process itself -
moving out-of-thought - that grounds our understanding of general otherness and, not, 
any particular attributes or properties of the thing in question. 163 
It is the activity of knowing some other 'in general' - and not otherness with 
respect to some ontological character of the actual thing known - on which I focus here 
as the necessary condition of understanding external existence. The ontological character 
162 That is not to say that the object causing the idea of this object is exactly identical to its representation 
in the mind. With the causal principle guiding us he re, an affirmed linking of an object in thought to its 
corresponding object proper in reality does not exc lude the pos ibility that the object per se could be 
more that its representational content in mind. Nevertheless, since all we have in cognition is this 
representation, the object that refers to my idea of it formally and actually has, at the ve1y lea ·t the 
properties that are given in the mental representation. 
163 In effect, the Meditator could have obtained this from any idea, if indeed external-correspondence 
could have been proven with respect to that idea. C learly, the arguments of the T hird Meditation show 
that this is not possible. Yet my concern at the present moment is no longer with the ontological essence 
of God in tenns o f proving its existence, but rather the affec t that knowledge of its existence has on the 
Meditator's grasp of Certa inty - the effec t o f being certain of something other than thought, regardless 
of the actual nature or essence of that thing. 
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ofthe idea of God is what allowed us to move outside of mind in the first place164, but it 
is the effects of the movement itself that gives the Meditator a broad understanding of 
otherness. It is by viriue of possessing knowledge of some externally existent other-
regardless of what that other is- that the Meditator can begin to grasp certainty in a 
different light than the inward certainty of thought or thinking which he gained in the 
Second Meditation. Thus the nature or character of the object which the Meditator 
knows as existing outside his mind is not of essential imporiance when the focus is on the 
implications of this movement. His certainty about the reality and being of some ' thing' 
that is not 'thought' is in itself what grounds the notion of 'other-existence', irTespective of 
what this particular other actually is. 
Essentially, knowledge of God's existence allows the Meditator to become 
intellectually acquainted with two core principles. First, knowledge that there is one 
particular thing that actually has a being or reality outside of his mind and, second, 
knowledge of the specific essence or character of the thing in question. The former 
establishes an overall grasp of otherness while the latter gives that 'otherness' a specific 
qualitative content. I focus here on claiming that the former - otherness in general - is the 
necessary starting point for regaining the world back for two main reasons. First 
knowledge of the particular characteristics of things in the world is secondary to 
knowledge that there is indeed an 'other' to begin with. Before he carr examine the 
character of the things in the world, the Meditator must first be aware that he grasps them 
as other than thought, which is exactly where we are at this point of the Meditation. That 
is to say, he stmis with the foundational knowledge that there is an 'other-than-thought' 
164 Again by this I refer of course to its objective reality, the reality of the object of the idea as it is given 
in the idea - the infinite and perfect. 
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and, only then can he proceed to examine the characteristics of such non-thinking things. 
Second, with respect to the fonnal qualitative properties of God, they are ultimately only 
ontologically applicable to God alone and not the external world which our thinking is 
about. 
Without the grasp of otherness, the possibility of knowledge having a real and 
concrete external dimension vanishes and all knowledge remains knowledge of ideas 
alone. In so far as the Meditator is concerned with the existence and nature of the object 
of his ideas - the concrete world he senses - the grasping of 'otherness' serves as a 
precursor; it allows him to ontologically distinguish their essence, whatever it may be, 
from his own essence, thought. Regardless of what the world may actually be like, he 
can now grasp the meaning of it being other than thought. 
Nevettheless this broad understanding of 'otherness' in general is simply the 
starting point of his ensuing endeavor in the remaining Meditations. While knowing or 
grasping the meaning of otherness is a necessary condition for the Meditator's movement 
towards the world, it most cettainly is not a sufficient one. 165 Thus the Meditator's grasp 
of otherness, with respect to the nature of the world as 'other', has ultimately only 
provided him with a purely negative knowledge of the external world's essence - he 
knows that it is 'not thought' but he does not yet know anything descriptive or qualitative 
about its actual ontological essence. In short, his gain here sheds no positive light on the 
nature of the world outside him but merely allows him to understand it as ontologically 
distinct from 'thought'. 
165 Since the Meditator is far away from actually gaining that world back at this po int of the Meditation, it 
is then the necessary condition of otherness which he must first obtain in order for that journey to have 
any comprehensible meaning. It is in this sense that I view the otherness as the s tarting point - -first 
knowing the meaning of an actua l ex istence other than thought and only then expounding on its 
properties. 
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In order fully to regain the world, the Meditator will clearly need to know 
something more concrete and desctiptive about its essence then merely understanding it 
as "other". It is here that we see the second aspect of focusing on the specific nature of 
God; the ontological incompatibility between God's essence and the es ence of the 
external world. When we consider what the Meditator actually knows about God's 
essence, does this actually assist him in providing a desctiption or even a clue about the 
essence of that world in so far as its characteristic or properties are concerned? 
Stepping again outside the confines of the Meditator's realm and looking at 
Descartes' own broader views, we note within his metaphysics of substance an 
insurmountable ontological difference between the substance of God and the substance of 
the world outside of mind - extended corporeal reality. God's ontological being, as a 
substance, is radically distinct, in its qualities and attributes, from those of the external 
world Descartes wants to regain; the extended world he senses. 166 Even though the 
Meditator does not yet know what the world he wants to regain is ultimately like with 
respect to its formal reality, it is inevitably neither infinite nor perfect. These properties of 
God catmot tell the Meditator anything descriptive about the external world. At most, 
this too, only provides a negative knowledge about the general 'other' world he is after by 
affirming what its essence is not rather than telling him what it is. 
This stands in is in direct relation to the ontological nature of the Cogito. I have 
claimed that in its complete ontological difference and uniqueness from the external 
world - corporeal or mathematical - Knowledge of Thought in essence i applicable only 
166 Though the Meditator himself may not explicitly express this metaphysics of substance it neverthe less 
comes out implic itly in his discussion of ideas in general and how the idea of God drastically differs 
from all others. In terms of both objective and fonnal reality, the idea of God shares nothing in common 
with the objects of our other ideas. 
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to that particular ontological being. The same can be said of our knowledge of God, when 
taken in relation to his essence. Knowledge of God's attributes of perfection and 
infinitude present us with a substance that is also utterly distinct from both thought and 
that which is external to thought. Hence knowledge of God as 'other' is utterly di tinct 
from knowledge of the rest of the world as other. However, in its very being as an 'other' 
it lays the grounding of non-mental otherness which is necessary for us to step beyond 
the confines of the mind. Even if from an ontological-descriptive approach, God shares 
nothing in common with the external world and thus, knowledge of his existence tells us 
nothing positive about the ontological richness of that world, knowledge of God, for us, 
is nevertheless knowledge of some 'other-than-thought'. It is this awareness of God as 
'other-than-thought' that will allow us to grasp the meaning of external otherness which 
will later be applied to the world, even if that world is utterly different from God. 
Again, I point out that knowledge of God at this point of the argument doe not 
actually serve as a guarantee that my ideas of corporeal things do in fact correspond to 
their object, fonnally and actually 'out there'. At the end of the Third Meditation the 
Meditator has not gained any of his actual particular knowledge of the sensed-perceived 
world back. God as a guarantor of my knowledge is indeed an issue much discussed in 
the literature. However, this element of Descartes' discussion in the Meditations is 
completely separate from my present argument. 167 What I am presently suggesting is 
something much more subtle and less dramatic, albeit immense in significance; 
knowledge of God' s existence as the necessary condition for 'thought' being able to 
grasp the essence of the external world as something other to itself, other than thinking. 
167 Though it is, l believe, complementary to it. The issue l look at here only confronts the intemal effects 
that awareness s of God 's existence bears on the Meditator's capacity to know anything else. 
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The Meditator could only arrive at an understanding that the objects of his thought refer 
to real concrete things if they are in fact understood to be onto logically separate from 
thinking. Thus, prior to anything external actually being regained, Knowledge of God 's 
existence provides the internal mechanism which allows the Meditator to step outside his 
mind, for he now can grasp the existence of something distinct from him. 
Furthennore, knowledge of God in a sense embodies the highest degree of 
external cetiainty we can have about anything and as such all other things known to exist 
outside of us, must borrow, so to speak, from this archetype or, highest mode, of external 
certainty. That is to say, once things are proven to exist in the world, through whatever 
means he employs, the Meditator only understands his certainty that they do in fact have 
an existence eparate from him, in relation to, and on the basis of, the one primordial pure 
move from thought to concrete existence, which he has in God alone. We already know, 
even if at this point of the Meditation, that establishing the move from idea to the 
existence of the idea' s intentional object, based solely on the nature of the idea alone, can 
only be accomplished with the idea of God. No matter what proof he will later provide 
for the actual correspondence of his ' other ideas' to their purported external object, it -
the proof- will require something other than what is solely present in the ideas. That 
sense of immediate concrete connection between an idea and its object based on nothing 
but the idea itself is what gives the idea of God urgency and thus represents for Descaties 
the truest of all our ideas. 168 
168 Furthermore, when I claim here !hat knowledge of God' s existence is an internal paradigm for all 
external certainty, I do not mean in the sense that, once we have proven the exte rnal reality of our ideas 
and regained the external world back, we can be certain o f them to the same degree that we are certain 
of God's existence. The res cogitans can never have such absolute knowledge of the existence of any of 
its ideas to the degree that it knows that God exist. It is only God that we can know as necessarily 
existing, in the 'Cog ito-external sense' , and it is precisely in this respect that it s tands as the highest 
criteria of external existence. As we have seen, we could never move to the external ex istence of the 
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The movement of the first three Meditations thus expresses the pursuit for 
certainty in two facets; the archetype for certainty with respect to the possibility of 
knowledge in general, and the archetype for certainty with respect to actual concrete 
knowledge - knowledge of an external reality. The former deals with understanding 
what it means to be certain that knowledge or knowing (thinking) is possible, whereas the 
latter deals with understanding that particular elements of our knowledge are externally 
certain, that is to say, that they have a real ontological non-mental existence - an 
existence independent of thought. The former is revealed through the limitations of doubt 
and the argument for the necessary existence of thinking in general and, the latter, is 
instantiated through knowledge of God's existence. 
The internal psychological function that each one of these certainties serve are 
two complementary sides of the same coin, together laying down the very possibility of 
external scientific knowledge. Awareness that there is in reality Thought or Thinking 
grounds the possibility of external knowledge in so far as all knowledge of things begins 
with knowing or thinking them. Awareness that God exists, as an ontolog1cally real 
entity, separate and other than thought, not only allows us to see that the move from 
thinking to externality is possible but more importantly it grounds in us the very grasp of 
the 'other' as distinct from thought. 
The Meditator at this point does not know what the 'other' world is truly like or 
whether it in fact even exists. Awareness that Thinking and God exist does not actually 
contents of any of our other ideas strictly based on the nature of these ideas - that is to say, their 
attributes - and thus, it is the case that in o far as somethjng existing external to the subject is 
concerned we can never have as pure and absolute awareness of this existence as we do when we reflect 
on God 's necessary existence. Even when we consider Mathematics and other pure Eternal Truths, 
while their self-given and innate certainty may be parallel to the certainty we have of God's necessary 
existence, the Demon Hypothesis has demolished any necessary external-dimension to these truths and 
they can only be thought of as true in Mind and not beyond the scopes of the Cogito. It is existence of 
things beyond mind or thought that is at stake here. 
120 
lead him to the concrete world his thoughts are about. Rather, it grounds both the 
possibility and comprehensibility of the endeavor to begin with. The possibility rests in 
the fact that there is thinking - the foundation of knowledge- and the comprehensibility 
stems for the ability to grasp the meaning of our knowledge being directed towards things 
that are in fact distinct from it, distinct from thinking. It is thus the ensuing task of the 
remaining Meditations to move beyond the mere possibility of external empirical 
knowledge and towards knowledge of its actual and concrete existence. 
The ontology of the Meditator's world by the end of the third Meditation consists 
ofThinking and God alone. Nevertheless, it is knowledge of God's existence that 
ultimately provides him with a type of certainty that truly opens the door towards external 
knowledge. Awareness that Thinking exists grounds the possibility of knowing in general 
but it, naturally, cannot give any external character to knowledge; even though his ideas 
are of things or objects that are thought of as being distinct from thinking, the limited 
ontology here- consisting of Thought alone - prohibits the Meditator from even 
comprehending the meaning of an existence outside of thought. Certainty here can only 
pertain to an awareness of the necessary existence of Thought. 
With knowledge of God, even though the objects of his ideas still have no reality 
outside of mind, he nevertheless can comprehend the possibility that they could have 
such a reality. The Meditator, by having knowledge of the existence of an actual extemal 
thing - God - has grounded the possibility of external knowing by making it 
comprehensible to begin with. Since the possibility of moving from thought to extemality 
has become actualized in his knowledge of God, he can now move on with his pursuit to 
regain the world back, for he is now capable of comprehending the very meaning of 
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knowing something as other than thought. In so far as Descartes' main goal is finding the 
foundation for empirical sciences, what he is after is a moment of truth that can ground 
the very meaning of instantiated certainty as it applies to the contents of our knowledge. 
The discovery of the Third Meditation opens the door towards regaining the world, for 
now the Meditator is anned with such a conception of certainty made concrete; the very 
meaning of external certainty is no longer something abstract and unrealizable but, rather, 
has been fully actualized through his knowledge of God's existence. Knowledge of God's 
necessary existence has expanded the Meditator's epistemological-psychological 
condition to one that can exhibit an understanding of certainty as it pertains to the 
existence of objects or principles as things which are onto logically external to thought. 
Certainty, without this dimension, would leave the Meditator confined to an 




Descartes, Rene. The Philosophical Writings Of Descartes, 3 vols., translated by John Cottingham, Robert 
Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, volume 3 inc luding Anthony Kenny. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988 
Descartes, Rene. Oeuvres De Descartes , II vols. , edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery. Paris: 
Librairie Philosophique J . Yrin, 1983 
Descartes, Rene. A Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, translated by John Veitch. 
Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1989 
Secondary sources: 
Ariew, Roger. Descartes and the Last Scholastics. Ithaca, N .Y: Cornell University Press, 1999. 
Broughton, Janet and Jolu1 Peter Carriero. A Companion to Descartes. Blackwell o mpanions to 
Philosophy ; 38. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2008. 
Broughton, Janet. Descartes' Method of Doubt. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002 
Carriero, John Peter. Descartes and the Autonomy of the Human Under tanding. Harvard Dissertations in 
Philosophy. New York: Garland Pub., 1990. 
Chappell, Y. C. Descartes's Meditations : Critical Essays. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. 
Cottingham, John. Descartes. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998 . 
---. Reason, Will, and Sensation : Studies in Cartesian Metaphysics. Oxford; New Y rk: larendon 
Press ; Oxford University Pres , 1994. 
---. The Cambridge Companion to Descartes . Cambridge; ew York: Cambridge University Press, 
1992. 
Curley, E. M . Descartes Against the Skeptics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978. 
Doney, Willis. Eternal Truths and the Cartesian Circle: A Collection of Studies. The Philosophy of 
Descartes. New York: Garland, 1987. 
Doney, Wi ll is, comp. Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays Willis Doney. Modem tudies in 
Philosophy. London, Me lbourne: M acmillan, 1968. 
Doney, Willis andY. C. Chappell. Twenty-Fil'e Years of Descartes Scholarship, 1960- 1984: A 
Bibliography . T he Philosophy of Descarte . ew York; London: Garland, 1987. 
Frankfurt, Harry G. Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen : The Defense of Reason in Descartes's Meditations. 
I st Princeton ed. Princeton, J: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
123 
Gaukroger, Stephen. The Blac/..:welf Guide to Descartes' Meditations. Blackwell Guides to Great Works ; 2. 
Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Pub, 2006. 
Grene, Marjorie Glicksman. Descartes among the Scholastics. T he Aquinas Lecture ; 1991 . Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 1991. 
Gueroult, Martial. Descartes' Philosophy Interpreted According to the Order of Reasons. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Pre s, 1984. 
Hatfield, Gary C. Routledge Philo ·ophy Guidebook to Descartes and the Meditations. Routledge 
Philosophy Guidebooks. London; ew York: Routledge, 2003. 
Kenny, Anthony. Descartes : A Study of His Philosophy. The Philosophy of Descartes. New York: 
Garland, 1987. 
Markie, Peter J. Descartes's Gambit. Ithaca: Cornell Universi ty Press, 1986. 
Rodis-Lewis, Genevieve. Descartes. Paris: Le Livre de poche, 1984. 
Rorty, Amelie. Es ays on Descartes' Meditations. Major Thinkers Series ; 4. Berkeley: University of 
Cal ifornia Pres , 1986. 
Secada, Jorge. Carte ian Metaphysics : The Late Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy. Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Smith, Norman Kemp. New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes : Descarte as Pioneer. The Philosophy 
ofDescartes. New York: Garland, 1987. 
Sorell , Tom. Descarte ·. International Library of Critical Essays in the History of Philosophy. Aldershot, 
England; Brookfield, Yt: A hgate, 1999. 
Spinoza, Baruch, The Principles of Descartes' Philosophy. La Salle; Ill : Open Court Pub. o, 1961 
Vinci, Thomas C. Cartesian Truth. ew York; Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen. Descartes : The Project of Pure Enquiry. Atlantic Highlands, .J : 
Humanities Press, 1978. 
Wilson, Margaret Dauler. Descartes. The Arguments of the Philosophers. London; Boston: Routledge & K. 
Paul, 1978 
124 



